Dynamic change model examining the effect of hedge fund activism on reported internal control weaknesses
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| ICWt+1 | ICWt+1 | |
| Before1 | 0.127 (0.501) | 0.182 (0.695) |
| Current | 0.439** (1.970) | 0.474** (2.021) |
| After1 | 0.336 (1.503) | 0.385 (1.628) |
| After2 | −0.157 (−0.609) | −0.087 (−0.323) |
| After3 | −0.568* (−1.799) | −0.595* (−1.784) |
| After4 | −0.727** (−1.965) | −0.651* (−1.718) |
| Size | −0.130 (−1.165) | −0.100 (−0.797) |
| Prior loss | 0.350* (1.849) | 0.375* (1.898) |
| ROA | −0.426 (−0.862) | −0.633 (−1.162) |
| Leverage | 1.065*** (3.310) | 1.124*** (3.265) |
| Sales growth | 0.209 (1.315) | 0.217 (1.296) |
| PPE | −0.010 (−0.125) | −0.014 (−0.146) |
| Return | −0.055 (−1.134) | −0.050 (−1.039) |
| Big4 | −0.526*** (−2.993) | −0.531*** (−2.717) |
| Auditor change | 1.100*** (4.633) | 1.119*** (4.493) |
| Firm age | 0.009 (1.429) | 0.004 (0.568) |
| KZ index | −0.000 (−0.155) | −0.002 (−0.701) |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.084 | 0.114 |
| Constant | −0.358 (−0.292) | −1.865 (−1.228) |
| Industry-fixed effects | No | Yes |
| Observations | 2,240 | 2,240 |
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| ICW | ICW | |
| Before1 | 0.127 (0.501) | 0.182 (0.695) |
| Current | 0.439** (1.970) | 0.474** (2.021) |
| After1 | 0.336 (1.503) | 0.385 (1.628) |
| After2 | −0.157 (−0.609) | −0.087 (−0.323) |
| After3 | −0.568* (−1.799) | −0.595* (−1.784) |
| After4 | −0.727** (−1.965) | −0.651* (−1.718) |
| Size | −0.130 (−1.165) | −0.100 (−0.797) |
| Prior loss | 0.350* (1.849) | 0.375* (1.898) |
| ROA | −0.426 (−0.862) | −0.633 (−1.162) |
| Leverage | 1.065*** (3.310) | 1.124*** (3.265) |
| Sales growth | 0.209 (1.315) | 0.217 (1.296) |
| PPE | −0.010 (−0.125) | −0.014 (−0.146) |
| Return | −0.055 (−1.134) | −0.050 (−1.039) |
| Big4 | −0.526*** (−2.993) | −0.531*** (−2.717) |
| Auditor change | 1.100*** (4.633) | 1.119*** (4.493) |
| Firm age | 0.009 (1.429) | 0.004 (0.568) |
| KZ index | −0.000 (−0.155) | −0.002 (−0.701) |
| Adjusted | 0.084 | 0.114 |
| Constant | −0.358 (−0.292) | −1.865 (−1.228) |
| Industry-fixed effects | No | Yes |
| Observations | 2,240 | 2,240 |
Note(s): This table reports the dynamic changes of reported internal control weaknesses around an activism event. Columns (1) and (2) use a window from two years prior to the event until four years after with Yeart−2 being the benchmark year. Before1 is an indicator that equals one for years that are one year before the hedge fund activism event. Current is an indicator that equals one for year that is the hedge fund target year. After1, After2, After3 and After4 are indicators that each equal one for years that are one, two, three or four years after the hedge fund activism event year, respectively. In all regressions, the dependent variable is ICWt+1. All data are winsorized at the one and 99% level. Column (2) includes industry-fixed effects (using Fama and French 48 industry classifications). Only firms that were targeted are included in the analysis. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 1. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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