Regression results
| DV = CSR controversies score | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO duality | 0.0631** (0.0248) | 0.0628** (0.0249) | 0.0636** (0.0249) | |
| Log(board_size) | −0.149 (0.109) | −0.147 (0.109) | −0.144 (0.109) | |
| Sustainability committee | 0.0126 (0.0235) | 0.0117 (0.0235) | 0.0114 (0.0235) | |
| Log(firm_age) | 0.0321 (0.0607) | 0.0291 (0.0609) | 0.0287 (0.0611) | |
| Log(employees) | 0.264*** (0.100) | 0.260*** (0.0999) | 0.259*** (0.0999) | |
| Log(ROA) | −0.0459** (0.0225) | −0.0450** (0.0225) | −0.0464** (0.0226) | |
| Log(Tobin’s Q) | −0.0768 (0.0641) | −0.0782 (0.0639) | −0.0776 (0.0642) | |
| Log(leverage) | −0.0187 (0.0327) | −0.0169 (0.0327) | −0.0162 (0.0327) | |
| CSR rating score | 0.0821** (0.0333) | 0.0835** (0.0333) | 0.0840** (0.0334) | |
| Log(tangability) | 0.0605 (0.0528) | 0.0572 (0.0528) | 0.0545 (0.0526) | |
| Sales growth | −0.0111 (0.00931) | −0.0119 (0.00930) | −0.0127 (0.00927) | |
| CSR incentives | −0.0186*** (0.0132) | −0.00227*** (0.0133) | −0.00291** (0.0133) | −0.0117* (0.0174) |
| Complexity | −0.0629 (0.0753) | −0.0500 (0.0758) | ||
| CSR incentives×complexity | 0.0335 (0.0354) | |||
| Munificence | 0.0122** (0.00577) | 0.0225*** (0.00648) | ||
| CSR incentives×munificence | −0.0163** (0.00777) | |||
| Dynamism | −0.0429 (0.0514) | −0.0730 (0.0498) | ||
| CSR incentives×dynamism | 0.0647* (0.0345) | |||
| Constant | −0.001** (0.000) | −1.116** (0.529) | −1.081** (0.530) | −1.086** (0.531) |
| Firm-fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Industry-fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year-fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 8,203 | 8,203 | 8,203 | 8,203 |
| R-squared | 0.009 | 0.031 | 0.132 | 0.145 |
| Number of firms | 1,763 | 1,763 | 1,763 | 1,763 |
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.0631 | 0.0628 | 0.0636 | ||
| Log(board_size) | −0.149 (0.109) | −0.147 (0.109) | −0.144 (0.109) | |
| Sustainability committee | 0.0126 (0.0235) | 0.0117 (0.0235) | 0.0114 (0.0235) | |
| Log(firm_age) | 0.0321 (0.0607) | 0.0291 (0.0609) | 0.0287 (0.0611) | |
| Log(employees) | 0.264 | 0.260 | 0.259 | |
| Log( | −0.0459 | −0.0450 | −0.0464 | |
| Log(Tobin’s Q) | −0.0768 (0.0641) | −0.0782 (0.0639) | −0.0776 (0.0642) | |
| Log(leverage) | −0.0187 (0.0327) | −0.0169 (0.0327) | −0.0162 (0.0327) | |
| 0.0821 | 0.0835 | 0.0840 | ||
| Log(tangability) | 0.0605 (0.0528) | 0.0572 (0.0528) | 0.0545 (0.0526) | |
| Sales growth | −0.0111 (0.00931) | −0.0119 (0.00930) | −0.0127 (0.00927) | |
| −0.0186 | −0.00227 | −0.00291 | −0.0117 | |
| Complexity | −0.0629 (0.0753) | −0.0500 (0.0758) | ||
| 0.0335 (0.0354) | ||||
| Munificence | 0.0122 | 0.0225 | ||
| −0.0163 | ||||
| Dynamism | −0.0429 (0.0514) | −0.0730 (0.0498) | ||
| 0.0647 | ||||
| Constant | −0.001 | −1.116 | −1.081 | −1.086 |
| Firm-fixed effects | ||||
| Industry-fixed effects | ||||
| Year-fixed effects | ||||
| Observations | 8,203 | 8,203 | 8,203 | 8,203 |
| 0.009 | 0.031 | 0.132 | 0.145 | |
| Number of firms | 1,763 | 1,763 | 1,763 | 1,763 |
This table reports standardized coefficients from fixed-effects regressions, with robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses. Model 1 includes CSR incentives only. Model 2 adds governance variables and firm characteristics. Model 3 adds environmental factors, and Model 4 includes interaction terms between CSR incentives and environmental factors to test moderation. All models control for firm, industry and year fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
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