Table 7 Effect of female management on...

Table 7

Effect of female management on firm performance (dependent variable: firm growth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS model ASO	OLS model innov. startups	OLS model ASO and innov. startups	IV model ASO and innov. startups
Female management	−1.870^***	0.340	0.235	72.644^**
Female management	(0.476)	(0.537)	(0.538)	(33.614)
Spin-off			−0.396	−11.079^**
Spin-off			(0.385)	(5.385)
Female management × Spinoff			−1.590^**	−73.627^**
Female management × Spinoff			(0.702)	(33.469)
Age (log)	−2.906^***	−2.623^***	−2.854^***	−3.278^***
Age (log)	(0.393)	(0.217)	(0.188)	(0.316)
Size	−0.154	−0.963^***	−0.673^***	−0.550^***
Size	(0.171)	(0.147)	(0.110)	(0.142)
Tangibility	−128.926^***	−0.253	−0.174	−0.812
Tangibility	(48.704)	(1.002)	(0.989)	(1.499)
Profitability	−0.404	−5.584^***	−2.767^***	−3.590^***
Profitability	(0.620)	(0.919)	(0.536)	(0.696)
Debt	−0.101	0.331^***	0.186^***	−0.011
Debt	(0.067)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.106)
Cash Holdings	19.887	4.063^***	3.695^***	2.427^*
Cash Holdings	(18.856)	(0.950)	(0.935)	(1.315)
Foreign management	1.731	−0.104	2.526^**	1.652
Foreign management	(1.125)	(0.634)	(1.028)	(1.133)
Venture Capital	1.931	−1.039^*	−0.323	−0.745
Venture Capital	(2.228)	(0.614)	(0.569)	(0.729)
R²	0.021	0.057	0.040
Observations	10,386	19,272	29,658	29,658

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS modelASO	OLS model innov. startups	OLS modelASO and innov. startups	IV modelASO and innov. startups
Female management	−1.870^***	0.340	0.235	72.644^**
Female management	(0.476)	(0.537)	(0.538)	(33.614)
Spin-off			−0.396	−11.079^**
Spin-off			(0.385)	(5.385)
Female management × Spinoff			−1.590^**	−73.627^**
Female management × Spinoff			(0.702)	(33.469)
Age (log)	−2.906^***	−2.623^***	−2.854^***	−3.278^***
Age (log)	(0.393)	(0.217)	(0.188)	(0.316)
Size	−0.154	−0.963^***	−0.673^***	−0.550^***
Size	(0.171)	(0.147)	(0.110)	(0.142)
Tangibility	−128.926^***	−0.253	−0.174	−0.812
Tangibility	(48.704)	(1.002)	(0.989)	(1.499)
Profitability	−0.404	−5.584^***	−2.767^***	−3.590^***
Profitability	(0.620)	(0.919)	(0.536)	(0.696)
Debt	−0.101	0.331^***	0.186^***	−0.011
Debt	(0.067)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.106)
Cash Holdings	19.887	4.063^***	3.695^***	2.427^*
Cash Holdings	(18.856)	(0.950)	(0.935)	(1.315)
Foreign management	1.731	−0.104	2.526^**	1.652
Foreign management	(1.125)	(0.634)	(1.028)	(1.133)
Venture Capital	1.931	−1.039^*	−0.323	−0.745
Venture Capital	(2.228)	(0.614)	(0.569)	(0.729)
R²	0.021	0.057	0.040
Observations	10,386	19,272	29,658	29,658

Note(s): Results in columns (1), (2) and (3) are based on pooled regressions. Year- and industry-fixed effects are included. Although the Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for the variable Female management, and the RIR test suggests a very low probability that our results are affected by endogeneity, we also report the IV estimates in column (4), using the industry-level average of female managers as an instrument, with results perfectly in line with column (3). Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10

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