Table 5

The role of the CSR committee in shareholder- versus stakeholder-oriented countries

Shareholders-oriented countriesStakeholders-oriented countries
Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
Panel A: Results with ROA
CSR0.002  −0.008  
(0.068)  (−0.972)  
CSR×CSR_COM0.073***  0.001  
(2.859)  (0.088)  
ENV −0.028**  −0.005 
 (−2.007)  (−1.297) 
ENV×CSR_COM 0.059***  −0.004 
 (4.287)  (−0.744) 
SOC  0.001  −0.010**
  (0.081)  (−2.123)
SOC×CSR_COM  0.049***  0.003
  (3.179)  (0.564)
CSR_COM−0.041***−0.031***−0.031***−0.0010.002−0.002
(−3.011)(−3.424)(−3.054)(−0.216)(0.602)(−0.475)
Constant−0.369***−0.361***−0.358***−0.114−0.113−0.117
(−3.178)(−3.155)(−3.102)(−1.154)(−1.142)(−1.179)
Control includedYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year FEYesYesYesYesYesYes
Firm FEYesYesYesYesYesYes
Observations5,2975,2975,2976,9816,9816,981
Adjusted-R20.5450.5460.5460.6240.6240.624
Panel B: Results with ROE
CSR−0.022*  0.074***  
(−1.653)  (2.687)  
CSR×CSR_COM0.039**  0.099**  
(2.165)  (2.464)  
ENV −0.015**  −0.034** 
 (−2.179)  (−2.039) 
ENV×CSR_COM 0.013  0.084*** 
 (1.254)  (3.603) 
SOC  −0.016**  0.030*
  (−2.079)  (1.894)
SOC×CSR_COM  0.031***  0.049**
  (3.073)  (2.107)
CSR_COM−0.017*−0.003−0.014**−0.079***−0.057***−0.052***
(−1.900)(−0.469)(−2.477)(−3.641)(−4.035)(−3.659)
Constant0.0020.0020.0020.003**0.003**0.003*
(1.113)(1.128)(1.139)(2.209)(2.155)(1.946)
Year FEYesYesYesYesYesYes
Firm FEYesYesYesYesYesYes
Observations5,2805,2805,2806,9806,9806,980
Adjusted-R20.4720.4720.4720.4200.4200.419

Note(s): This table reports the moderating effect of the CSR committee on the CSR–FP nexus across stakeholder- and shareholder-oriented countries. We place countries in the stakeholder-oriented (shareholder-oriented) sample if their legal systems are common law. The independent variable is CSR, measured by a firm's CSR score and its two individual components, namely, environmental and social scores. The moderating variable is a firm's CSR committee, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a CSR committee and 0 otherwise. We also control for firm-level financial and governance variables, namely, leverage, size, sales growth, R&D, board size, board independence, institutional quality (IQ) and gross domestic product (GDP) growth. We estimate the models using OLS regression with year and industry fixed effects. Moreover, standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using firm-level clustering. t-statistics is reported in the parentheses, whereas the *, ** and *** portray statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

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