Results of the robustness analyses
| Dependent variable | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|
| CSR controversies score | Sustainability award | |
| CEO duality | 0.0637* (0.0347) | −0.0129 (0.0141) |
| Log(board_size) | 0.0536 (0.103) | 0.00503 (0.0378) |
| Sustainability committee | 0.0811** (0.0336) | 0.0102 (0.0115) |
| Log(firm_age) | 0.0312 (0.0440) | 0.0285 (0.0200) |
| Log(employees) | 0.260*** (0.0713) | −0.0623 (0.0488) |
| Log(ROA) | −0.0714* (0.0416) | 0.00339 (0.00975) |
| Log(Tobin’s Q) | −0.0395 (0.0530) | −0.0443* (0.0248) |
| Log(leverage) | 0.000605 (0.0310) | 0.0163* (0.00862) |
| CSR rating score | 0.172*** (0.0600) | −0.00571 (0.00511) |
| Log(tangability) | −0.00226 (0.0501) | 0.0196 (0.0151) |
| Sales growth | −0.00351 (0.0247) | −0.00415 (0.00992) |
| (second-stage) | −0.375*** (0.142) | |
| CSR incentives | 0.0329* (0.0235) | |
| Complexity | −0.000136 (0.0662) | 0.370 (0.341) |
| CSR incentives×complexity | 0.850*** (0.292) | 0.376 (0.273) |
| Munificence | 0.0837*** (0.0310) | −0.0501** (0.0221) |
| CSR incentives×munificence | −0.0922*** (0.0330) | −0.0687** (0.0278) |
| Dynamism | −0.259*** (0.0856) | 0.349 (0.286) |
| CSR incentives×dynamism | 0.258*** (0.0548) | 0.335** (0.117) |
| Constant | −0.926** (0.432) | 0.105* (0.189) |
| Firm-fixed effects | NO | YES |
| Industry-fixed effects | NO | YES |
| Year-fixed effects | NO | YES |
| Observations | 2,730 | 3,865 |
| R-squared | 0.403 | 0.184 |
| Number of firms | 658 | 1,436 |
| Dependent variable | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0637 | −0.0129 (0.0141) | |
| Log(board_size) | 0.0536 (0.103) | 0.00503 (0.0378) |
| Sustainability committee | 0.0811 | 0.0102 (0.0115) |
| Log(firm_age) | 0.0312 (0.0440) | 0.0285 (0.0200) |
| Log(employees) | 0.260 | −0.0623 (0.0488) |
| Log( | −0.0714 | 0.00339 (0.00975) |
| Log(Tobin’s Q) | −0.0395 (0.0530) | −0.0443 |
| Log(leverage) | 0.000605 (0.0310) | 0.0163 |
| 0.172 | −0.00571 (0.00511) | |
| Log(tangability) | −0.00226 (0.0501) | 0.0196 (0.0151) |
| Sales growth | −0.00351 (0.0247) | −0.00415 (0.00992) |
| −0.375 | ||
| 0.0329 | ||
| Complexity | −0.000136 (0.0662) | 0.370 (0.341) |
| 0.850 | 0.376 (0.273) | |
| Munificence | 0.0837 | −0.0501 |
| −0.0922 | −0.0687 | |
| Dynamism | −0.259 | 0.349 (0.286) |
| 0.258 | 0.335 | |
| Constant | −0.926 | 0.105 |
| Firm-fixed effects | ||
| Industry-fixed effects | ||
| Year-fixed effects | ||
| Observations | 2,730 | 3,865 |
| 0.403 | 0.184 | |
| Number of firms | 658 | 1,436 |
This table presents the results of two robustness tests. Model 5 (2SLS) examines CSR incentives’ effect on CSR controversies, showing a reduction, stronger in dynamic environments and weaker in munificent ones. Larger firms and those with higher CSR ratings face more controversies, while profitability reduces them. Model 6 (fixed effects) tests CSR incentives’ effect on sustainability reputation, finding they increase the likelihood of receiving a sustainability award, with the effect amplified in dynamic environments but dampened in munificent settings. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
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