Table 7. From empirical findings to the... | Emerald Publishing

Table 7.

From empirical findings to the negotiation base and negotiation model

Empirical finding	Evidence in results	Theoretical issue	Framework implication
Hotels perceive MTO dependence as necessary rather than fully voluntary	Many respondents describe compromise and reliance on MTO demand access	Low BATNA and power dependence	Negotiation base begins with explicit assessment of outside options and perceived dependence
MTOs are viewed as indispensable market access providers	Respondents report that MTOs control access to overseas demand and destination information	Demand gatekeeping and asymmetric information	Model treats information and demand access as central power resources
Contractual traps extend beyond room price	Contracts include stop-sale restrictions, release periods, payment delays, liability clauses and information restrictions	Hidden transaction costs and contractual governance	Framework broadens negotiation from price to the full contract architecture
Price and profitability dominate perceived conflict areas	Table 3 shows price and profitability as central concerns	Distributive bargaining and stated positions	Model moves actors from positional bargaining toward underlying interests and objective criteria
Rigid tactics are used despite weak bargaining power	Table 5 reports inflexible positioning, rejection of initial requests and bottom lines	Misalignment between tactics and BATNA	Model emphasizes communication, option generation and relationship-preserving bargaining
Reputation, reviews, technology, differentiation and alliances can improve leverage	Table 6 reports positive reviews, product quality, trust and reputation as negotiation resources	Power rebalancing through strategic resources	Negotiation base includes resources that can strengthen BATNA over time
External conditions shape conflict dynamics	Table 4 identifies economic and political conditions as major influences	Context-dependent and time-sensitive bargaining	Model includes temporal adjustment and changing external conditions

Empirical finding	Evidence in results	Theoretical issue	Framework implication
Hotels perceive MTO dependence as necessary rather than fully voluntary	Many respondents describe compromise and reliance on MTO demand access	Low BATNA and power dependence	Negotiation base begins with explicit assessment of outside options and perceived dependence
MTOs are viewed as indispensable market access providers	Respondents report that MTOs control access to overseas demand and destination information	Demand gatekeeping and asymmetric information	Model treats information and demand access as central power resources
Contractual traps extend beyond room price	Contracts include stop-sale restrictions, release periods, payment delays, liability clauses and information restrictions	Hidden transaction costs and contractual governance	Framework broadens negotiation from price to the full contract architecture
Price and profitability dominate perceived conflict areas	Table 3 shows price and profitability as central concerns	Distributive bargaining and stated positions	Model moves actors from positional bargaining toward underlying interests and objective criteria
Rigid tactics are used despite weak bargaining power	Table 5 reports inflexible positioning, rejection of initial requests and bottom lines	Misalignment between tactics and BATNA	Model emphasizes communication, option generation and relationship-preserving bargaining
Reputation, reviews, technology, differentiation and alliances can improve leverage	Table 6 reports positive reviews, product quality, trust and reputation as negotiation resources	Power rebalancing through strategic resources	Negotiation base includes resources that can strengthen BATNA over time
External conditions shape conflict dynamics	Table 4 identifies economic and political conditions as major influences	Context-dependent and time-sensitive bargaining	Model includes temporal adjustment and changing external conditions