Table A2 Alignment of FBC initiatives... | Emerald Publishing

Table A2

Alignment of FBC initiatives with the “three Es”

FBC initiative	Focus of PA
FBC initiative	Economy – ensuring resources are acquired at the lowest possible cost without compromising quality	Efficiency – evaluating how well resources are used to maximise output	Effectiveness – measuring the extent to which objectives and intended outcomes are achieved
Smaller, Low-Cost Missions	NASA shifted towards smaller, cheaper spacecraft that could be built faster; for instance, the Mars Pathfinder mission used a much smaller team than earlier efforts but still successfully landed the Sojourner rover on Mars in 1997 (McCurdy, 2001)	Compared to the flagship Cassini spacecraft, the 1996 Mars Global Surveyor embodied the FBC approach – built in under three years, at just 20% of Cassini's mass, and costing $220M versus $2B (Squibb et al., 2000)
Simplified Mission Designs	FBC missions streamlined design to cut cost and complexity; for example, the NEAR mission was built in 27 months for $122M (down from $200M) and still successfully orbited and landed on asteroid Eros (Ward, 2012)		Hubble servicing missions in the 1990s highlighted lessons for future efforts, including the need for simple tool designs to improve extravehicular mission success (Werneth, 2001)
Use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology	NASA used commercial off-the-shelf technology to reduce costs; for example, the 1998 Deep Space 1 mission employed COTS components, including a cost-effective ion propulsion system (Ward, 2012)	NASA standardised requirements for COTS hardware so sensors and modems could be reused across Mars missions, improving development efficiency (Delaney, 1997)
Rapid Development Cycles		NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5. A recognised FBC's shift to shorter development cycles and expansion into tech programs, but an OIG audit found clearer implementation guidance was needed; notably, 16 FBC missions were completed in seven years versus 15 years for Cassini (NASA OIG, 2001; Frank, 2019)	Shorter timelines reduced delays and costs; missions like Stardust (1999) met tight deadlines while achieving their scientific goals (Frank, 2019)
Risk-Tolerant Approach	The Deep Space 1 team faced the challenge of developing and operating high-risk technologies on a tight schedule and low budget while balancing a “take risks but don't fail” philosophy (Lehman et al., 2000)		NASA accepted higher risk levels, treating failures as learning opportunities; losses like MCO and MPL in 1999 informed improved mission designs (Ward, 2012)
Multiple Missions Instead of One		The Discovery program reduced bureaucracy by having Congress approve overall selection rules, enabling NASA to initiate missions without repeated approval; four missions launched between February 1996 and February 1999 (Callahan, 2014; Frank, 2019)	Rather than relying on a single high-stakes mission, NASA launched multiple smaller missions to boost overall success and pursue diverse goals; for instance, Deep Space 1 (1998) tested propulsion technology, while Stardust (1999) collected comet samples, contributing to four successful Discovery missions in the late 1990s (McCurdy, 2001; Frank, 2019)
Decentralised Decision-Making		NASA empowered small teams and project managers to make rapid decisions with minimal bureaucracy; for example, JPL's autonomy on Mars Pathfinder (1997) enabled quick problem-solving, contrasting with NASA's earlier centralised, military-style approach (Hamaker, 1999)	In a 2000 Senate hearing, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin cautioned against rigid, one-size-fits-all approaches that stifle ingenuity, while the Discovery program's success was partly attributed to decentralised PI-led management giving investigators full mission control (U.S. Senate, 2000; Issac, 1997)
Lean Management Practices	Advances in microtechnology reduced spacecraft mass, enabling smaller, cheaper launches and cutting costs given launch prices of $10,000–$32,000 per kg (McCurdy, 2001; Jones, 2015)	NASA streamlined workflows to boost efficiency; Mars Pathfinder (1997) was built in three years using parallel development and lean management, enabling rapid decisions with a small team, and required far less documentation than Cassini (3 vs 36 cm) (Frank, 2019; Taylor, 2007)
Flexible Contracting	NASA partnered with industry and academia to tap external expertise and cut costs, using flexible procurement and off-the-shelf technology to speed development (Dumas and Walton, 2000)
Failure-Tolerant Culture			NASA defended its FY2002 plan against GAO criticism by citing NPG 7120.5's FBC approach, emphasising mission success through prudent risk acceptance; despite 1999 failures, FBC missions achieved higher scientific output per dollar than many past programs (GAO, 2001; Dillon and Madsen, 2001)
Cross-Disciplinary Collaboration	Cross-functional collaboration among engineers, scientists and planners optimised designs and reduced redundancy; FBC's use of small, modular satellites lowered costs, sped development and increased mission frequency (Casler, 2014)

FBC initiative	Focus of PA
FBC initiative	Economy – ensuring resources are acquired at the lowest possible cost without compromising quality	Efficiency – evaluating how well resources are used to maximise output	Effectiveness – measuring the extent to which objectives and intended outcomes are achieved
Smaller, Low-Cost Missions	NASA shifted towards smaller, cheaper spacecraft that could be built faster; for instance, the Mars Pathfinder mission used a much smaller team than earlier efforts but still successfully landed the Sojourner rover on Mars in 1997 (McCurdy, 2001)	Compared to the flagship Cassini spacecraft, the 1996 Mars Global Surveyor embodied the FBC approach – built in under three years, at just 20% of Cassini's mass, and costing $220M versus $2B (Squibb et al., 2000)
Simplified Mission Designs	FBC missions streamlined design to cut cost and complexity; for example, the NEAR mission was built in 27 months for $122M (down from $200M) and still successfully orbited and landed on asteroid Eros (Ward, 2012)		Hubble servicing missions in the 1990s highlighted lessons for future efforts, including the need for simple tool designs to improve extravehicular mission success (Werneth, 2001)
Use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology	NASA used commercial off-the-shelf technology to reduce costs; for example, the 1998 Deep Space 1 mission employed COTS components, including a cost-effective ion propulsion system (Ward, 2012)	NASA standardised requirements for COTS hardware so sensors and modems could be reused across Mars missions, improving development efficiency (Delaney, 1997)
Rapid Development Cycles		NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5. A recognised FBC's shift to shorter development cycles and expansion into tech programs, but an OIG audit found clearer implementation guidance was needed; notably, 16 FBC missions were completed in seven years versus 15 years for Cassini (NASA OIG, 2001; Frank, 2019)	Shorter timelines reduced delays and costs; missions like Stardust (1999) met tight deadlines while achieving their scientific goals (Frank, 2019)
Risk-Tolerant Approach	The Deep Space 1 team faced the challenge of developing and operating high-risk technologies on a tight schedule and low budget while balancing a “take risks but don't fail” philosophy (Lehman et al., 2000)		NASA accepted higher risk levels, treating failures as learning opportunities; losses like MCO and MPL in 1999 informed improved mission designs (Ward, 2012)
Multiple Missions Instead of One		The Discovery program reduced bureaucracy by having Congress approve overall selection rules, enabling NASA to initiate missions without repeated approval; four missions launched between February 1996 and February 1999 (Callahan, 2014; Frank, 2019)	Rather than relying on a single high-stakes mission, NASA launched multiple smaller missions to boost overall success and pursue diverse goals; for instance, Deep Space 1 (1998) tested propulsion technology, while Stardust (1999) collected comet samples, contributing to four successful Discovery missions in the late 1990s (McCurdy, 2001; Frank, 2019)
Decentralised Decision-Making		NASA empowered small teams and project managers to make rapid decisions with minimal bureaucracy; for example, JPL's autonomy on Mars Pathfinder (1997) enabled quick problem-solving, contrasting with NASA's earlier centralised, military-style approach (Hamaker, 1999)	In a 2000 Senate hearing, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin cautioned against rigid, one-size-fits-all approaches that stifle ingenuity, while the Discovery program's success was partly attributed to decentralised PI-led management giving investigators full mission control (U.S. Senate, 2000; Issac, 1997)
Lean Management Practices	Advances in microtechnology reduced spacecraft mass, enabling smaller, cheaper launches and cutting costs given launch prices of $10,000–$32,000 per kg (McCurdy, 2001; Jones, 2015)	NASA streamlined workflows to boost efficiency; Mars Pathfinder (1997) was built in three years using parallel development and lean management, enabling rapid decisions with a small team, and required far less documentation than Cassini (3 vs 36 cm) (Frank, 2019; Taylor, 2007)
Flexible Contracting	NASA partnered with industry and academia to tap external expertise and cut costs, using flexible procurement and off-the-shelf technology to speed development (Dumas and Walton, 2000)
Failure-Tolerant Culture			NASA defended its FY2002 plan against GAO criticism by citing NPG 7120.5's FBC approach, emphasising mission success through prudent risk acceptance; despite 1999 failures, FBC missions achieved higher scientific output per dollar than many past programs (GAO, 2001; Dillon and Madsen, 2001)
Cross-Disciplinary Collaboration	Cross-functional collaboration among engineers, scientists and planners optimised designs and reduced redundancy; FBC's use of small, modular satellites lowered costs, sped development and increased mission frequency (Casler, 2014)