Firm fixed effect
| Discretionary Bonus (1) | Discretionary Bonus (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 0.037 | 0.072 |
| (0.665) | (0.408) | |
| Accounting Quality1it | −0.018** | |
| (0.012) | ||
| Accounting Quality2it | −0.066*** | |
| (0.004) | ||
| ROA Volatilityit | −0.207 | −0.204 |
| (0.246) | (0.252) | |
| Return Volatilityit | 0.118 | 0.114 |
| (0.299) | (0.313) | |
| CEO Tenureit | 0.003** | 0.003** |
| (0.040) | (0.037) | |
| CEO Dualityit | −0.008 | −0.008 |
| (0.566) | (0.546) | |
| R&D to Salesit | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| (0.769) | (0.648) | |
| B/M Ratioit | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| (0.478) | (0.471) | |
| Lossit | 0.012 | 0.012 |
| (0.321) | (0.317) | |
| Sizeit | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| (0.958) | (0.935) | |
| Leverageit | 0.051 | 0.052 |
| (0.176) | (0.169) | |
| Annual Returnit | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| (0.392) | (0.364) | |
| ROAit | 0.009 | 0.011 |
| (0.872) | (0.855) | |
| Year Indicators | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes |
| Number of observations | 7,541 | 7,541 |
| R2 | 0.044 | 0.042 |
| 0.037 | 0.072 | |
| (0.665) | (0.408) | |
| −0.018** | ||
| (0.012) | ||
| −0.066*** | ||
| (0.004) | ||
| −0.207 | −0.204 | |
| (0.246) | (0.252) | |
| 0.118 | 0.114 | |
| (0.299) | (0.313) | |
| 0.003** | 0.003** | |
| (0.040) | (0.037) | |
| −0.008 | −0.008 | |
| (0.566) | (0.546) | |
| 0.000 | 0.000 | |
| (0.769) | (0.648) | |
| 0.004 | 0.004 | |
| (0.478) | (0.471) | |
| 0.012 | 0.012 | |
| (0.321) | (0.317) | |
| −0.001 | −0.001 | |
| (0.958) | (0.935) | |
| 0.051 | 0.052 | |
| (0.176) | (0.169) | |
| 0.005 | 0.005 | |
| (0.392) | (0.364) | |
| 0.009 | 0.011 | |
| (0.872) | (0.855) | |
| Year Indicators | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes |
| Number of observations | 7,541 | 7,541 |
| 0.044 | 0.042 |
Note(s): Presented in Table 10 are the results for linear probability model controlling year and firm fixed effects using cluster-robust standard errors. The regressions are clustered by firm. In Column 1, the independent variable Accounting Quality1 is a composite measure, which is the average of standardized Big4, standardized Earning Predict CF, and the opposite of standardized Abnormal Accruals. In Column 2, Accounting Quality2 is also a composite measure, which is the average of the three ranks scaled by the number of observations: the rank in Big4, the rank in Earning Predict CF, and the rank in Abnormal Accruals (in decreasing order). The sample includes observations in which CEOs received either a discretionary bonus or a formula bonus but not both. The regressions control for year and firm fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% level, respectively. P-values in brackets are from two-tailed t-tests
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