Examples of studies that found organizational factors important for use
| Author(s) | Was information used? | Type of information | Organizational factors | Information providers | Information | Information channels | Environmental factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hill and Andrews (2005)** | Yes, but use varies | PI: outputs, efficiencies and outcomes | Budget format influences use: Input-based budgeting processes limited the use of PI compared to performance- based budgeting approaches by focusing attention on appropriations | ||||
| Bourdeaux (2006)** | Yes, but intensity of use varies | Performance measures |
| ||||
| Ellul and Hodges (2019)*** | Yes, varies from high use to low use | Financial information (input information) and PI (output, outcome and efficiency information) | Organizational practices alter use: Government's existing practices encourage focus on inputs while ignoring outputs and outcomes | Information type affects use: Input information limits political bargaining which makes it attractive and more widely used | |||
| Giacomini et al. (2016)* | Yes, varies from high to low levels of use | Accounting information (financial and non- financial/PI) | Stages of political cycle can affect use: Accounting information is used more in decision-making stage, where it operates as ammunition, as compared to the policy formulating stage, where accounting information improves understanding | Level of political conflict modifies use: More political conflict indicates more accounting information use | |||
| Ho (2006)* | Yes, use varies from extensive use to no use and also varies among cities | Input, output, outcome, and efficiency information |
| Citizens involvement in performance measurement design can steer use: Citizen involvement integrates performance measurement with decision-making | |||
| Johansson and Siverbo (2009)* | Yes, but use varies depending on the city | Performance evaluation report (quality, productivity,and efficiency benchmark information) |
| Political environment affects use: Municipalities with left-wing majority in the local council use less information | |||
| Lu and Willoughby (2015) ** | Yes, moderate use | PI (outputs and outcomes) |
| Legal foundation promotes PI use: Having a proper legal foundation for performance-based budgeting contributes to higher PI use | |||
| Paulsson (2006)*** | Yes, although it is less common that ministers would use accounting information as compared to political advisor use | Accrual accounting information |
| ||||
| Raudla (2012)*** | Yes, limited use | PI (outputs and outcomes) |
| Documents inhibit use: Documents are too long and cumbersome, and this contributes to limited use | |||
| Saliterer & Korac (2014)* | Yes, high and extensive | PI (effectiveness/outcome and efficiency) | Organizational culture enhances PI use: Developmental culture increases performance information use | Availability of information is crucial for use: When availability of PI increases, PI use also increases | |||
| Saliterer and Korac (2013)* | Yes, extensive use | PI (efficiency and effectiveness/outcome measures) |
| External accountability is a determinant of use: PI is used more in external accountability relationships |
| Author(s) | Was information used? | Type of information | Organizational factors | Information providers | Information | Information channels | Environmental factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes, but use varies | PI: outputs, efficiencies and outcomes | Budget format influences use: Input-based budgeting processes limited the use of PI compared to performance- based budgeting approaches by focusing attention on appropriations | |||||
| Yes, but intensity of use varies | Performance measures | Legislative responsibility for budgeting influences use: Legislative responsibility for budgeting increased use of performance measures Legislative engagement in oversight of PI affects use: Legislative engagement in oversight of PI increased use of performance measures | |||||
| Yes, varies from high use to low use | Financial information (input information) and PI (output, outcome and efficiency information) | Organizational practices alter use: Government's existing practices encourage focus on inputs while ignoring outputs and outcomes | Information type affects use: Input information limits political bargaining which makes it attractive and more widely used | ||||
| Yes, varies from high to low levels of use | Accounting information (financial and non- financial/PI) | Stages of political cycle can affect use: Accounting information is used more in decision-making stage, where it operates as ammunition, as compared to the policy formulating stage, where accounting information improves understanding | Level of political conflict modifies use: More political conflict indicates more accounting information use | ||||
| Yes, use varies from extensive use to no use and also varies among cities | Input, output, outcome, and efficiency information | Organizational culture relates to use: Culture integrates PI with decision-making Performance measurement practices affect use: Measurement practices need to be in order if PI use is expected to happen Performance measures connected to goals, planning and reporting influence use: Connecting measures to goals, planning and reporting enhances use | Citizens involvement in performance measurement design can steer use: Citizen involvement integrates performance measurement with decision-making | ||||
| Yes, but use varies depending on the city | Performance evaluation report (quality, productivity,and efficiency benchmark information) | Organizational slack relates to use: Organizational slack contributes to higher use Administrative competences and capabilities drive use: Administrative competences and capabilities promote higher use Well-developed change routines explain use: Well-developed change routines are associated with higher use | Political environment affects use: Municipalities with left-wing majority in the local council use less information | ||||
| Yes, moderate use | PI (outputs and outcomes) | Performance management is crucial for PI use: Budgeting for performance is more likely to occur when state conducts performance management Measurement system maturity contributes to PI use: Measurement system maturity increases some PI use Shared responsibilities are important for PI use: Shared responsibilities advance PI use Capacity-building relates to PI use: Capacity-building increases PI use | Legal foundation promotes PI use: Having a proper legal foundation for performance-based budgeting contributes to higher PI use | ||||
| Yes, although it is less common that ministers would use accounting information as compared to political advisor use | Accrual accounting information | Funding of the agency shapes use: Agencies financed with fees use more information than agencies financed with appropriations Financial problems affect use: Agencies with financial problems use more information than agencies not having such problems | |||||
| Yes, limited use | PI (outputs and outcomes) | Budget process lowers use: Budget process is too time-constrained, which limits PI use Organizational roles cause problems for use: Limited role of legislators does not incentivize use | Documents inhibit use: Documents are too long and cumbersome, and this contributes to limited use | ||||
| Yes, high and extensive | PI (effectiveness/outcome and efficiency) | Organizational culture enhances PI use: Developmental culture increases performance information use | Availability of information is crucial for use: When availability of PI increases, PI use also increases | ||||
| Yes, extensive use | PI (efficiency and effectiveness/outcome measures) | Rational culture is important for use: Rational culture is an incentive to increase PI use Partnership building affects use: Partnership building increases some PI use Internal management explains use: PI is used less in internal management Rational implementation relates to use: Rational implementation promotes higher PI use | External accountability is a determinant of use: PI is used more in external accountability relationships |
Note(s): *Local government, **State government, ***Central government
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