Second-order themes and supporting evidence
| 2nd order theme | Extracts from director interviews | Extracts from inquiry reports |
|---|---|---|
| Relational ties | Q: Could you tell us how you came to be a director of Crown? | It is clear that [BB] was considered by [JP] to be a “good friend”, and it is apparent that their association was the catalyst for [BB] to join the Crown Board |
| A: I was invited to be a director. The chairman at the time was [JP] | ||
| Q: Do you have to make any formal application or anything like that? | ||
| - NSW Inquiry report p-508 | ||
| A: No, I don't believe that I did at the time | ||
| - witness interview HM p-3826 | ||
| Conflicts of interest | I remain committed to serving the best interests of Crown and, most importantly, you - witness interview AD p-4058 | There is no doubt that the lines of reporting were blurred; risks were not properly identified; identified risks were not properly notified; conflicts or potential conflicts were not recognised; and the corporate needs of Crown were not given precedence over the corporate needs or desires of [the major shareholder] |
| - NSW Inquiry report p-446 | ||
| Lack role knowledge | Q: In terms of joining of the board, were you given any induction training or other training in respect of preparing you for the role of director of the companies? | A further rather unedifying and significant step was the one-hour online AML training for the Board introduced during latter parts of the Public Hearings. This was 13 months after the allegations were exposed in the print media, 10 months after Counsel Assisting opened the Public Hearings referring to the problems in the accounts and after months of what may reasonably be described as devastating evidence of the obvious indicia of money laundering within the accounts |
| A: Not that I recall | ||
| - witness interview BB p-3826 | ||
| - NSW Inquiry report p-347 | ||
| Poor board practices | Q: Has the board of Crown Resorts conducted any review, itself, of the circumstances which led to this corporate governance problem? | Crown's ineffectual corporate governance, in particular the failure to set risk appetite of the company with disastrous consequences in China in 2016, is the responsibility of all directors who served at the time |
| A: Not that I'm aware of - witness interview PJH p-4140 | ||
| - NSW Inquiry report p-510 | ||
| Lack of inquiry | Well, I made the presumption those obligations were being met - witness interview JA p-3496 | Crown's directors were not informed of very significant matters of which they should have been informed … |
| – NSW Inquiry report p-347 | ||
| Over confidence in management | Q: Did it occur to you at the time that in having [management] prepare an investigation report, they were, in a sense, investigating themselves? | It should be recognized that in mid-2019 the Crown Board was dealing with numerous and significant matters affecting Crown's corporate reputation …. Instead of pursuing and obtaining the explanation from [management], the Crown Board permitted [management] to prepare a report … requiring it to place implicit trust in [management] to report accurately to them on the very matters in respect of which the [regulator] had been critical of |
| A: No, it did not occur to me at the time | ||
| Q: … it didn't occur to you at the time that management may be a little self-interested in the investigation? | ||
| A: I trusted management to act in the best interests of Crown and give us an honest appraisal to the board | ||
| - NSW Inquiry report p-556 | ||
| - witness interview PJH p-4173 |
| 2nd order theme | Extracts from director interviews | Extracts from inquiry reports |
|---|---|---|
| Relational ties | Q: Could you tell us how you came to be a director of Crown? | It is clear that [BB] was considered by [JP] to be a “good friend”, and it is apparent that their association was the catalyst for [BB] to join the Crown Board |
| A: I was invited to be a director. The chairman at the time was [JP] | ||
| Q: Do you have to make any formal application or anything like that? | ||
| A: No, I don't believe that I did at the time | ||
| Conflicts of interest | I remain committed to serving the best interests of Crown and, most importantly, you - | There is no doubt that the lines of reporting were blurred; risks were not properly identified; identified risks were not properly notified; conflicts or potential conflicts were not recognised; and the corporate needs of Crown were not given precedence over the corporate needs or desires of [the major shareholder] |
| Lack role knowledge | Q: In terms of joining of the board, were you given any induction training or other training in respect of preparing you for the role of director of the companies? | A further rather unedifying and significant step was the one-hour online AML training for the Board introduced during latter parts of the Public Hearings. This was 13 months after the allegations were exposed in the print media, 10 months after Counsel Assisting opened the Public Hearings referring to the problems in the accounts and after months of what may reasonably be described as devastating evidence of the obvious indicia of money laundering within the accounts |
| A: Not that I recall | ||
| Poor board practices | Q: Has the board of Crown Resorts conducted any review, itself, of the circumstances which led to this corporate governance problem? | Crown's ineffectual corporate governance, in particular the failure to set risk appetite of the company with disastrous consequences in China in 2016, is the responsibility of all directors who served at the time |
| A: Not that I'm aware of | ||
| Lack of inquiry | Well, I made the presumption those obligations were being met | Crown's directors were not informed of very significant matters of which they should have been informed … |
| Over confidence in management | Q: Did it occur to you at the time that in having [management] prepare an investigation report, they were, in a sense, investigating themselves? | It should be recognized that in mid-2019 the Crown Board was dealing with numerous and significant matters affecting Crown's corporate reputation …. Instead of pursuing and obtaining the explanation from [management], the Crown Board permitted [management] to prepare a report … requiring it to place implicit trust in [management] to report accurately to them on the very matters in respect of which the [regulator] had been critical of |
| A: No, it did not occur to me at the time | ||
| Q: … it didn't occur to you at the time that management may be a little self-interested in the investigation? | ||
| A: I trusted management to act in the best interests of Crown and give us an honest appraisal to the board | ||
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.