Results of the empirical models testing the relationship between the family firm and realized innovation opportunities and the mediating effect of TMT knowledge exchange
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Realized innovation opportunities | Realized innovation opportunities | TMT knowledge exchange | Realized innovation opportunities | Realized innovation opportunities | Realized innovation opportunities |
| Family firm | – | −0.2842* (0.1474) | −0.3306** (0.1590) | – | −0.2303 (0.1469) | −0.2304 (0.1480) |
| TMT knowledge exchange | – | – | – | 0.1780*** (0.0629) | 0.1632** (0.0649) | 0.1382 (0.0889) |
| Family firm * TMT knowledge exchange | – | – | – | – | – | 0.0450 (0.1222) |
| Firm size | 0.0351 (0.0807) | 0.0144 (0.0798) | 0.0991 (0.0783) | 0.0132 (0.0788) | −0.0018 (0.0788) | −0.0016 (0.0788) |
| Firm hierarchical levels | −0.0274 (0.0655) | −0.0319 (0.0641) | 0.0193 (0.0660) | −0.0318 (0.0660) | −0.0351 (0.0650) | −0.0340 (0.0652) |
| Firm age | −0.0958 (0.0622) | −0.0831 (0.0617) | 0.0099 (0.0726) | −0.0950 (0.0624) | −0.0848 (0.0621) | −0.0826 (0.0628) |
| Firm growth | 0.0172 (0.0562) | 0.0175 (0.0535) | −0.0836 (0.0674) | 0.0322 (0.0563) | 0.0311 (0.0547) | 0.0324 (0.0544) |
| Subsidiary firm | 0.1040 (0.1457) | 0.0709 (0.1451) | −0.1725 (0.1619) | 0.1278 (0.1420) | 0.0991 (0.1424) | 0.1008 (0.1431) |
| Controlled by a foreign firm | −0.5150*** (0.1716) | −0.6023*** (0.1839) | 0.1921 (0.2102) | −0.5673*** (0.1768) | −0.6336*** (0.1869) | −0.6340*** (0.1873) |
| TMT size | 0.0145 (0.0264) | 0.0194 (0.0261) | 0.0151 (0.0237) | 0.0128 (0.0264) | 0.0169 (0.0263) | 0.0164 (0.0265) |
| Female CEO | −0.0087 (0.2002) | −0.0299 (0.1905) | 0.1937 (0.2558) | −0.0476 (0.1953) | −0.0615 (0.1865) | −0.0712 (0.1912) |
| CEO tenure | −0.0157 (0.0621) | 0.0155 (0.0647) | 0.0490 (0.0774) | −0.0180 (0.0588) | 0.0075 (0.0614) | 0.0061 (0.0610) |
| CEO MBA | −0.0305 (0.1689) | −0.0331 (0.1656) | 0.1648 (0.1526) | −0.0604 (0.1703) | −0.0600 (0.1674) | −0.0615 (0.1673) |
| CEO decision power | 0.1411** (0.0586) | 0.1530*** (0.0574) | 0.1146* (0.0645) | 0.1232** (0.0578) | 0.1343** (0.0571) | 0.1348** (0.0575) |
| Market competition | 0.2331*** (0.0623) | 0.2333*** (0.0623) | 0.2029*** (0.0665) | 0.1970*** (0.0644) | 0.2002*** (0.0644) | 0.2013*** (0.0646) |
| Market evolution | 0.1206* (0.0658) | 0.1297* (0.0659) | 0.1023 (0.0656) | 0.1043 (0.0655) | 0.1130* (0.0656) | 0.1127* (0.0658) |
| Industry dummy | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Geographical area dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | −0.4387* (0.2271) | −0.3521 (0.2244) | −0.1830 (0.2170) | −0.3882* (0.2244) | −0.3222 (0.2232) | −0.3129 (0.2289) |
| Observations | 237 | 237 | 237 | 237 | 237 | 237 |
| R2 | 0.2115 | 0.2256 | 0.1160 | 0.2399 | 0.2489 | 0.2494 |
| Log-likelihood | −308.7 | −306.6 | −321.2 | −304.4 | −302.9 | −302.9 |
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Realized innovation opportunities | Realized innovation opportunities | TMT knowledge exchange | Realized innovation opportunities | Realized innovation opportunities | Realized innovation opportunities |
| Family firm | – | −0.2842 | −0.3306 | – | −0.2303 (0.1469) | −0.2304 (0.1480) |
| TMT knowledge exchange | – | – | – | 0.1780 | 0.1632 | 0.1382 (0.0889) |
| Family firm * TMT knowledge exchange | – | – | – | – | – | 0.0450 (0.1222) |
| Firm size | 0.0351 (0.0807) | 0.0144 (0.0798) | 0.0991 (0.0783) | 0.0132 (0.0788) | −0.0018 (0.0788) | −0.0016 (0.0788) |
| Firm hierarchical levels | −0.0274 (0.0655) | −0.0319 (0.0641) | 0.0193 (0.0660) | −0.0318 (0.0660) | −0.0351 (0.0650) | −0.0340 (0.0652) |
| Firm age | −0.0958 (0.0622) | −0.0831 (0.0617) | 0.0099 (0.0726) | −0.0950 (0.0624) | −0.0848 (0.0621) | −0.0826 (0.0628) |
| Firm growth | 0.0172 (0.0562) | 0.0175 (0.0535) | −0.0836 (0.0674) | 0.0322 (0.0563) | 0.0311 (0.0547) | 0.0324 (0.0544) |
| Subsidiary firm | 0.1040 (0.1457) | 0.0709 (0.1451) | −0.1725 (0.1619) | 0.1278 (0.1420) | 0.0991 (0.1424) | 0.1008 (0.1431) |
| Controlled by a foreign firm | −0.5150 | −0.6023 | 0.1921 (0.2102) | −0.5673 | −0.6336 | −0.6340 |
| TMT size | 0.0145 (0.0264) | 0.0194 (0.0261) | 0.0151 (0.0237) | 0.0128 (0.0264) | 0.0169 (0.0263) | 0.0164 (0.0265) |
| Female CEO | −0.0087 (0.2002) | −0.0299 (0.1905) | 0.1937 (0.2558) | −0.0476 (0.1953) | −0.0615 (0.1865) | −0.0712 (0.1912) |
| CEO tenure | −0.0157 (0.0621) | 0.0155 (0.0647) | 0.0490 (0.0774) | −0.0180 (0.0588) | 0.0075 (0.0614) | 0.0061 (0.0610) |
| CEO MBA | −0.0305 (0.1689) | −0.0331 (0.1656) | 0.1648 (0.1526) | −0.0604 (0.1703) | −0.0600 (0.1674) | −0.0615 (0.1673) |
| CEO decision power | 0.1411 | 0.1530 | 0.1146 | 0.1232 | 0.1343 | 0.1348 |
| Market competition | 0.2331 | 0.2333 | 0.2029 | 0.1970 | 0.2002 | 0.2013 |
| Market evolution | 0.1206 | 0.1297 | 0.1023 (0.0656) | 0.1043 (0.0655) | 0.1130 | 0.1127 |
| Industry dummy | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Geographical area dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | −0.4387 | −0.3521 (0.2244) | −0.1830 (0.2170) | −0.3882 | −0.3222 (0.2232) | −0.3129 (0.2289) |
| Observations | 237 | 237 | 237 | 237 | 237 | 237 |
| 0.2115 | 0.2256 | 0.1160 | 0.2399 | 0.2489 | 0.2494 | |
| Log-likelihood | −308.7 | −306.6 | −321.2 | −304.4 | −302.9 | −302.9 |
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 and *p < 0.10
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