Theoretical propositions for Sanction efficacy
| Proposition (Px) | Source of meta-analytic evidence | Theoretical explanation |
|---|---|---|
| P1: Asymmetric Deterrence | Sanction Certainty p < 0.01 (compliance) vs. p > 0.05 (Violation) | Sanctions function primarily as promotive social cues that reinforce compliance rather than preventive threats that suppress violations |
| P2: Celerity-Dependent Deterrence | Celerity x Certainty/Severity moderation | Temporal delay (low celerity) leads to signal decay, weakening the perceived behavior-consequence linkage, thereby neutralizing the deterrent weight of certainty and severity |
| P3: Context-Contingent Deterrence | Geographic region as a significant moderator | Deterrence efficacy is context-dependent, operating through a trust-control paradox shaped by cultural norms and institutional trust |
| Proposition ( | Source of meta-analytic evidence | Theoretical explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Sanction Certainty | Sanctions function primarily as promotive social cues that reinforce compliance rather than preventive threats that suppress violations | |
| Celerity x Certainty/Severity moderation | Temporal delay (low celerity) leads to signal decay, weakening the perceived behavior-consequence linkage, thereby neutralizing the deterrent weight of certainty and severity | |
| Geographic region as a significant moderator | Deterrence efficacy is context-dependent, operating through a trust-control paradox shaped by cultural norms and institutional trust |
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