Table 2 In what ways did FBC function as... | Emerald Publishing

Table 2

In what ways did FBC function as a conceptual alignment of PA? A comparative assessment

FBC initiative	Alignment with PA principles
Ways NASA's FBC used performance-auditing logics
1. Emphasis on economy and efficiency as primary evaluative criteria	FBC emphasised cost reduction and schedule compression – key elements of public administration's “3 Es”, reflecting a focus on resource efficiency and doing “more with less” (Lonsdale et al., 2011; Garber, 2002; McCurdy, 2001)
2. Use of performance framing to justify managerial reform	FBC was framed as a response to fiscal constraints and rising expectations, aligning resource use with performance outcomes and positioning it as a performance-enhancing innovation rather than just cost cutting (Power, 1997)
3. Portfolio-level assessment of “success per dollar”	NASA increasingly assessed missions by overall portfolio value rather than individual success, aligning with public administration's focus on performance relative to resource use (Paxton, 2007; Parker et al., 2021)
4. Internal monitoring and post-mission reviews	NASA's internal post-1999 reviews of FBC missions assessed cost, schedule, risk and outcomes, functioning as performance evaluations that identified systemic weaknesses and improvement opportunities (NASA OIG, 2000)
5. Managerial alignment with PA's emphasis on strategic resource allocation	FBC required managers to explicitly balance scope, risk and cost, promoting transparent alignment of decisions with strategic objectives (Lonsdale et al., 2011)
6. Contribution to organisational resilience through PA-like learning loops	Partial PA logics – such as performance framing, cost–risk analysis and post-mission evaluation – supported learning and adaptation after failures, strengthening resilience in high-risk environments (Boin and Lodge, 2016; Hollnagel et al., 2006; Rana and Parker, 2023)
Ways NASA's FBC did not use performance-auditing logics
1. Lack of independence and external scrutiny	A key PA principle is independence from the entity being assessed, but FBC relied largely on internal evaluations, lacking external scrutiny (Power, 1997; NASA OIG, 2000)
2. Absence of effectiveness-oriented evaluation	While FBC emphasised economy and efficiency, it often overlooked effectiveness, with missions assessed mainly on cost and schedule rather than achievement of objectives (Ward, 2010; McCurdy, 2001)
3. No formalised audit framework or codified criteria	NASA did not formally define FBC or establish clear metrics, benchmarks or audit protocols, conflicting with PA's emphasis on explicit evaluative criteria (NASA OIG, 2000; Lonsdale et al., 2011)
4. Limited documentation and traceability	FBC's rapid cycles reduced documentation, limiting auditability and weakening transparent evidence trails, contributing to knowledge gaps after failures (Power, 2000; NASA OIG, 2001)
5. Weak integration with strategic management systems	NASA OIG (2000) found that FBC goals were not integrated into strategic planning or performance systems, limiting monitoring and comparison with non-FBC missions
6. Insufficient risk-tracking and verification processes	Failures like the MCO and MPL exposed weaknesses in systems engineering and risk auditing, as FBC lacked the consistent, systematic monitoring required in PA frameworks (NASA OIG, 2001; Rana et al., 2022; NASA, 1999; 2000b)

FBC initiative	Alignment with PA principles
Ways NASA's FBC used performance-auditing logics
1. Emphasis on economy and efficiency as primary evaluative criteria	FBC emphasised cost reduction and schedule compression – key elements of public administration's “3 Es”, reflecting a focus on resource efficiency and doing “more with less” (Lonsdale et al., 2011; Garber, 2002; McCurdy, 2001)
2. Use of performance framing to justify managerial reform	FBC was framed as a response to fiscal constraints and rising expectations, aligning resource use with performance outcomes and positioning it as a performance-enhancing innovation rather than just cost cutting (Power, 1997)
3. Portfolio-level assessment of “success per dollar”	NASA increasingly assessed missions by overall portfolio value rather than individual success, aligning with public administration's focus on performance relative to resource use (Paxton, 2007; Parker et al., 2021)
4. Internal monitoring and post-mission reviews	NASA's internal post-1999 reviews of FBC missions assessed cost, schedule, risk and outcomes, functioning as performance evaluations that identified systemic weaknesses and improvement opportunities (NASA OIG, 2000)
5. Managerial alignment with PA's emphasis on strategic resource allocation	FBC required managers to explicitly balance scope, risk and cost, promoting transparent alignment of decisions with strategic objectives (Lonsdale et al., 2011)
6. Contribution to organisational resilience through PA-like learning loops	Partial PA logics – such as performance framing, cost–risk analysis and post-mission evaluation – supported learning and adaptation after failures, strengthening resilience in high-risk environments (Boin and Lodge, 2016; Hollnagel et al., 2006; Rana and Parker, 2023)
Ways NASA's FBC did not use performance-auditing logics
1. Lack of independence and external scrutiny	A key PA principle is independence from the entity being assessed, but FBC relied largely on internal evaluations, lacking external scrutiny (Power, 1997; NASA OIG, 2000)
2. Absence of effectiveness-oriented evaluation	While FBC emphasised economy and efficiency, it often overlooked effectiveness, with missions assessed mainly on cost and schedule rather than achievement of objectives (Ward, 2010; McCurdy, 2001)
3. No formalised audit framework or codified criteria	NASA did not formally define FBC or establish clear metrics, benchmarks or audit protocols, conflicting with PA's emphasis on explicit evaluative criteria (NASA OIG, 2000; Lonsdale et al., 2011)
4. Limited documentation and traceability	FBC's rapid cycles reduced documentation, limiting auditability and weakening transparent evidence trails, contributing to knowledge gaps after failures (Power, 2000; NASA OIG, 2001)
5. Weak integration with strategic management systems	NASA OIG (2000) found that FBC goals were not integrated into strategic planning or performance systems, limiting monitoring and comparison with non-FBC missions
6. Insufficient risk-tracking and verification processes	Failures like the MCO and MPL exposed weaknesses in systems engineering and risk auditing, as FBC lacked the consistent, systematic monitoring required in PA frameworks (NASA OIG, 2001; Rana et al., 2022; NASA, 1999; 2000b)

Source(s): Authors' own work