Characteristics of included studies in this systematic review
| Author and year | Research design | Key findings and relevance for RQ |
|---|---|---|
| Ahari et al., 2022 | Mixed-method policy analysis | Shows that around Russia’s 24 Feb 2022 invasion, RUB–crypto trading and Bitcoin volumes briefly spiked before normalizing; attributes this mainly to individual wealth protection and small-scale transfers, noting that overall market liquidity remains far too limited to sustain large-scale sanctions evasion |
| Clautice (2019) | Qualitative policy, case-based analysis | Sanctioned states use cryptocurrency primarily to evade restrictions on access to international finance and to generate foreign exchange. Highlights North Korea’s state-sponsored crypto thefts and the emergence of state-backed coins (e.g. Iran’s PayMon, Venezuela’s Petro). Identifies regulatory lag in Office of Foreign Assets Control/FinCEN frameworks and the decentralized affordances of crypto as key enablers of evasion |
| Cozzi (2020) | Qualitative legal and policy analysis | Argues that blockchain can both aid and hinder sanctions enforcement: pseudonymity enables evasion, but transparency and automation could enhance compliance. Highlights how technological affordances shape both evasion and enforcement dynamics in sanctions governance |
| Fantacci and Gobbi (2021) | Qualitative policy analysis | Argues that stablecoins and CBDCs can be used to bypass US sanctions by creating alternative payment networks outside SWIFT. Links this to broader challenges to US monetary hegemony and sanctions enforcement. Shows how technological innovation enables states to evade sanctions and weaken US control over global payments |
| Kirkpatrick et al., 2019 | Qualitative legal and policy analysis | Examines how Iran, Russia and Venezuela explore cryptocurrencies to bypass SWIFT and US sanctions. Notes OFAC’s position that crypto transactions remain sanctionable and highlights compliance gaps for exchanges. Shows how sanctioned states exploit crypto to evade US financial controls, while weak compliance frameworks enable persistent enforcement challenges |
| Konowicz (2018) | Qualitative policy analysis | Identifies five strategies (crypto theft, mining, national coins, joint coins, public adoption) used by sanctioned states to bypass US sanctions. Urges US interagency action and blockchain tracking as countermeasures. Demonstrates how state and societal crypto use undermines sanctions, reinforcing the need for coordinated enforcement and technological monitoring |
| Macfarlane (2021) | Qualitative doctrinal and policy analysis | Argues that pseudo-anonymity and weak cross-border regulation enable crypto-based sanctions evasion by states like North Korea and Iran. Proposes a multilateral treaty to harmonize international oversight. Highlights how fragmented enforcement environments and crypto’s affordances sustain state-level sanctions evasion, reinforcing need for coordinated global regulation |
| Makhlouf and Selmi (2022) | Mixed-method policy analysis | Finds that sanctions on Russian banks and removal from SWIFT sharply reduce formal remittances. Notes limited potential for crypto to offset sanctions due to liquidity and traceability constraints. Shows that while crypto offers theoretical evasion pathways, structural limits reduce its utility, reinforcing sanctions’ short-term financial impact |
| Theiri et al., 2022 | Quantitative empirical event study | Finds that the Russia–Ukraine invasion triggered only short-lived BTC/ETH liquidity spikes; medium-term spreads unchanged – limiting capacity for large-scale Russian sanctions evasion via crypto markets. Indicates insufficient, non-persistent crypto market depth to support sustained Russia sanctions circumvention |
| Wronka (2022) | Qualitative case-based policy analysis | Shows that digital currencies heighten sanctions-evasion risk through pseudonymity and fragmented, cross-jurisdictional regulation; discusses Russia’s push for a state-run “cryptorouble” and non-SWIFT rails to bypass dollar constraints; argues stronger KYC/monitoring are needed to curb such workarounds |
| Wright, 2023 | Qualitative legal and policy analysis | Shows that weak/uneven crypto regulation enables sanctions evasion; surveys Russia’s 2014–2022 cases alongside Venezuela, Iran and DPRK. Proposes international coordination and stronger KYC requirements to curb crypto-enabled sanctions evasion. Links Russia-focused evasion pathways to regulatory gaps, clarifying how technological affordances and enforcement capacity shape sanctions effectiveness |
| Zhao and Miao, 2023 | Quantitative empirical study | Shows that Russia’s 24 Feb 2022 invasion did not sustain increases in Bitcoin-Russian Ruble/Bitcoin-US Dollar trading pair volumes; Bitcoin co-moves with risk assets, and Bitcoin volume only weakly tracks Russian oil exports – indicating insufficient depth for large-scale Russian sanctions evasion |
| Author and year | Research design | Key findings and relevance for |
|---|---|---|
| Mixed-method policy analysis | Shows that around Russia’s 24 Feb 2022 invasion, RUB–crypto trading and Bitcoin volumes briefly spiked before normalizing; attributes this mainly to individual wealth protection and small-scale transfers, noting that overall market liquidity remains far too limited to sustain large-scale sanctions evasion | |
| Qualitative policy, case-based analysis | Sanctioned states use cryptocurrency primarily to evade restrictions on access to international finance and to generate foreign exchange. Highlights North Korea’s state-sponsored crypto thefts and the emergence of state-backed coins (e.g. Iran’s PayMon, Venezuela’s Petro). Identifies regulatory lag in Office of Foreign Assets Control/FinCEN frameworks and the decentralized affordances of crypto as key enablers of evasion | |
| Qualitative legal and policy analysis | Argues that blockchain can both aid and hinder sanctions enforcement: pseudonymity enables evasion, but transparency and automation could enhance compliance. Highlights how technological affordances shape both evasion and enforcement dynamics in sanctions governance | |
| Qualitative policy analysis | Argues that stablecoins and CBDCs can be used to bypass | |
| Qualitative legal and policy analysis | Examines how Iran, Russia and Venezuela explore cryptocurrencies to bypass | |
| Qualitative policy analysis | Identifies five strategies (crypto theft, mining, national coins, joint coins, public adoption) used by sanctioned states to bypass | |
| Qualitative doctrinal and policy analysis | Argues that pseudo-anonymity and weak cross-border regulation enable crypto-based sanctions evasion by states like North Korea and Iran. Proposes a multilateral treaty to harmonize international oversight. Highlights how fragmented enforcement environments and crypto’s affordances sustain state-level sanctions evasion, reinforcing need for coordinated global regulation | |
| Mixed-method policy analysis | Finds that sanctions on Russian banks and removal from | |
| Quantitative empirical event study | Finds that the Russia–Ukraine invasion triggered only short-lived BTC/ | |
| Qualitative case-based policy analysis | Shows that digital currencies heighten sanctions-evasion risk through pseudonymity and fragmented, cross-jurisdictional regulation; discusses Russia’s push for a state-run “cryptorouble” and non-SWIFT rails to bypass dollar constraints; argues stronger KYC/monitoring are needed to curb such workarounds | |
| Qualitative legal and policy analysis | Shows that weak/uneven crypto regulation enables sanctions evasion; surveys Russia’s 2014–2022 cases alongside Venezuela, Iran and | |
| Quantitative empirical study | Shows that Russia’s 24 Feb 2022 invasion did not sustain increases in Bitcoin-Russian Ruble/Bitcoin-US Dollar trading pair volumes; Bitcoin co-moves with risk assets, and Bitcoin volume only weakly tracks Russian oil exports – indicating insufficient depth for large-scale Russian sanctions evasion |
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