Table 5.

Results of the robustness analyses

Dependent variableModel 5Model 6
CSR controversies scoreSustainability award
CEO duality0.0637* (0.0347)−0.0129 (0.0141)
Log(board_size)0.0536 (0.103)0.00503 (0.0378)
Sustainability committee0.0811** (0.0336)0.0102 (0.0115)
Log(firm_age)0.0312 (0.0440)0.0285 (0.0200)
Log(employees)0.260*** (0.0713)−0.0623 (0.0488)
Log(ROA)−0.0714* (0.0416)0.00339 (0.00975)
Log(Tobin’s Q)−0.0395 (0.0530)−0.0443* (0.0248)
Log(leverage)0.000605 (0.0310)0.0163* (0.00862)
CSR rating score0.172*** (0.0600)−0.00571 (0.00511)
Log(tangability)−0.00226 (0.0501)0.0196 (0.0151)
Sales growth−0.00351 (0.0247)−0.00415 (0.00992)
CSRincentives^(second-stage)−0.375*** (0.142)
CSR incentives0.0329* (0.0235)
Complexity−0.000136 (0.0662)0.370 (0.341)
CSR incentives×complexity0.850*** (0.292)0.376 (0.273)
Munificence0.0837*** (0.0310)−0.0501** (0.0221)
CSR incentives×munificence−0.0922*** (0.0330)−0.0687** (0.0278)
Dynamism−0.259*** (0.0856)0.349 (0.286)
CSR incentives×dynamism0.258*** (0.0548)0.335** (0.117)
Constant−0.926** (0.432)0.105* (0.189)
Firm-fixed effectsNOYES
Industry-fixed effectsNOYES
Year-fixed effectsNOYES
Observations2,7303,865
R-squared0.4030.184
Number of firms6581,436
Note(s):

This table presents the results of two robustness tests. Model 5 (2SLS) examines CSR incentives’ effect on CSR controversies, showing a reduction, stronger in dynamic environments and weaker in munificent ones. Larger firms and those with higher CSR ratings face more controversies, while profitability reduces them. Model 6 (fixed effects) tests CSR incentives’ effect on sustainability reputation, finding they increase the likelihood of receiving a sustainability award, with the effect amplified in dynamic environments but dampened in munificent settings. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively

Source(s): Author’s own creation

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