Table AI

Effect sizes of included studies

AuthorNSettingProcess variables includedBoard performance variables includedEffect sizes (r)
1. Wan and Ong (2005) 424Listed firms in SingaporeEN
CC
UKS
A. Service role
B. Monitoring role
EN × A: 0.44
EN × B: 0.57
CC × A: 0.38
CC × B: 0.47
UKS × A: 0.56
UKS × B: 0.58
2. Zona and Zattoni (2007) 301Large manufacturing firms in ItalyEN
CC
UKS
A. Service
B. Monitoring
EN × A: 0.50
EN × B: 0.33
CC × A: 0.00
CC × B: 0.00
UKS × A: 0.25
UKS × B: 0.39
3. van Ees et al. (2008) 136Large firms in the NetherlandsEN
CC
UKS
A. Strategy
B. Monitoring
EN × A: 0.19
EN × B: 0.38
CC × A: 0.02
CC × B: 0.45
UKS × A: 0.24
UKS × B: 0.57
4. Minichilli et al. (2009) 301Large industrial firms in ItalyEN (commitment)
CC (critical debate)
A. Service: Advisory task, networking task and strategic participation
B. Control: Behavioural control, output control and strategy control.
EN × A: 0.46a
EN × B: 0.41a
CC × A: 0.08a
CC × B: 0.01a
5. Gnan and Zattoni (2009) 498Small firms in NorwayEN (commitment)
CC
A. Advisory task
B. Control task
EN × A: 0.26b
EN × B: 0.19b
CC × A: 0.27b
CC × B: 0.30b
6.Scarborough et al. (2010) 135Firms with a corporate secretary in the USENBoard activismEN: 0.56
7. Bailey and Peck (2011) 104Publicly traded firms in the United StatedEN
CC
UKS
Board task performanceEN: 0.53
CC: 0.69
UKS: 0.50
8. Namoga (2011) 86Public and private enterprises on Fiji and Solomon IslandsEN
CC
UKS
A. Service role performance
B. Monitoring and control role performance
EN × A: 0.62
EN × B: 0.17
CC × A: 0.44
CC × B: 0.29
UKS × A: 0.45
UKS × B: 0.73
9. Minichilli et al. (2012) 535Listed and large firms in Norway and ItalyEN
CC
UKS
A. Advisory task performance
B. Control task performance
EN × A: 0.40
EN × B: 0.36
CC × A: 0.01
CC × B: 0.01
UKS × A: 0.34
UKS × B: 0.26
10. Garnes and Mathisen (2014) 307Collaborative tourist organisations in NorwayEN
CC
Board commitmentEN 0.44
CC–0.30
11. McNulty et al. (2013) 141Large firms in the United KingdomEN
CC
UKS
Financial risk-takingEN: 0.22c
CC: 0.20c
UKS: −0.02c
12. Msweli and Singh (2014) 289State owned firms in South AfricaEN
CC
UKS
Board decision qualityEN: 0.45
CC: 0.54
UKS: 0.60
13. Zattoni et al. (2015) 488SMEs in NorwayEN
CC
UKS
A. Strategy task performance
B. Monitoring task performance
EN × A: 0.50
EN × B: 0.37
CC × A: 0.10
CC × B: 0.01
UKS × A: 0.65
UKS × B: 0.66
14. Heemskerk et al. (2015) 148Educational organisations in the NetherlandsEN
CC (task conflict)
UKS
A. Advisory task performance
B. Control task performance
EN × A: 0.39
EN × B: 0.39
CC × A: 0.33
CC × B: 0.32
UKS × A: 0.32
UKS × B: 0.41
15. Ranasinghe et al. (2015) 184Listed firms in AustraliaEN
CC
UKS
Monitoring of financial reportingEN: 0.33
CC: 0.10
UKS: 0.30
16. Mostert et al. (2015) 285Banks and insurance companies in the NetherlandsCCA. Board advice provision
B. Board monitoring
CC × A: −0.09
CC × B: 0.21
17. Zona (2016) 109Family firms in ItalyEN
CC
UKS
Board performanceEN: 0.61
CC: 0.21
UKS: 0.43

Notes:

EN = effort norms, CC = cognitive conflict and UKS = the use of knowledge and skills.

aBoth board roles were measured as three separate variables. Although one should in general not add up correlations, the similarity of the three board roles both in concept as in outcome makes it justifiable to compute a mean r using Fisher’s z-transformation.

bEffect sizes in this study were reported as βs within a multiple regression analysis. Estimates of effect sizes as r are calculated using the transformation suggested by Peterson and Brown (2005): r = 0.99β + 0.04λ + 0.2η with λ = 1 (for β > 0) and η = 1 (for the average intercorrelation of the predictor variable set is > 0.18).

cEffect sizes of the three (inverse) proxies of financial risk-taking during the credit crisis: ΔCash&Equivalents, ΔNetCash and ΔFinancialSlack were reported separately. Given the similarities, conceptual as well as numerical, a mean effect size for r was computed using Fisher’s z-transformation

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