Pathways to anticipatory public management: strategies, manifestations, and implications
| Theme | Challenges it addresses | Mechanisms (causal drivers) | Manifestations in practice (what it looks like) | Illustrative cases | Implications for anticipatory public management |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic, multi-level change (Agency building) |
| Effective integration requires concurrent technical, structural and cultural shifts, supported by champions and adaptive leadership, and learning-oriented environments that permit experimentation (Janzwood and Piereder, 2019) | Named champions mobilise coalitions; sanctioned pilot spaces; iterative cycles linked to decision forums; routines that normalise futures work; creative space for tool experimentation (Janzwood and Piereder, 2019) | Queensland Futures and Foresight Team, a six-month pilot scaled to a second agency (Picavet et al., 2026); OECD programmes in Lithuania, Italy and Malta (OECD, 2025) |
|
| Building foresight literacy and competencies (Agency building) |
| Capability building should develop organisation-wide “foresight literacy”, “a tool for self-education that induces a reform of thought”, paired with diversified skills so staff can operate across multiple plausible futures (Janzwood and Piereder, 2019, p. 619; Kanzola and Petrakis, 2024) | Training connects scenarios to role-specific decisions; workforce development shifts from fixed skill lists to contingency-ready portfolios; builds capacity for STEEPED analysis across all dimensions (Janzwood and Piereder, 2019; Kanzola and Petrakis, 2024; Van Woensel, 2020) | North Macedonia migration-foresight programme, with masterclasses, an advanced certificate, training-of-trainers and a university master's course (Ashkapova and Zulfiu Alili, 2025) |
|
| Network governance and collaborative approaches (Authorising environment) |
| Polycrisis conditions require networked coordination across interests, levels and expertise; foresight should run through the entire policy cycle, not just the front end (Keinänen et al., 2026; Van Woensel, 2020) | Cross-agency teams cycle through shared sensing, adaptive reorganisation and strategy renewal; foresight checkpoints appear in design, implementation and review phases; Team Finland-style collaborative structures; boundary-spanning processes and individuals (Keinänen et al., 2026; Van Woensel, 2020) | ESPAS, nine EU bodies with monthly sense-making and a shared signal repository (De Vito and Taffoni, 2026); JRC Policy Lab blockchain foresight feeding a European Parliament resolution (Pólvora and Nascimento, 2021); Tuscany cross-sector roadmapping (Fabbri, 2016) |
|
| Institutional reforms and structural integration (Authorising environment) |
| Positions foresight as foundational to all strategic activities, not supplementary. Standing foresight units linked to central planning and budget processes translate insights into allocations and programme designs; institutionalisation must balance rigour, salience and stakeholder legitimacy (OECD, 2019; Janzwood and Piereder, 2019) | Formal linkages to cabinet and treasury cycles; scheduled foresight gates in planning and budget calendars; continuous scanning–analysis–feedback loops; hybrid analytics plus expert judgement; foresight as integral as financial or human resource management; systematic post-exercise assessments and cumulative learning | US federal agencies, with Veterans Affairs (foresight as the foundation of its strategic plan), Coast Guard Evergreen and the Office of Net Assessment (Greenblott et al., 2019); plus the EU Better Regulation Toolbox, through which foresight enters the Commission's impact assessment process (OECD, 2022; De Vito and Taffoni, 2026) |
|
| Emerging practice points to “foresight-on-site”, with continuous human–machine anticipatory pipelines (Saritas et al., 2022), analogous to the move from inspection to total quality management | |||||
| Democratic legitimacy and participatory processes (Authorising environment) |
| Public-sector distinctiveness makes inclusion and deliberation central to legitimacy; scenario processes should surface competing values and build shared directions while maintaining democratic accountability (Leigh, 2003; Roberge, 2013) | Open consultations accounting for diverse stakeholder interests; accessible communication of complex futures; documented stakeholder inputs shaping preferred pathways; transparent processes with broad participation; foresight as democratic practice, not technocratic exercise | UK Net Zero Society, a public dialogue with participants selected to reflect national demographics (Government Office for Science, 2023; De Vito and Taffoni, 2026) |
|
| Theme | Challenges it addresses | Mechanisms (causal drivers) | Manifestations in practice (what it looks like) | Illustrative cases | Implications for anticipatory public management |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic, multi-level change | Fragmented approach and ad hoc practice Departmental silos and cross-boundary coordination failures Measurement and evaluation challenges | Effective integration requires concurrent technical, structural and cultural shifts, supported by champions and adaptive leadership, and learning-oriented environments that permit experimentation ( | Named champions mobilise coalitions; sanctioned pilot spaces; iterative cycles linked to decision forums; routines that normalise futures work; creative space for tool experimentation ( | Queensland Futures and Foresight Team, a six-month pilot scaled to a second agency ( | Builds momentum, overcomes resistance and establishes foresight as a standing organisational capability instead of an isolated, episodic exercise |
| Building foresight literacy and competencies | Capability and methodological gaps Legitimacy and credibility deficits (evidential-standing deficit) | Capability building should develop organisation-wide “foresight literacy”, “a tool for self-education that induces a reform of thought”, paired with diversified skills so staff can operate across multiple plausible futures ( | Training connects scenarios to role-specific decisions; workforce development shifts from fixed skill lists to contingency-ready portfolios; builds capacity for STEEPED analysis across all dimensions ( | North Macedonia migration-foresight programme, with masterclasses, an advanced certificate, training-of-trainers and a university master's course ( | Reduces cultural barriers and raises the quality of application through sophisticated multi-dimensional analysis, not just familiarity with tools Enables handling of systemic interdependencies |
| Network governance and collaborative approaches | Departmental silos and cross-boundary coordination failures Fragmented approach and ad hoc practice | Polycrisis conditions require networked coordination across interests, levels and expertise; foresight should run through the entire policy cycle, not just the front end ( | Cross-agency teams cycle through shared sensing, adaptive reorganisation and strategy renewal; foresight checkpoints appear in design, implementation and review phases; Team Finland-style collaborative structures; boundary-spanning processes and individuals ( | ESPAS, nine EU bodies with monthly sense-making and a shared signal repository ( | Enables system-level sense-making and improves the uptake of foresight in downstream implementation Overcomes limitations of vertical hierarchies while reconciling with specialised expertise |
| Institutional reforms and structural integration | Fragmented approach and ad hoc practice Capability and methodological gaps Political and budgetary short-termism Measurement and evaluation challenges | Positions foresight as foundational to all strategic activities, not supplementary. Standing foresight units linked to central planning and budget processes translate insights into allocations and programme designs; institutionalisation must balance rigour, salience and stakeholder legitimacy ( | Formal linkages to cabinet and treasury cycles; scheduled foresight gates in planning and budget calendars; continuous scanning–analysis–feedback loops; hybrid analytics plus expert judgement; foresight as integral as financial or human resource management; systematic post-exercise assessments and cumulative learning | US federal agencies, with Veterans Affairs (foresight as the foundation of its strategic plan), Coast Guard Evergreen and the Office of Net Assessment ( | Converts insights into durable mandates, funding and ongoing practice rather than episodic exercises Transforms foresight from peripheral tool to core organising principle Builds evidence-based practices through evaluation |
| Emerging practice points to “foresight-on-site”, with continuous human–machine anticipatory pipelines ( | |||||
| Democratic legitimacy and participatory processes | Political and budgetary short-termism Legitimacy and credibility deficits (evidential-standing deficit) | Public-sector distinctiveness makes inclusion and deliberation central to legitimacy; scenario processes should surface competing values and build shared directions while maintaining democratic accountability ( | Open consultations accounting for diverse stakeholder interests; accessible communication of complex futures; documented stakeholder inputs shaping preferred pathways; transparent processes with broad participation; foresight as democratic practice, not technocratic exercise | UK Net Zero Society, a public dialogue with participants selected to reflect national demographics ( | Strengthens social licence and the durability of anticipatory choices by aligning them with societal aspirations Bridges the gap between long-term benefits and short-term electoral accountability |
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.