Table 6 Cross-sectional analysis...

Table 6

Cross-sectional analysis

Dependent variable: ESG_i,t
Subsamples	Government intervention		CEO power		Board meeting frequency
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	3.927***	3.921***	3.934***	3.941***	3.926***	3.956***
Constant	(81.420)	(106.705)	(75.474)	(143.342)	(113.831)	(72.019)
PPI_i,t-1	0.005	0.019**	0.007	0.015**	0.015**	0.012
PPI_i,t-1	(0.463)	(2.318)	(0.692)	(2.333)	(1.982)	(0.981)
Duality_i,t-1	−0.003	−0.001	/	/	−0.001	−0.003
Duality_i,t-1	(-1.166)	(-0.670)	/	/	(-0.591)	(-1.332)
B_Size_i,t-1	−0.004	0.004	0.013**	−0.005	−0.001	0.002
B_Size_i,t-1	(-0.584)	(0.815)	(1.969)	(-1.448)	(-0.122)	(0.361)
B_Female_i,t-1	−0.004	−0.001	0.002	−0.006	−0.004	0.004
B_Female_i,t-1	(-0.502)	(-0.240)	(0.317)	(-1.309)	(-0.684)	(0.496)
B_Ind_i,t-1	0.028	0.082***	0.080***	0.039***	0.065***	0.040*
B_Ind_i,t-1	(1.460)	(4.978)	(3.934)	(2.992)	(4.263)	(1.786)
Firm_Size_i,t-1	0.017***	0.018***	0.015***	0.018***	0.018***	0.015***
Firm_Size_i,t-1	(15.581)	(21.161)	(12.059)	(30.922)	(23.270)	(11.805)
Firm_Age_i,t-1	−0.009***	−0.010***	−0.006***	−0.010***	−0.011***	−0.007***
Firm_Age_i,t-1	(-5.478)	(-9.271)	(-4.177)	(-10.837)	(-9.832)	(-4.354)
ROA_i,t-1	0.109***	0.092***	0.121***	0.083***	0.100***	0.090***
ROA_i,t-1	(6.214)	(7.170)	(7.297)	(7.034)	(8.307)	(4.795)
LEV_i,t-1	−0.051***	−0.054***	−0.044***	−0.057***	−0.053***	−0.051***
LEV_i,t-1	(-7.999)	(-10.883)	(-6.612)	(-15.230)	(-11.235)	(-7.369)
Slack_i,t-1	0.033***	0.040***	0.046***	0.034***	0.029***	0.063***
Slack_i,t-1	(2.595)	(3.817)	(3.278)	(3.560)	(2.911)	(4.419)
Exchange_i,t-1	−0.003	−0.010***	−0.010***	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.003
Exchange_i,t-1	(-1.230)	(-5.320)	(-3.946)	(-5.486)	(-4.868)	(-1.360)
Foreign_i,t-1	0.008	0.009**	0.006	0.009***	0.009**	0.008
Foreign_i,t-1	(1.470)	(2.314)	(1.302)	(2.779)	(2.431)	(1.517)
SOE_i,t-1	0.009***	0.013***	0.002	0.018***	0.012***	0.008***
SOE_i,t-1	(3.207)	(5.605)	(0.573)	(12.138)	(5.668)	(2.711)
Top1_i,t-1	−0.003	−0.000	0.008	−0.005	0.000	−0.008
Top1_i,t-1	(−0.406)	(−0.084)	(1.002)	(−1.093)	(0.019)	(−0.977)
Media_i,t-1	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002**
Media_i,t-1	(2.843)	(3.570)	(3.475)	(4.415)	(3.891)	(2.505)
Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	10,309	16,435	10,272	16,472	19,487	7,257
Adjusted R²	0.137	0.159	0.116	0.175	0.160	0.124
Coefficient comparison Test
PPI in the high versus low local government intervention (GI) subsamples: F-stat. = 50; p-value = 0.000
PPI in the high versus low CEO power (CEO_Power) subsamples: F-stat. = 47; p-value = 0.000
PPI in the high versus low board meeting frequency (B_Meet) subsamples: F-stat. = 50; p-value = 0.000

Dependent variable: ESG_i,t
Subsamples	Government intervention		CEO power		Board meeting frequency
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	3.927***	3.921***	3.934***	3.941***	3.926***	3.956***
Constant	(81.420)	(106.705)	(75.474)	(143.342)	(113.831)	(72.019)
PPI_i,t-1	0.005	0.019**	0.007	0.015**	0.015**	0.012
PPI_i,t-1	(0.463)	(2.318)	(0.692)	(2.333)	(1.982)	(0.981)
Duality_i,t-1	−0.003	−0.001	/	/	−0.001	−0.003
Duality_i,t-1	(-1.166)	(-0.670)	/	/	(-0.591)	(-1.332)
B_Size_i,t-1	−0.004	0.004	0.013**	−0.005	−0.001	0.002
B_Size_i,t-1	(-0.584)	(0.815)	(1.969)	(-1.448)	(-0.122)	(0.361)
B_Female_i,t-1	−0.004	−0.001	0.002	−0.006	−0.004	0.004
B_Female_i,t-1	(-0.502)	(-0.240)	(0.317)	(-1.309)	(-0.684)	(0.496)
B_Ind_i,t-1	0.028	0.082***	0.080***	0.039***	0.065***	0.040*
B_Ind_i,t-1	(1.460)	(4.978)	(3.934)	(2.992)	(4.263)	(1.786)
Firm_Size_i,t-1	0.017***	0.018***	0.015***	0.018***	0.018***	0.015***
Firm_Size_i,t-1	(15.581)	(21.161)	(12.059)	(30.922)	(23.270)	(11.805)
Firm_Age_i,t-1	−0.009***	−0.010***	−0.006***	−0.010***	−0.011***	−0.007***
Firm_Age_i,t-1	(-5.478)	(-9.271)	(-4.177)	(-10.837)	(-9.832)	(-4.354)
ROA_i,t-1	0.109***	0.092***	0.121***	0.083***	0.100***	0.090***
ROA_i,t-1	(6.214)	(7.170)	(7.297)	(7.034)	(8.307)	(4.795)
LEV_i,t-1	−0.051***	−0.054***	−0.044***	−0.057***	−0.053***	−0.051***
LEV_i,t-1	(-7.999)	(-10.883)	(-6.612)	(-15.230)	(-11.235)	(-7.369)
Slack_i,t-1	0.033***	0.040***	0.046***	0.034***	0.029***	0.063***
Slack_i,t-1	(2.595)	(3.817)	(3.278)	(3.560)	(2.911)	(4.419)
Exchange_i,t-1	−0.003	−0.010***	−0.010***	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.003
Exchange_i,t-1	(-1.230)	(-5.320)	(-3.946)	(-5.486)	(-4.868)	(-1.360)
Foreign_i,t-1	0.008	0.009**	0.006	0.009***	0.009**	0.008
Foreign_i,t-1	(1.470)	(2.314)	(1.302)	(2.779)	(2.431)	(1.517)
SOE_i,t-1	0.009***	0.013***	0.002	0.018***	0.012***	0.008***
SOE_i,t-1	(3.207)	(5.605)	(0.573)	(12.138)	(5.668)	(2.711)
Top1_i,t-1	−0.003	−0.000	0.008	−0.005	0.000	−0.008
Top1_i,t-1	(−0.406)	(−0.084)	(1.002)	(−1.093)	(0.019)	(−0.977)
Media_i,t-1	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002**
Media_i,t-1	(2.843)	(3.570)	(3.475)	(4.415)	(3.891)	(2.505)
Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	10,309	16,435	10,272	16,472	19,487	7,257
Adjusted R²	0.137	0.159	0.116	0.175	0.160	0.124
Coefficient comparison Test
PPI in the high versus low local government intervention (GI) subsamples: F-stat. = 50; p-value = 0.000
PPI in the high versus low CEO power (CEO_Power) subsamples: F-stat. = 47; p-value = 0.000
PPI in the high versus low board meeting frequency (B_Meet) subsamples: F-stat. = 50; p-value = 0.000

Note(s): Variables are defined in Appendix. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ^** and ^*** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively

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