Table 10

Firm fixed effect

Discretionary Bonus (1)Discretionary Bonus (2)
Intercept0.0370.072
(0.665)(0.408)
Accounting Quality1it−0.018** 
(0.012) 
Accounting Quality2it −0.066***
 (0.004)
ROA Volatilityit−0.207−0.204
(0.246)(0.252)
Return Volatilityit0.1180.114
(0.299)(0.313)
CEO Tenureit0.003**0.003**
(0.040)(0.037)
CEO Dualityit−0.008−0.008
(0.566)(0.546)
R&D to Salesit0.0000.000
(0.769)(0.648)
B/M Ratioit0.0040.004
(0.478)(0.471)
Lossit0.0120.012
(0.321)(0.317)
Sizeit−0.001−0.001
(0.958)(0.935)
Leverageit0.0510.052
(0.176)(0.169)
Annual Returnit0.0050.005
(0.392)(0.364)
ROAit0.0090.011
(0.872)(0.855)
Year IndicatorsYesYes
Firm fixed effectYesYes
Number of observations7,5417,541
R20.0440.042

Note(s): Presented in Table 10 are the results for linear probability model controlling year and firm fixed effects using cluster-robust standard errors. The regressions are clustered by firm. In Column 1, the independent variable Accounting Quality1 is a composite measure, which is the average of standardized Big4, standardized Earning Predict CF, and the opposite of standardized Abnormal Accruals. In Column 2, Accounting Quality2 is also a composite measure, which is the average of the three ranks scaled by the number of observations: the rank in Big4, the rank in Earning Predict CF, and the rank in Abnormal Accruals (in decreasing order). The sample includes observations in which CEOs received either a discretionary bonus or a formula bonus but not both. The regressions control for year and firm fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% level, respectively. P-values in brackets are from two-tailed t-tests

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