Table A3

Reporting architecture: typical evidence and common gaps (with references)

AreaWhat credible disclosure looks likeCommon gap noted in practice
Cyber–KM artifactsNamed playbooks, threat models, and lessons-learned repositories referenced with dates or versionsGeneric statements about “awareness” without identifiable artifacts (Alsehrawy et al., 2022; Uden and He, 2017)
Learning loopsDescriptions of after-action reviews, cross-functional exercises, and how outputs changed proceduresAbsence of a traceable link between incident learning and operational changes (Bebbington et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2018)
Reuse/coverage measuresSimple indicators such as adoption rates, training coverage, near-miss capture or audit findingsNo metrics to judge whether knowledge was actually used beyond the originating team
DT–environment linkageConcrete DT use cases (for example, arrival scheduling or berth optimization) tied to emissions-relevant decisionsHigh-level claims about “efficiency” without an operational pathway to GHG outcomes (de Vicente-Lama et al., 2023; Di Vaio et al., 2025a, 2025b, 2025c; Homayouni et al., 2025; Notteboom et al., 2022)

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