Partners quality, stock price crash risk and agency costs
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NCSKEW | DUVOL | COUNT | CRASH | |
| Panel A. High agency costs | ||||
| LP_QUALITY | −0.131*** (0.044) | −0.079** (0.036) | −0.681** (0.296) | −0.168** (0.080) |
| RP_QUALITY | −0.101** (0.042) | −0.068** (0.031) | −0.312** (0.136) | −0.135* (0.077) |
| C and control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1449 | 1449 | 1449 | 1449 |
| R2 | 0.196 | 0.032 | 0.079 | |
| Adj_R2 | 0.189 | 0.023 | 0.063 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.061 | |||
| F | 11.832*** | 1.784*** | 3.521*** | |
| LR Chi2 | 154.561*** | |||
| Panel B. Low agency costs | ||||
| LP_QUALITY | −0.120* (0.069) | −0.075 (0.058) | −0.520* (0.289) | −0.123 (0.088) |
| RP_QUALITY | −0.099 (0.071) | −0.063 (0.048) | −0.306 (0.211) | −0.130 (0.096) |
| C and control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1,449 | 1,449 | 1,449 | 1,449 |
| R2 | 0.184 | 0.031 | 0.075 | |
| Adj_R2 | 0.172 | 0.021 | 0.061 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.060 | |||
| F | 11.730*** | 1.689*** | 3.430*** | |
| LR Chi2 | 149.384*** | |||
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 1449 | 1449 | 1449 | 1449 | |
| 0.196 | 0.032 | 0.079 | ||
| Adj_ | 0.189 | 0.023 | 0.063 | |
| Pseudo | 0.061 | |||
| F | 11.832 | 1.784 | 3.521 | |
| 154.561 | ||||
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 1,449 | 1,449 | 1,449 | 1,449 | |
| 0.184 | 0.031 | 0.075 | ||
| Adj_ | 0.172 | 0.021 | 0.061 | |
| Pseudo | 0.060 | |||
| F | 11.730 | 1.689 | 3.430 | |
| 149.384 | ||||
This table presents results of regressions testing whether the relationship between audit partner quality and crash risk differs across firms with high versus low agency costs. Key coefficients for LP_QUALITY and RP_QUALITY are highlighted and bolded. All regressions control for firm- and audit-specific variables, with year and industry fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficients are shown in italics for ease of reference. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
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