Robustness regressions using Market-to-Book ratio (MTB)
| Variables | (1) ESG (Lagged) | (2) Environmental (Lagged) | (3) Social (Lagged) | (4) Governance (Lagged) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (lagged) | −0.132** (−2.67) | – | – | – |
| Environmental Score (lagged) | – | −0.069** (−2.51) | – | – |
| Social Score (lagged) | – | – | −0.049** (−2.89) | – |
| Governance Score (lagged) | – | – | – | −0.054** (−2.31) |
| Executive gender diversity (cent.) | 0.043 (1.26) | 0.012 (0.36) | 0.021 (0.64) | 0.062 (1.58) |
| ESG × Exec. gender diversity | −0.011** (−2.57) | −0.008*** (−3.05) | −0.006** (−2.29) | −0.007** (−2.24) |
| Firm size (log assets) | −1.145 (−1.39) | −1.155 (−1.50) | −1.019 (−1.41) | −1.432 (−1.49) |
| Profitability (ROA) | 0.121* (2.07) | 0.121* (2.02) | 0.126** (2.26) | 0.117* (2.05) |
| Leverage (DTC) | −0.032 (−1.02) | −0.030 (−1.00) | −0.033 (−1.04) | −0.027 (−0.90) |
| Price volatility | 0.140 (1.48) | 0.137 (1.47) | 0.153 (1.53) | 0.153 (1.52) |
| Board gender diversity | −0.030 (−1.32) | −0.044* (−1.95) | −0.027 (−1.20) | −0.023 (−0.89) |
| Board size | 0.345* (1.90) | 0.333* (1.84) | 0.359* (1.94) | 0.340* (1.89) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 |
| Number of firms | 430 | 430 | 430 | 430 |
| R2 (within) | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.01 | 0.013 |
| F-statistic (Driscoll–Kraay) | 172473.11*** | 1492744.33*** | 194901.40*** | 77408.38*** |
| Variables | (1) ESG | (2) Environmental | (3) Social | (4) Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (lagged) | −0.132** (−2.67) | – | – | – |
| Environmental Score (lagged) | – | −0.069** (−2.51) | – | – |
| Social Score (lagged) | – | – | −0.049** (−2.89) | – |
| Governance Score (lagged) | – | – | – | −0.054** (−2.31) |
| Executive gender diversity (cent.) | 0.043 (1.26) | 0.012 (0.36) | 0.021 (0.64) | 0.062 (1.58) |
| ESG × Exec. gender diversity | −0.011** (−2.57) | −0.008*** (−3.05) | −0.006** (−2.29) | −0.007** (−2.24) |
| Firm size (log assets) | −1.145 (−1.39) | −1.155 (−1.50) | −1.019 (−1.41) | −1.432 (−1.49) |
| Profitability (ROA) | 0.121* (2.07) | 0.121* (2.02) | 0.126** (2.26) | 0.117* (2.05) |
| Leverage (DTC) | −0.032 (−1.02) | −0.030 (−1.00) | −0.033 (−1.04) | −0.027 (−0.90) |
| Price volatility | 0.140 (1.48) | 0.137 (1.47) | 0.153 (1.53) | 0.153 (1.52) |
| Board gender diversity | −0.030 (−1.32) | −0.044* (−1.95) | −0.027 (−1.20) | −0.023 (−0.89) |
| Board size | 0.345* (1.90) | 0.333* (1.84) | 0.359* (1.94) | 0.340* (1.89) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 |
| Number of firms | 430 | 430 | 430 | 430 |
| 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.01 | 0.013 | |
| F-statistic (Driscoll–Kraay) | 172473.11*** | 1492744.33*** | 194901.40*** | 77408.38*** |
Note(s): Estimates are from fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence. The dependent variable is Market-to-Book ratio (MTB). ESG and pillar scores (Refinitiv) are mean-centred before interaction with executive gender diversity; main ESG effects are interpreted at mean diversity. All models include firm and year fixed effects (year dummies not shown). Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.