Activities and facts of the stakeholder P10 (Data set for the CLD model)
| Time (month) | Empirical observation | Conceptual anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Project kick-off: P10 (UK small consultancy) and P11 (Italian public university) hold the highest budget shares. P10 is highly dependent on the project for survival, whereas P11 combines institutional legitimacy with financial control | Power asymmetry emerges from budget allocation versus organisational scale: P10's survival dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) contrasts with P11's institutional legitimacy and financial authority (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) |
| 10 | Currency fluctuations reduce P10's budget by 25%, generating dissatisfaction | Dissatisfaction arises when expected and realised outcomes diverge, motivating corrective actions (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Huxham and Vangen, 2005) |
| 11 | P10 communicates the issue to partners informally, proposing budget redistribution | Dissatisfaction triggers influence actions (lobbying, coalition building) to realign resources (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Mitchell et al., 1997). P10 uses soft influence via sensemaking and informal framing to legitimise claims (Weick, 1995; Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Suchman, 1995) |
| 12 | P10 explores partners' positions, mediates expectations, and formalises a redistribution request to the Steering Board | Collaborative governance and participatory decision-making are applied through informal consultations and formal proposals (Bryson, 2018; Vangen and Huxham, 2013). Proximity (physical/relational) shapes acceptance of solutions (Driscoll and Starik, 2004; Mitchell et al., 1997; Rajablu and Wan Fadzilah, 2015) |
| 13 | Steering Board rejects redistribution due to contractual and EU rules; P10's dissatisfaction escalates into urgency | Regulatory constraints enforce limits, while rising urgency drives strategic influence and adaptive governance (Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Bryson, 2018; Aaltonen and Sivonen, 2009; Mitchell et al., 1997) |
| 14 | P10 targets P11 based on low proximity, high budget, and low interest to recover resources | Stakeholder prioritisation, power mapping, and tactical decision-making in collaborative governance (Bryson, 2018; Vangen and Huxham, 2013) |
| 15–18 | P10 identifies legal-technical non-compliance in P11's deliverables and escalates it formally | Institutionalising claims amplifies accountability and influence, triggering escalation (Sterman, 2000; Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Glasl, 1999; Aaltonen and Sivonen, 2009; Eskerod and Huemann, 2014) |
| 19 | P10's discursive actions reduce P11's credibility and raise P10's legitimacy; lobbying intensifies | Escalation and credibility leverage are strategic influence actions shaping perceptions, power, and legitimacy (Hardy, 1996; Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Bryson, 2018) |
| 20 | Increased networking and proximity allow P10 to form a coalition, reinforced by P11's resistance | Coalition-building is facilitated by relational dynamics and stakeholder influence within collaborative networks (Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Bryson, 2018) |
| 24 | P10 shares issues with all partners, gaining collective legitimacy for formal action against P11 | Legitimacy-building and collective endorsement enable formalised corrective measures (Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Bryson, 2018) |
| 25 | Coordinator proposes a compromise; P11 radicalises opposition; P10 formalises a complaint | Conflict escalation, stakeholder polarisation, and institutionalised issue management shape partner behaviours (Sterman, 2000; Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Hendry, 2005) |
| 26 | Extraordinary Steering Board suspends P11; P11 is isolated from communications and deliverables | Asymmetric power dynamics and stakeholder exclusion affect legitimacy, participation, and governance (Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Bryson, 2018) |
| 27 | P11 initiates official actions to protect its position | Escalation and defencive behaviour by stakeholders under conflict conditions (Vangen and Huxham, 2013) |
| 29 | P10 coalition raises the dispute to the EU level; legal threats emerge | Escalation to higher institutional levels exerts pressure and activates governance hierarchies (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Vangen and Huxham, 2013; Bovens, 2007) |
| 30 | EU intervenes, suspends the project, and reallocates P10's activities and budget to other partners | Institutional authority and legitimacy resolve disputes through governance interventions and resource redistribution in multi-stakeholder networks (Bovens, 2007) |
| Time (month) | Empirical observation | Conceptual anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Project kick-off: P10 (UK small consultancy) and P11 (Italian public university) hold the highest budget shares. P10 is highly dependent on the project for survival, whereas P11 combines institutional legitimacy with financial control | Power asymmetry emerges from budget allocation versus organisational scale: P10's survival dependence ( |
| 10 | Currency fluctuations reduce P10's budget by 25%, generating dissatisfaction | Dissatisfaction arises when expected and realised outcomes diverge, motivating corrective actions ( |
| 11 | P10 communicates the issue to partners informally, proposing budget redistribution | Dissatisfaction triggers influence actions (lobbying, coalition building) to realign resources ( |
| 12 | P10 explores partners' positions, mediates expectations, and formalises a redistribution request to the Steering Board | Collaborative governance and participatory decision-making are applied through informal consultations and formal proposals ( |
| 13 | Steering Board rejects redistribution due to contractual and EU rules; P10's dissatisfaction escalates into urgency | Regulatory constraints enforce limits, while rising urgency drives strategic influence and adaptive governance ( |
| 14 | P10 targets P11 based on low proximity, high budget, and low interest to recover resources | Stakeholder prioritisation, power mapping, and tactical decision-making in collaborative governance ( |
| 15–18 | P10 identifies legal-technical non-compliance in P11's deliverables and escalates it formally | Institutionalising claims amplifies accountability and influence, triggering escalation ( |
| 19 | P10's discursive actions reduce P11's credibility and raise P10's legitimacy; lobbying intensifies | Escalation and credibility leverage are strategic influence actions shaping perceptions, power, and legitimacy ( |
| 20 | Increased networking and proximity allow P10 to form a coalition, reinforced by P11's resistance | Coalition-building is facilitated by relational dynamics and stakeholder influence within collaborative networks ( |
| 24 | P10 shares issues with all partners, gaining collective legitimacy for formal action against P11 | Legitimacy-building and collective endorsement enable formalised corrective measures ( |
| 25 | Coordinator proposes a compromise; P11 radicalises opposition; P10 formalises a complaint | Conflict escalation, stakeholder polarisation, and institutionalised issue management shape partner behaviours ( |
| 26 | Extraordinary Steering Board suspends P11; P11 is isolated from communications and deliverables | Asymmetric power dynamics and stakeholder exclusion affect legitimacy, participation, and governance ( |
| 27 | P11 initiates official actions to protect its position | Escalation and defencive behaviour by stakeholders under conflict conditions ( |
| 29 | P10 coalition raises the dispute to the EU level; legal threats emerge | Escalation to higher institutional levels exerts pressure and activates governance hierarchies ( |
| 30 | EU intervenes, suspends the project, and reallocates P10's activities and budget to other partners | Institutional authority and legitimacy resolve disputes through governance interventions and resource redistribution in multi-stakeholder networks ( |
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