Table 2 Testable propositions and their... | Emerald Publishing

Table 2

Testable propositions and their content

Proposition	Content
P1	Signal strength (signaling theory) moderates the severity of adverse selection problems (agency theory) such that stronger signals reduce contractual safeguards demanded by investors
P2	Resource orchestration capacity (RBV) moderates the postinvestment agency costs such that ventures with higher absorptive capacity experience lower monitoring intensity
P3	The effectiveness of signaling → agency → RBV sequencing is contingent on institutional context, with weaker effects in emerging economies where alternative governance mechanisms operate

Proposition	Content
P1	Signal strength (signaling theory) moderates the severity of adverse selection problems (agency theory) such that stronger signals reduce contractual safeguards demanded by investors
P2	Resource orchestration capacity (RBV) moderates the postinvestment agency costs such that ventures with higher absorptive capacity experience lower monitoring intensity
P3	The effectiveness of signaling → agency → RBV sequencing is contingent on institutional context, with weaker effects in emerging economies where alternative governance mechanisms operate