Sensitivity analysis: ESG performance, executive gender diversity (binary), and Tobin's
| Variables | (1) ESG (Lagged) | (2) Environmental (Lagged) | (3) Social (Lagged) | (4) Governance (Lagged) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (lagged) | 0.0013** (2.89) | – | – | – |
| Environmental Score (lagged) | – | 0.0017*** (3.55) | – | – |
| Social Score (lagged) | – | – | 0.0028*** (4.24) | – |
| Governance Score (lagged) | – | – | – | −0.0014** (−2.80) |
| High executive gender diversity | — (base = low) | — (base = low) | — (base = low) | — (base = low) |
| ESG × High diversity | −0.000 (ns) | −0.000 (ns) | −0.000 (ns) | −0.000 (ns) |
| Firm size (log assets) | −0.020 (−0.26) | −0.027 (−0.34) | −0.031 (−0.41) | −0.009 (−0.11) |
| Profitability (ROA) | 0.036*** (8.74) | 0.036*** (8.87) | 0.036*** (8.71) | 0.036*** (8.74) |
| Leverage (DTC) | 0.002 (1.55) | 0.002 (1.58) | 0.002 (1.68) | 0.002 (1.47) |
| Price volatility | 0.009*** (3.56) | 0.009*** (3.54) | 0.009*** (3.55) | 0.009*** (3.52) |
| Board gender diversity | −0.001* (−1.88) | −0.001 (−1.79) | −0.001* (−1.96) | −0.001 (−1.46) |
| Board size | 0.011*** (3.82) | 0.011*** (3.82) | 0.010*** (3.85) | 0.011*** (3.84) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 |
| Number of firms | 430 | 430 | 430 | 430 |
| R2 (within) | 0.155 | 0.156 | 0.158 | 0.156 |
| F-statistic (Driscoll–Kraay) | 6,029,849*** | 6,161,629*** | 1,686,078*** | 10,600,000*** |
| Variables | (1) ESG | (2) Environmental | (3) Social | (4) Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (lagged) | 0.0013** (2.89) | – | – | – |
| Environmental Score (lagged) | – | 0.0017*** (3.55) | – | – |
| Social Score (lagged) | – | – | 0.0028*** (4.24) | – |
| Governance Score (lagged) | – | – | – | −0.0014** (−2.80) |
| High executive gender diversity | — (base = low) | — (base = low) | — (base = low) | — (base = low) |
| ESG × High diversity | −0.000 (ns) | −0.000 (ns) | −0.000 (ns) | −0.000 (ns) |
| Firm size (log assets) | −0.020 (−0.26) | −0.027 (−0.34) | −0.031 (−0.41) | −0.009 (−0.11) |
| Profitability (ROA) | 0.036*** (8.74) | 0.036*** (8.87) | 0.036*** (8.71) | 0.036*** (8.74) |
| Leverage (DTC) | 0.002 (1.55) | 0.002 (1.58) | 0.002 (1.68) | 0.002 (1.47) |
| Price volatility | 0.009*** (3.56) | 0.009*** (3.54) | 0.009*** (3.55) | 0.009*** (3.52) |
| Board gender diversity | −0.001* (−1.88) | −0.001 (−1.79) | −0.001* (−1.96) | −0.001 (−1.46) |
| Board size | 0.011*** (3.82) | 0.011*** (3.82) | 0.010*** (3.85) | 0.011*** (3.84) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 | 5,505 |
| Number of firms | 430 | 430 | 430 | 430 |
| 0.155 | 0.156 | 0.158 | 0.156 | |
| F-statistic (Driscoll–Kraay) | 6,029,849*** | 6,161,629*** | 1,686,078*** | 10,600,000*** |
Note(s): Estimates are from fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence. Executive gender diversity is a binary variable (1 = above-median female representation). ESG variables are mean-centred before interaction. Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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