Core properties of peer-to-peer sharing economy platform business models
| Examples | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Core dimensions | Descriptions | Airbnb | Uber |
| No transfer of ownership (i.e. access-based consumption) | Consumers gain temporary, short-term access to resources, while legal ownership remains with the service provider (e.g. Hazée et al., 2017; Schaefers et al., 2016) | Guests gain temporary access to rental space during their short-term stay | Riders gain temporary access to drivers’ vehicle and service for a trip |
| Peer-to-peer exchange mediated through a digital platform | Peer-to-peer activities of providing, obtaining, and sharing the access to resources, mediated through an online technology-enabled platform (e.g. Hamari et al., 2016; Andreassen et al., 2018) | Airbnb does not own hotels but connects hosts (with underutilized capacity) and guests using an online platform | Uber does not own cars but matches drivers and their cars (with underutilized capacity) with riders using an online platform |
| Sharing relates to tangible assets | Consumers gain access to tangible assets (e.g. cars, bicycles, clothing, and accommodation) that are sometimes enhanced by other resources such as labor (e.g. providing a dining experience; Wittkowski et al., 2013) | Hosts share tangible assets (i.e. accommodation) and experiences (e.g. breakfast) with guests | Drivers share tangible assets (i.e. cars) and services (i.e. driving service) with riders |
| Indirect network effects and transaction volume (i.e. liquidity) enhance matching quality | Indirect network effects (i.e. cross-side effects) are critical for two or more-sided platforms whereby the service value increases for one user group when a new user of a different user group joins the platform (Johnson, 2018) Value is added through higher transaction volume (liquidity) as it results in improved matching of capacity and demand, heterogeneous resource features with heterogeneous customer needs, and time and geography requirements. Liquidity combined with powerful matching analytics enhance value for all players | More Airbnb hosts (supply) add value to guests (demand), and vice versa. A larger network results in better matching of demand and capacity, and of user needs and product features | More riders (demand) means more drivers (supply), and vice versa. A larger network results in improved matching, especially in combination with surge pricing which allocates available capacity based on marginal utility |
| Limited direct network effects beyond a threshold level | Direct network effects (i.e. same-side network effects) offer benefits only until a threshold level at which the overall network size is sufficiently attractive for users (or providers) to join the platform. Beyond that, there is little benefit to a user (or provider) if more same-side actors join. Benefits translate mainly through indirect network effects | Once sufficient listings are available to make the platform attractive to users, further Airbnb hosts add competition to existing listings and do not offer direct benefits. The same logic applies to users | Once sufficient listings are available to make the platform attractive to users, further drivers add competition for rides and do not offer direct benefits. The same logic applies to riders |
| Examples | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Core dimensions | Descriptions | Airbnb | Uber |
| No transfer of ownership (i.e. access-based consumption) | Consumers gain temporary, short-term access to resources, while legal ownership remains with the service provider (e.g. | Guests gain temporary access to rental space during their short-term stay | Riders gain temporary access to drivers’ vehicle and service for a trip |
| Peer-to-peer exchange mediated through a digital platform | Peer-to-peer activities of providing, obtaining, and sharing the access to resources, mediated through an online technology-enabled platform (e.g. | Airbnb does not own hotels but connects hosts (with underutilized capacity) and guests using an online platform | Uber does not own cars but matches drivers and their cars (with underutilized capacity) with riders using an online platform |
| Sharing relates to tangible assets | Consumers gain access to tangible assets (e.g. cars, bicycles, clothing, and accommodation) that are sometimes enhanced by other resources such as labor (e.g. providing a dining experience; | Hosts share tangible assets (i.e. accommodation) and experiences (e.g. breakfast) with guests | Drivers share tangible assets (i.e. cars) and services (i.e. driving service) with riders |
| Indirect network effects and transaction volume (i.e. liquidity) enhance matching quality | Indirect network effects (i.e. cross-side effects) are critical for two or more-sided platforms whereby the service value increases for one user group when a new user of a different user group joins the platform ( | More Airbnb hosts (supply) add value to guests (demand), and vice versa. A larger network results in better matching of demand and capacity, and of user needs and product features | More riders (demand) means more drivers (supply), and vice versa. A larger network results in improved matching, especially in combination with surge pricing which allocates available capacity based on marginal utility |
| Limited direct network effects beyond a threshold level | Direct network effects (i.e. same-side network effects) offer benefits only until a threshold level at which the overall network size is sufficiently attractive for users (or providers) to join the platform. Beyond that, there is little benefit to a user (or provider) if more same-side actors join. Benefits translate mainly through indirect network effects | Once sufficient listings are available to make the platform attractive to users, further Airbnb hosts add competition to existing listings and do not offer direct benefits. The same logic applies to users | Once sufficient listings are available to make the platform attractive to users, further drivers add competition for rides and do not offer direct benefits. The same logic applies to riders |
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