Hedge fund activism and changes in reported internal control weaknesses
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| ICWt+1 | ICWt+1 | |
| Hedge fund intervention | 0.472*** (2.821) | 0.530*** (3.108) |
| Size | −0.157*** (−4.227) | −0.208*** (−4.978) |
| Prior loss | 0.139* (1.764) | 0.155* (1.863) |
| ROA | −0.234*** (−3.220) | −0.246*** (−3.368) |
| Leverage | 0.188*** (7.954) | 0.235*** (9.203) |
| Sales growth | 0.116* (1.891) | 0.111* (1.647) |
| PPE | 0.818 (0.567) | 1.613 (0.924) |
| Return | −0.084* (−1.822) | −0.104* (−1.848) |
| Big4 | −0.671*** (−9.102) | −0.679*** (−8.835) |
| Auditor change | 0.758*** (7.758) | 0.726*** (7.233) |
| Firm age | −0.007*** (−2.598) | −0.009*** (−3.292) |
| KZ index | 0.003** (2.287) | 0.003** (2.142) |
| Constant | −2.435* (−1.802) | −3.096* (−1.810) |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.064 | 0.095 |
| Industry-fixed effects | No | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | No | Yes |
| Observations | 20,060 | 20,060 |
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| ICW | ICW | |
| Hedge fund intervention | 0.472*** (2.821) | 0.530*** (3.108) |
| Size | −0.157*** (−4.227) | −0.208*** (−4.978) |
| Prior loss | 0.139* (1.764) | 0.155* (1.863) |
| ROA | −0.234*** (−3.220) | −0.246*** (−3.368) |
| Leverage | 0.188*** (7.954) | 0.235*** (9.203) |
| Sales growth | 0.116* (1.891) | 0.111* (1.647) |
| PPE | 0.818 (0.567) | 1.613 (0.924) |
| Return | −0.084* (−1.822) | −0.104* (−1.848) |
| Big4 | −0.671*** (−9.102) | −0.679*** (−8.835) |
| Auditor change | 0.758*** (7.758) | 0.726*** (7.233) |
| Firm age | −0.007*** (−2.598) | −0.009*** (−3.292) |
| KZ index | 0.003** (2.287) | 0.003** (2.142) |
| Constant | −2.435* (−1.802) | −3.096* (−1.810) |
| Adjusted | 0.064 | 0.095 |
| Industry-fixed effects | No | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | No | Yes |
| Observations | 20,060 | 20,060 |
Note(s): This table reports the effect of hedge fund activism on the reported internal control weaknesses in the year subsequent to the activism event. The dependent variable is the reported firm internal control weaknesses in the next year. The regressions are clustered by White standard errors. Column (2) includes industry-fixed effects (using Fama and French 48 industry classifications) and year-fixed effects. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 1. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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