Results of the empirical models testing, in family firms, the relationship between TMT composition and TMT knowledge exchange and the moderating effect of the CEO search
| Variables | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TMT composition | – | 0.0417 (0.3316) | 0.0412 (0.3371) | 6.1033*** (1.7221) |
| CEO search | – | – | −0.0041 (0.1490) | 1.0570*** (0.3045) |
| TMT composition * CEO search | – | – | – | −1.3333*** (0.3656) |
| Firm size | 0.1984* (0.1078) | 0.1972* (0.1099) | 0.1972* (0.1105) | 0.1322 (0.1085) |
| Firm hierarchical levels | −0.0339 (0.0819) | −0.0338 (0.0824) | −0.0339 (0.0831) | −0.0086 (0.0858) |
| Firm age | −0.1019 (0.0995) | −0.1009 (0.1022) | −0.1004 (0.0988) | −0.0852 (0.0984) |
| Firm growth | −0.1442*** (0.0530) | −0.1451*** (0.0542) | −0.1450*** (0.0541) | −0.1158* (0.0593) |
| Subsidiary firm | −0.2051 (0.2203) | −0.2063 (0.2196) | −0.2062 (0.2215) | −0.0866 (0.2248) |
| Controlled by a foreign firm | 0.6198** (0.2795) | 0.6184** (0.2819) | 0.6192** (0.2778) | 0.5640* (0.2858) |
| TMT size | 0.0208 (0.0330) | 0.0206 (0.0330) | 0.0206 (0.0335) | 0.0342 (0.0331) |
| CEO−centric TMT | 0.0477 (0.2101) | 0.0500 (0.2098) | 0.0489 (0.2087) | 0.1923 (0.2180) |
| TMT trust | 0.4987*** (0.0774) | 0.5000*** (0.0773) | 0.5004*** (0.0797) | 0.5077*** (0.0812) |
| Family CEO | 0.0957 (0.1993) | 0.0993 (0.2045) | 0.0990 (0.2090) | 0.1303 (0.2081) |
| Female CEO | 0.6519 (0.4695) | 0.6567 (0.4717) | 0.6555 (0.4729) | 0.5565 (0.4539) |
| CEO tenure | 0.0077 (0.0775) | 0.0080 (0.0779) | 0.0080 (0.0785) | −0.0140 (0.0753) |
| CEO MBA | 0.1592 (0.2018) | 0.1563 (0.2014) | 0.1569 (0.2011) | 0.1063 (0.2005) |
| CEO decision power | 0.1553 (0.1021) | 0.1529 (0.1005) | 0.1527 (0.0992) | 0.1617* (0.0949) |
| Market competition | 0.1345 (0.0954) | 0.1341 (0.0953) | 0.1341 (0.0958) | 0.1388 (0.0933) |
| Market evolution | 0.0558 (0.0997) | 0.0577 (0.1018) | 0.0574 (0.1033) | 0.0973 (0.0982) |
| Industry dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Geographical area dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | −0.4078 (0.4039) | −0.4387 (0.4738) | −0.4186 (0.9159) | −5.4088*** (1.5964) |
| Observations | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| R2 | 0.3897 | 0.3898 | 0.3898 | 0.4312 |
| Log-likelihood | 0.390 | 0.390 | 0.390 | 0.431 |
| Variables | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TMT composition | – | 0.0417 (0.3316) | 0.0412 (0.3371) | 6.1033 |
| CEO search | – | – | −0.0041 (0.1490) | 1.0570 |
| TMT composition * CEO search | – | – | – | −1.3333 |
| Firm size | 0.1984 | 0.1972 | 0.1972 | 0.1322 (0.1085) |
| Firm hierarchical levels | −0.0339 (0.0819) | −0.0338 (0.0824) | −0.0339 (0.0831) | −0.0086 (0.0858) |
| Firm age | −0.1019 (0.0995) | −0.1009 (0.1022) | −0.1004 (0.0988) | −0.0852 (0.0984) |
| Firm growth | −0.1442 | −0.1451 | −0.1450 | −0.1158 |
| Subsidiary firm | −0.2051 (0.2203) | −0.2063 (0.2196) | −0.2062 (0.2215) | −0.0866 (0.2248) |
| Controlled by a foreign firm | 0.6198 | 0.6184 | 0.6192 | 0.5640 |
| TMT size | 0.0208 (0.0330) | 0.0206 (0.0330) | 0.0206 (0.0335) | 0.0342 (0.0331) |
| CEO−centric TMT | 0.0477 (0.2101) | 0.0500 (0.2098) | 0.0489 (0.2087) | 0.1923 (0.2180) |
| TMT trust | 0.4987 | 0.5000 | 0.5004 | 0.5077 |
| Family CEO | 0.0957 (0.1993) | 0.0993 (0.2045) | 0.0990 (0.2090) | 0.1303 (0.2081) |
| Female CEO | 0.6519 (0.4695) | 0.6567 (0.4717) | 0.6555 (0.4729) | 0.5565 (0.4539) |
| CEO tenure | 0.0077 (0.0775) | 0.0080 (0.0779) | 0.0080 (0.0785) | −0.0140 (0.0753) |
| CEO MBA | 0.1592 (0.2018) | 0.1563 (0.2014) | 0.1569 (0.2011) | 0.1063 (0.2005) |
| CEO decision power | 0.1553 (0.1021) | 0.1529 (0.1005) | 0.1527 (0.0992) | 0.1617 |
| Market competition | 0.1345 (0.0954) | 0.1341 (0.0953) | 0.1341 (0.0958) | 0.1388 (0.0933) |
| Market evolution | 0.0558 (0.0997) | 0.0577 (0.1018) | 0.0574 (0.1033) | 0.0973 (0.0982) |
| Industry dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Geographical area dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | −0.4078 (0.4039) | −0.4387 (0.4738) | −0.4186 (0.9159) | −5.4088 |
| Observations | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| 0.3897 | 0.3898 | 0.3898 | 0.4312 | |
| Log-likelihood | 0.390 | 0.390 | 0.390 | 0.431 |
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 and *p < 0.10
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