Table 1. Structural capture rubric –...

Table 1.

Structural capture rubric – operationalisation

Indicator	Operationalisation criteria	Evidence threshold
Path dependency	Provision structures future decisions to systematically advantage industry actors	Reform requires legislative amendment; delegated correction depends on institutional will
Implementation asymmetry	Implementing mechanisms privilege regulated actors while marginalising public oversight	Provider self-interpretation without pre-market external review; reactive ex-post enforcement
Contestability foreclosure	Provision forecloses public-interest reinterpretation through abstract conditions	Conditions sufficiently open-textured to sustain wide provider interpretations; no mandatory public review
Limited reversibility	Correction requires process exceeding administrative adjustment	Coordinated civil society demands rejected during trilogue; correction requires co-legislative procedure

Indicator	Operationalisation criteria	Evidence threshold
Path dependency	Provision structures future decisions to systematically advantage industry actors	Reform requires legislative amendment; delegated correction depends on institutional will
Implementation asymmetry	Implementing mechanisms privilege regulated actors while marginalising public oversight	Provider self-interpretation without pre-market external review; reactive ex-post enforcement
Contestability foreclosure	Provision forecloses public-interest reinterpretation through abstract conditions	Conditions sufficiently open-textured to sustain wide provider interpretations; no mandatory public review
Limited reversibility	Correction requires process exceeding administrative adjustment	Coordinated civil society demands rejected during trilogue; correction requires co-legislative procedure

Note(s):

On application; each indicator is treated as satisfied when both elements of its evidence threshold are documented in the provision under analysis. Path dependency requires that reform exceed delegated administrative correction and that any delegated corrective authority depend on institutional will not yet demonstrated. Implementation asymmetry requires the absence of mandatory pre-market external review together with reactive ex-post enforcement. Contestability foreclosure requires conditions sufficiently abstract to sustain wide provider interpretations together with absence of a mandatory public-interest review mechanism. Limited reversibility requires that coordinated public-interest demands have been raised and rejected during the legislative process and that correction depend on co-legislative procedure. The rubric is interpretive rather than scoring-based: the threshold is whether the documentary record supports both elements at sufficient depth to distinguish embedded asymmetry from incidental alignment

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable