Moderation analysis: ESG performance × executive gender diversity and Tobin's Q
| Variables | (1) FE–DK (ESG × Exec. gender) | (2) FE–DK (lagged ESG × Exec. gender) |
|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (centred) | 0.000 (0.31) | – |
| Lagged ESG Score (centred, t–1) | – | 0.001 (1.10) |
| Executive gender diversity (cent.) | −0.000 (−0.56) | −0.001 (−0.70) |
| ESG × Exec. gender diversity | −0.00014** (−2.81) | −0.00015*** (−3.56) |
| Firm size (log assets) | −0.008 (−0.11) | −0.028 (−0.36) |
| Profitability (ROA) | 0.039*** (9.29) | 0.037*** (8.86) |
| Leverage (DTC) | 0.002 (1.80) | 0.002 (1.59) |
| Price volatility | 0.008*** (3.48) | 0.009*** (3.58) |
| Board gender diversity | −0.001 (−1.51) | −0.001 † (−2.08) |
| Board size | 0.013*** (4.37) | 0.011*** (3.70) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,936 | 5,505 |
| Number of firms | 430 | 430 |
| R2 (within) | 0.167 | 0.158 |
| Model F (Driscoll–Kraay) | 1940234.41*** | 65982.00*** |
| Variables | (1) FE–DK (ESG × Exec. gender) | (2) FE–DK (lagged ESG × Exec. gender) |
|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (centred) | 0.000 (0.31) | – |
| Lagged ESG Score (centred, t–1) | – | 0.001 (1.10) |
| Executive gender diversity (cent.) | −0.000 (−0.56) | −0.001 (−0.70) |
| ESG × Exec. gender diversity | −0.00014** (−2.81) | −0.00015*** (−3.56) |
| Firm size (log assets) | −0.008 (−0.11) | −0.028 (−0.36) |
| Profitability (ROA) | 0.039*** (9.29) | 0.037*** (8.86) |
| Leverage (DTC) | 0.002 (1.80) | 0.002 (1.59) |
| Price volatility | 0.008*** (3.48) | 0.009*** (3.58) |
| Board gender diversity | −0.001 (−1.51) | −0.001 † (−2.08) |
| Board size | 0.013*** (4.37) | 0.011*** (3.70) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,936 | 5,505 |
| Number of firms | 430 | 430 |
| 0.167 | 0.158 | |
| Model F (Driscoll–Kraay) | 1940234.41*** | 65982.00*** |
Note(s): Fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll–Kraay SEs (robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence). ESG (Refinitiv) and executive gender diversity (female executive share) are mean-centred; ESG effect is at average diversity. Board gender diversity = female director share. Firm and year FE included (years not shown). T-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; †p ˜ 0.06
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