Split-sample sensitivity analysis: ESG performance, executive gender diversity, and Tobin's Q
| Variables | (1) ESG Non-sensitive | (2) ESG Sensitive | (3) Environmental Non-sensitive | (4) Environmental Sensitive | (5) Social Non-sensitive | (6) Social Sensitive | (7) Governance non-sensitive | (8) Governance sensitive |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (lagged) | 0.003*** (4.63) | 0.000 (0.06) | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Environmental Score (lagged) | – | – | 0.004*** (4.15) | −0.000 (−0.44) | – | – | – | – |
| Social Score (lagged) | – | – | – | – | 0.004*** (7.82) | 0.001 (1.28) | – | – |
| Governance Score (lagged) | – | – | – | – | – | – | −0.001 (−0.47) | −0.000 (−0.57) |
| Executive gender diversity | 0.010*** (3.23) | −0.003 (−0.50) | 0.005* (2.07) | −0.001 (−0.23) | 0.006 (1.68) | −0.003 (−0.52) | 0.005 (1.45) | −0.001 (−0.54) |
| ESG × Gender diversity | −0.000*** (−4.03) | 0.000 (0.31) | −0.000*** (−3.17) | 0.000 (0.00) | −0.000* (−1.85) | 0.000 (0.28) | −0.000* (−2.05) | 0.000 (0.10) |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,395 | 2,110 | 3,395 | 2,110 | 3,395 | 2,110 | 3,395 | 2,110 |
| Number of firms | 307 | 207 | 307 | 207 | 307 | 207 | 307 | 207 |
| R2 (within) | 0.185 | 0.148 | 0.186 | 0.148 | 0.187 | 0.149 | 0.184 | 0.148 |
| Variables | (1) ESG | (2) ESG | (3) Environmental | (4) Environmental | (5) Social | (6) Social | (7) Governance non-sensitive | (8) Governance sensitive |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG Score (lagged) | 0.003*** | 0.000 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Environmental Score (lagged) | – | – | 0.004*** | −0.000 | – | – | – | – |
| Social Score (lagged) | – | – | – | – | 0.004*** | 0.001 | – | – |
| Governance Score (lagged) | – | – | – | – | – | – | −0.001 | −0.000 |
| Executive gender diversity | 0.010*** | −0.003 | 0.005* | −0.001 | 0.006 | −0.003 | 0.005 | −0.001 |
| ESG × Gender diversity | −0.000*** | 0.000 | −0.000*** | 0.000 | −0.000* | 0.000 | −0.000* | 0.000 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,395 | 2,110 | 3,395 | 2,110 | 3,395 | 2,110 | 3,395 | 2,110 |
| Number of firms | 307 | 207 | 307 | 207 | 307 | 207 | 307 | 207 |
| 0.185 | 0.148 | 0.186 | 0.148 | 0.187 | 0.149 | 0.184 | 0.148 |
Note(s): Estimates are from fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence. ESG and pillar scores are mean-centred prior to interaction. Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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