Table 2 Regression results of total...

Table 2

Regression results of total accruals for the Spanish municipalities between 2016 and 2018

Variables	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	0.1317 $***$	0.1157 $***$	0.2103 $***$	0.1772 $***$	0.1653 $***$
Intercept	(0.0179)	(0.0186)	(0.0236)	(0.0171)	(0.0164)
$1 / T A_{(t - 1)}$	70,513 $^{*}$	13,213 $^{*}$	−6,878	−45,740	−64,472
$1 / T A_{(t - 1)}$	(34,432)	(26,739)	(46,824)	(45,111)	(48,457)
$Δ$ REV $(t)$ − $Δ$ REC $(t)$ /TA $(t - 1)$	0.1278 $**$	0.1287 $**$	0.1477 $**$	0.1489 $**$	0.1495 $**$
$Δ$ REV $(t)$ − $Δ$ REC $(t)$ /TA $(t - 1)$	(0.0490)	(0.0508)	(0.0642)	(0.0651)	(0.0653)
$P P E_{(t)} / T A_{(t - 1)}$	−0.1668 $***$	−0.1672 $***$	−0.1682 $***$	−0.1685 $***$	−0.1684 $***$
$P P E_{(t)} / T A_{(t - 1)}$	(0.0186)	(0.0182)	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0165)
Government variables
HI		0.0536 $**$		0.0460 $**$	0.0452 $**$
HI		(0.0212)		(0.0203)	(0.0198)
ALIGN		0.0074 $**$		0.0094 $**$	0.0095 $**$
ALIGN		(0.0030)		(0.0039)	(0.0039)
RIGHT-WING		−0.0033		−0.0023	−0.0021
RIGHT-WING		(0.0027)		(0.0036)	(0.0035)
Mayor variables
WAGE			−0.0086 $**$	−0.0068 $**$	−0.0055 $**$
WAGE			(0.0027)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)
FULLTIME			0.0176 $***$	0.0158 $***$	0.0975 $**$
FULLTIME			(0.0047)	(0.0043)	(0.0403)
FEMALE			0.0017	0.0022	0.0022
FEMALE			(0.0028)	(0.0032)	(0.0031)
WAGE*FULLTIME					−0.0078 $^{*}$
WAGE*FULLTIME					(0.0037)
$N$	3,190	3,142	2,673	2,673	2,673
$R^{2}$	0.7797	0.7839	0.8087	0.8106	0.8107
$F_{S T A T}$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No
Temporal effects	No	No	No	No	No

Variables	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	0.1317 $***$	0.1157 $***$	0.2103 $***$	0.1772 $***$	0.1653 $***$
Intercept	(0.0179)	(0.0186)	(0.0236)	(0.0171)	(0.0164)
$1 / T A_{(t - 1)}$	70,513 $^{*}$	13,213 $^{*}$	−6,878	−45,740	−64,472
$1 / T A_{(t - 1)}$	(34,432)	(26,739)	(46,824)	(45,111)	(48,457)
$Δ$ REV $(t)$ − $Δ$ REC $(t)$ /TA $(t - 1)$	0.1278 $**$	0.1287 $**$	0.1477 $**$	0.1489 $**$	0.1495 $**$
$Δ$ REV $(t)$ − $Δ$ REC $(t)$ /TA $(t - 1)$	(0.0490)	(0.0508)	(0.0642)	(0.0651)	(0.0653)
$P P E_{(t)} / T A_{(t - 1)}$	−0.1668 $***$	−0.1672 $***$	−0.1682 $***$	−0.1685 $***$	−0.1684 $***$
$P P E_{(t)} / T A_{(t - 1)}$	(0.0186)	(0.0182)	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0165)
Government variables
HI		0.0536 $**$		0.0460 $**$	0.0452 $**$
HI		(0.0212)		(0.0203)	(0.0198)
ALIGN		0.0074 $**$		0.0094 $**$	0.0095 $**$
ALIGN		(0.0030)		(0.0039)	(0.0039)
RIGHT-WING		−0.0033		−0.0023	−0.0021
RIGHT-WING		(0.0027)		(0.0036)	(0.0035)
Mayor variables
WAGE			−0.0086 $**$	−0.0068 $**$	−0.0055 $**$
WAGE			(0.0027)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)
FULLTIME			0.0176 $***$	0.0158 $***$	0.0975 $**$
FULLTIME			(0.0047)	(0.0043)	(0.0403)
FEMALE			0.0017	0.0022	0.0022
FEMALE			(0.0028)	(0.0032)	(0.0031)
WAGE*FULLTIME					−0.0078 $^{*}$
WAGE*FULLTIME					(0.0037)
$N$	3,190	3,142	2,673	2,673	2,673
$R^{2}$	0.7797	0.7839	0.8087	0.8106	0.8107
$F_{S T A T}$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No
Temporal effects	No	No	No	No	No

Note(s): Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, while $*$ ⁠, $**$ and $***$ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively

Source(s): self-devised

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