Table 6 Dynamic effects and lagged...

Table 6

Dynamic effects and lagged moderation: ESG and ROA

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$E S G_{t - 1}$	−0.0001(0.0001)		−0.0001(0.0001)	−0.0001(0.0001)
$E S G_{t - 2}$		−0.0004***(0.0001)	−0.0003***(0.0001)
$A b n F e e s_{t - 1}$				0.0005(0.0010)
$E S G_{t - 1} \times A b n F e e s_{t - 1}$				−0.0001**(0.0001)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,511	24,706	24,441	29,511
Number of Firms	4,510	4,100	4,095	4,510
R-squared	0.520	0.527	0.541	0.520

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$E S G_{t - 1}$	−0.0001(0.0001)		−0.0001(0.0001)	−0.0001(0.0001)
$E S G_{t - 2}$		−0.0004***(0.0001)	−0.0003***(0.0001)
$A b n F e e s_{t - 1}$				0.0005(0.0010)
$E S G_{t - 1} \times A b n F e e s_{t - 1}$				−0.0001**(0.0001)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,511	24,706	24,441	29,511
Number of Firms	4,510	4,100	4,095	4,510
R-squared	0.520	0.527	0.541	0.520

Note(s): This table presents the regression results for the dynamic effects of ESG (lagged by one and two years) and the lagged moderation effect of abnormal audit fees. $E S G_{t - 1}$ and $E S G_{t - 2}$ denote the one-year and two-year lagged ESG scores, respectively. Column (4) tests the interaction between one-year lagged ESG and one-year lagged abnormal audit fees. Continuous variables involved in interactions are mean-centered. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

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