Regression result for high independent director’s vs low independent directors’ firms
| Variables | Low independent directors | High independent directors | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| NUM KAM | NUM KAM | WORD KAM | WORD_KAM | NUM KAM | NUM KAM | WORD KAM | WORD KAM | |
| lnProx_KM | −0.064** (0.030) | −0.050* (0.029) | −0.018 (0.028) | −0.009 (0.034) | ||||
| lnProx_Min | −0.083** (0.035) | −0.072** (0.034) | −0.024 (0.033) | −0.028 (0.040) | ||||
| Constant | −0.711 (0.847) | −0.855 (0.853) | 4.716*** (0.830) | 4.568*** (0.835) | −0.151 (0.796) | −0.202 (0.801) | 5.238*** (0.961) | 5.166*** (0.967) |
| Observation | 233 | 233 | 233 | 233 | 232 | 232 | 232 | 232 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.262 | 0.266 | 0.260 | 0.265 | 0.153 | 0.153 | 0.145 | 0.147 |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob > F | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Variables | Low independent directors | High independent directors | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| WORD_KAM | ||||||||
| lnProx_KM | −0.064 | −0.050 | −0.018 (0.028) | −0.009 (0.034) | ||||
| lnProx_Min | −0.083 | −0.072 | −0.024 (0.033) | −0.028 (0.040) | ||||
| Constant | −0.711 (0.847) | −0.855 (0.853) | 4.716 | 4.568 | −0.151 (0.796) | −0.202 (0.801) | 5.238 | 5.166 |
| Observation | 233 | 233 | 233 | 233 | 232 | 232 | 232 | 232 |
| Adjusted | 0.262 | 0.266 | 0.260 | 0.265 | 0.153 | 0.153 | 0.145 | 0.147 |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob > | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
This table reports the cross-sectional results showing the impact of auditor−client geographic proximity on KAMs disclosures between low- vs high-independent director firms. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
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