Content and empirical approach of testable propositions
| Proposition | Content | Empirical approach | Derivation from synthesis |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | Signal strength moderates adverse selection severity: stronger signals reduce contractual safeguards demanded | Moderated regression with signal strength × information asymmetry interaction | Theoretical fragmentation (Pattern 1): isolates signaling-agency interaction |
| P2 | Resource orchestration capacity moderates the post-investment agency costs: higher absorptive capacity → lower monitoring intensity | Panel data with venture-level absorptive capacity measures | Theoretical fragmentation (Pattern 1): isolates RBV-agency interaction |
| P3 | Signaling → agency → RBV sequencing is contingent on institutional context: weaker effects in emerging economies | Comparative institutional analysis, multi-group SEM | Institutional contingency (Pattern 2): context-dependent funding effects |
| P4 | Early financing decisions create path dependence: initial funding source shapes subsequent access through reputation effects | Longitudinal event history analysis | Path dependence (Pattern 3): financing sequences in entrepreneurial narratives |
| P5 | Digital platform design moderates signal effectiveness: higher platform noise reduces signal-to-noise ratio | Platform-level fixed effects, natural experiments | Platform dynamics (Pattern 4): crowdfunding studies reveal mediation effects |
| Proposition | Content | Empirical approach | Derivation from synthesis |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | Signal strength moderates adverse selection severity: stronger signals reduce contractual safeguards demanded | Moderated regression with signal strength × information asymmetry interaction | Theoretical fragmentation (Pattern 1): isolates signaling-agency interaction |
| P2 | Resource orchestration capacity moderates the post-investment agency costs: higher absorptive capacity → lower monitoring intensity | Panel data with venture-level absorptive capacity measures | Theoretical fragmentation (Pattern 1): isolates RBV-agency interaction |
| P3 | Signaling → agency → RBV sequencing is contingent on institutional context: weaker effects in emerging economies | Comparative institutional analysis, multi-group SEM | Institutional contingency (Pattern 2): context-dependent funding effects |
| P4 | Early financing decisions create path dependence: initial funding source shapes subsequent access through reputation effects | Longitudinal event history analysis | Path dependence (Pattern 3): financing sequences in entrepreneurial narratives |
| P5 | Digital platform design moderates signal effectiveness: higher platform noise reduces signal-to-noise ratio | Platform-level fixed effects, natural experiments | Platform dynamics (Pattern 4): crowdfunding studies reveal mediation effects |
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