ESG and profitability conditional on earnings volatility
| (1) Baseline ROA | (2) ROA + vol control | (3) ROE + vol control | |
|---|---|---|---|
| E score (t−1) | 0.0036** | 0.0035** | 0.0101** |
| S score (t−1) | −0.0059*** | −0.0057*** | −0.0120** |
| G score (t−1) | 0.0033 | 0.0029 | 0.0039 |
| ROA_vol3_lag | −0.1640 | 0.0097 | |
| Ln(Assets) | −0.0118* | −0.0160* | −0.0389* |
| Board size | −0.0007 | −0.0011 | −0.0039 |
| State ownership | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 |
| Foreign ownership | 0.0006** | 0.0007** | 0.0015** |
| Board independence | 0.0200** | 0.0173* | 0.0232 |
| Observations | 647 | 585 | 585 |
| Firms | 62 | 62 | 62 |
| R2 (within) | 0.0807 | 0.0963 | 0.0686 |
| Firm and Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| (1) Baseline ROA | (2) ROA + vol control | (3) ROE + vol control | |
|---|---|---|---|
| E score (t−1) | 0.0036** | 0.0035** | 0.0101** |
| S score (t−1) | −0.0059*** | −0.0057*** | −0.0120** |
| G score (t−1) | 0.0033 | 0.0029 | 0.0039 |
| ROA_vol3_lag | −0.1640 | 0.0097 | |
| Ln(Assets) | −0.0118* | −0.0160* | −0.0389* |
| Board size | −0.0007 | −0.0011 | −0.0039 |
| State ownership | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 |
| Foreign ownership | 0.0006** | 0.0007** | 0.0015** |
| Board independence | 0.0200** | 0.0173* | 0.0232 |
| Observations | 647 | 585 | 585 |
| Firms | 62 | 62 | 62 |
| 0.0807 | 0.0963 | 0.0686 | |
| Firm and Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Note(s): ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 replicates the baseline profitability specification from the companion paper. Columns 2 and 3 add ROA_vol3_lag as a control variable to test whether ESG predicts profitability beyond its effect on earnings risk. The minimal attenuation of ESG coefficients (2.8 per cent for E, 3.4 per cent for S) indicates that the profitability and risk channels operate largely independently
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