Use of coding for model development
| Sample participant quote | First-order concepts | Second-order themes | Aggregate dimensions | Resource logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| • “Today, being a Financial Expert also includes knowing the sustainability reporting requirements” (BM33) | Knowledge of sustainability regulation (CSRD, ESRS, AktG §100) and transparency duties is core to expertise | Substantive content of sustainability expertise | Constructing sustainability expertise as a shared capability | RBV-grounded internal capability built under RDT-driven external expectations: boards convert under-specified external competence demands into a collectively defined, self-credentialled capability. Underpins Stage 1 of the process model (Figure 1) |
| • “You must understand sustainability aspects in the context of company strategy, business model, risk management and reporting” (BM33) | Ability to link sustainability with strategy, business model, risk management and financial performance | |||
| • “For me it's a holistic view on the company's long-term ability to exist, inside-out and outside-in” (BM34) | Holistic view on the firm's long-term viability (inside-out and outside-in) | |||
| • “You have to see the goal conflicts – profitability versus investments in sustainable projects” (BM33) | Recognising and managing trade-offs between sustainability goals and profitability (e.g. dividends vs investments) | |||
| • “Social sustainability is basically in the DNA of every union representative on the board” (BM34) | Social sustainability competence is viewed as the “DNA” of union-linked employee representatives | |||
| • “Ecological sustainability I wouldn't really claim for myself; that's not my core expertise” (BM34) | Environmental expertise is often narrower and strongly industry-specific, especially among employee representatives | |||
| • “I completed an ESG performance management certificate at a business school” (BM33) | Formal certifications and courses used to evidence expertise | Credentials, shared definitions and learning processes | ||
| • “We first had to define together what we actually understand by sustainability expertise” (BM06) | Boards run internal processes to agree what “sustainability expertise” means in the competence matrix | |||
| • “Identification is mostly self-evaluation – people tick the box themselves” (BM08) | Self-evaluation in competence profiles dominates identification of sustainability experts | |||
| • “Gaining expertise happens through regular deep dives and workshops for the whole board and committees” (BM29) | Board-wide trainings, workshops and deep dives are central to building a shared ESG literacy baseline | |||
| • “There is no test – it's checked rather through the work itself and our documentations” (BM08) | Systematic testing or external assurance of individual expertise is rare; “proof” is mainly work output | |||
| • “We have several former CEOs who already worked intensively with CO2 and sustainability topics” (BM22) | Selection of shareholder representatives stresses prior CEO/board roles and sectoral sustainability experience | |||
| • “Employee representatives gain such expertise mostly through training – for example via the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung” (BM25) | Employee representatives acquire ESG knowledge mainly via union foundations and targeted training | Different acquisition channels and knowledge bases | Distributing and combining expertise across the shareholder and employee benches | The two resource logics embodied in the benches: shareholder representatives carry RDT-facing external, regulatory and capital-market resources; employee representatives carry RBV-facing internal, operational and workforce resources, combined and reconciled across benches. Underpins Stage 2 of the process model (Figure 1) |
| • “We bring the practical part – direct knowledge from operations that lets us judge social impacts” (BM23) | Employee representatives contribute granular operational knowledge on working conditions and social impacts | |||
| • “The shareholder side brings a lot of scientific and theoretical knowledge, plus a strong capital-market perspective” (BM22) | Shareholder representatives contribute more theoretical, regulatory and capital-market driven ESG perspectives | |||
| • “Employee representatives focus on the S, while the capital side rather emphasizes E and G topics” (BM23) | Employee side tends to prioritise social (S) issues; shareholder side stresses environmental (E) and governance (G) topics | Divergent sustainability priorities and time horizons | ||
| • “We usually think in longer time horizons, the capital side is still very capital-market-oriented” (BM33) | Employee representatives adopt a longer-term, stakeholder-oriented time horizon than the capital side | |||
| • “Overall the cooperation is very appreciative; both sides see the different expertise they bring” (BM24) | Collaboration between the two banks is often described as respectful and complementary rather than confrontational | |||
| • “There are goal conflicts – for example how much dividend we pay out versus investing in new circular models” (BM05) | Conflicts arise mainly around resource allocation and distributional issues (dividends, investment pace, job security) | |||
| • “Basically, the one who knows the topic best has the greatest weight – good arguments convince” (BM33) | Members with deepest subject-matter expertise, or a committee chair, often carry greatest weight in discussions | Formal and informal influence channels | Mobilising expertise into influence through governance channels | Governance channels arbitrate the two logics and convert expertise into influence: committee gateways, agenda-setting and chair authority, and informal/cross-bench coordination determine whether expertise is confined to compliance or extended to strategic integration. Underpins Stage 3 of the process model (Figure 1) |
| • “If there is no sustainability committee, the chair of the supervisory board has the greatest weight, as in all topics” (BM12) | Where no sustainability committee exists, the board chair dominates ESG topics like other strategic issues | |||
| • “In the audit committee ESG is an extra topic, it's not yet a strategic core issue” (BM30) | Audit committees are key loci for sustainability, but ESG is treated mainly as an additional reporting topic | |||
| • “A sustainability committee isn't mere symbolism – they really have work to do and are weighted like other committees” (BM35) | Dedicated sustainability committees exist in some firms; their effectiveness depends on integration with the main board | |||
| • “It is often more effective to work directly with the management responsible for operations than to merely raise a critical question during the meeting” (BM04) | Informal networks and direct work with operative management can be more impactful than formal board debate | |||
| • “The co-determination structure clearly reinforces sustainability – it lets us raise internal and external pressure” (BM05) | Codetermination is widely perceived as a catalyst that strengthens sustainability anchoring on the board | Codetermination and political context | ||
| • “How should we transform companies if we don't think employment along with it? Co-determination makes that unavoidable” (BM30) | Codetermination brings a stronger voice for social issues and employment impacts in transformation debates | |||
| • “In the supervisory board, you share full corporate responsibility; sustainability cannot be delegated to an expert” (BM21) | Some shareholder representatives stress that all members share ESG responsibility and resist “delegating” it to a few experts | |||
| • “The political rollback, especially in the US, removed a lot of support that capital markets once gave to sustainability” (BM35) | Regulatory complexity and political backlash are seen as external obstacles to deeper ESG integration |
| Sample participant quote | First-order concepts | Second-order themes | Aggregate dimensions | Resource logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| • “Today, being a Financial Expert also includes knowing the sustainability reporting requirements” (BM33) | Knowledge of sustainability regulation (CSRD, ESRS, AktG §100) and transparency duties is core to expertise | Substantive content of sustainability expertise | RBV-grounded internal capability built under RDT-driven external expectations: boards convert under-specified external competence demands into a collectively defined, self-credentialled capability. Underpins Stage 1 of the process model ( | |
| • “You must understand sustainability aspects in the context of company strategy, business model, risk management and reporting” (BM33) | Ability to link sustainability with strategy, business model, risk management and financial performance | |||
| • “For me it's a holistic view on the company's long-term ability to exist, inside-out and outside-in” (BM34) | Holistic view on the firm's long-term viability (inside-out and outside-in) | |||
| • “You have to see the goal conflicts – profitability versus investments in sustainable projects” (BM33) | Recognising and managing trade-offs between sustainability goals and profitability (e.g. dividends vs investments) | |||
| • “Social sustainability is basically in the DNA of every union representative on the board” (BM34) | Social sustainability competence is viewed as the “DNA” of union-linked employee representatives | |||
| • “Ecological sustainability I wouldn't really claim for myself; that's not my core expertise” (BM34) | Environmental expertise is often narrower and strongly industry-specific, especially among employee representatives | |||
| • “I completed an ESG performance management certificate at a business school” (BM33) | Formal certifications and courses used to evidence expertise | Credentials, shared definitions and learning processes | ||
| • “We first had to define together what we actually understand by sustainability expertise” (BM06) | Boards run internal processes to agree what “sustainability expertise” means in the competence matrix | |||
| • “Identification is mostly self-evaluation – people tick the box themselves” (BM08) | Self-evaluation in competence profiles dominates identification of sustainability experts | |||
| • “Gaining expertise happens through regular deep dives and workshops for the whole board and committees” (BM29) | Board-wide trainings, workshops and deep dives are central to building a shared ESG literacy baseline | |||
| • “There is no test – it's checked rather through the work itself and our documentations” (BM08) | Systematic testing or external assurance of individual expertise is rare; “proof” is mainly work output | |||
| • “We have several former CEOs who already worked intensively with CO2 and sustainability topics” (BM22) | Selection of shareholder representatives stresses prior CEO/board roles and sectoral sustainability experience | |||
| • “Employee representatives gain such expertise mostly through training – for example via the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung” (BM25) | Employee representatives acquire ESG knowledge mainly via union foundations and targeted training | Different acquisition channels and knowledge bases | The two resource logics embodied in the benches: shareholder representatives carry RDT-facing external, regulatory and capital-market resources; employee representatives carry RBV-facing internal, operational and workforce resources, combined and reconciled across benches. Underpins Stage 2 of the process model ( | |
| • “We bring the practical part – direct knowledge from operations that lets us judge social impacts” (BM23) | Employee representatives contribute granular operational knowledge on working conditions and social impacts | |||
| • “The shareholder side brings a lot of scientific and theoretical knowledge, plus a strong capital-market perspective” (BM22) | Shareholder representatives contribute more theoretical, regulatory and capital-market driven ESG perspectives | |||
| • “Employee representatives focus on the S, while the capital side rather emphasizes E and G topics” (BM23) | Employee side tends to prioritise social (S) issues; shareholder side stresses environmental (E) and governance (G) topics | Divergent sustainability priorities and time horizons | ||
| • “We usually think in longer time horizons, the capital side is still very capital-market-oriented” (BM33) | Employee representatives adopt a longer-term, stakeholder-oriented time horizon than the capital side | |||
| • “Overall the cooperation is very appreciative; both sides see the different expertise they bring” (BM24) | Collaboration between the two banks is often described as respectful and complementary rather than confrontational | |||
| • “There are goal conflicts – for example how much dividend we pay out versus investing in new circular models” (BM05) | Conflicts arise mainly around resource allocation and distributional issues (dividends, investment pace, job security) | |||
| • “Basically, the one who knows the topic best has the greatest weight – good arguments convince” (BM33) | Members with deepest subject-matter expertise, or a committee chair, often carry greatest weight in discussions | Formal and informal influence channels | Governance channels arbitrate the two logics and convert expertise into influence: committee gateways, agenda-setting and chair authority, and informal/cross-bench coordination determine whether expertise is confined to compliance or extended to strategic integration. Underpins Stage 3 of the process model ( | |
| • “If there is no sustainability committee, the chair of the supervisory board has the greatest weight, as in all topics” (BM12) | Where no sustainability committee exists, the board chair dominates ESG topics like other strategic issues | |||
| • “In the audit committee ESG is an extra topic, it's not yet a strategic core issue” (BM30) | Audit committees are key loci for sustainability, but ESG is treated mainly as an additional reporting topic | |||
| • “A sustainability committee isn't mere symbolism – they really have work to do and are weighted like other committees” (BM35) | Dedicated sustainability committees exist in some firms; their effectiveness depends on integration with the main board | |||
| • “It is often more effective to work directly with the management responsible for operations than to merely raise a critical question during the meeting” (BM04) | Informal networks and direct work with operative management can be more impactful than formal board debate | |||
| • “The co-determination structure clearly reinforces sustainability – it lets us raise internal and external pressure” (BM05) | Codetermination is widely perceived as a catalyst that strengthens sustainability anchoring on the board | Codetermination and political context | ||
| • “How should we transform companies if we don't think employment along with it? Co-determination makes that unavoidable” (BM30) | Codetermination brings a stronger voice for social issues and employment impacts in transformation debates | |||
| • “In the supervisory board, you share full corporate responsibility; sustainability cannot be delegated to an expert” (BM21) | Some shareholder representatives stress that all members share ESG responsibility and resist “delegating” it to a few experts | |||
| • “The political rollback, especially in the US, removed a lot of support that capital markets once gave to sustainability” (BM35) | Regulatory complexity and political backlash are seen as external obstacles to deeper ESG integration |
Note(s): Gioia-style data structure. The three aggregate dimensions correspond to the three stages of the process model in Figure 1 and to the findings sub-sections. The final column states the resource logic each dimension expresses, clarifying how resource dependence (external) and resource-based (internal) considerations are combined, reconciled or held in tension within board processes
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