Table 7

Effect of director turnover on the relationship between hedge fund activism and internal control weaknesses

(1)(2)
ICWt+1ICWt+1
Director turnover = 1Director turnover = 0
Hedge fund intervention0.475*** (3.246)0.148 (1.014)
Size−0.137** (−2.101)−0.153 (−1.270)
Prior loss0.336*** (3.137)−0.314* (−1.677)
ROA−0.075 (−0.412)−0.439* (−1.939)
Leverage0.139*** (4.079)0.287*** (3.425)
Sales growth0.163** (2.368)−0.131 (−0.549)
PPE−0.078 (−1.471)−0.115 (−0.064)
Return−0.136** (−1.998)−0.133 (−1.015)
Big4−0.433*** (−4.424)−0.958*** (−4.127)
Auditor change0.530*** (3.408)−0.215 (−0.613)
Firm age−0.053 (−1.441)−0.219*** (−3.125)
KZ index0.002 (1.078)0.006* (1.901)
Constant−1.186** (−2.164)1.228 (1.239)
Industry-fixed effectsYesYes
Year-fixed effectsYesYes
Observations13,2735,247

Note(s): This table analyzes if firms that had director changes experience stronger relationships between hedge fund activism and internal control weaknesses by using logit model. Firms that experienced director changes in the next year are reported in Column (1). Firms that experienced no director changes in the next year are reported in Column (2). All data is Winsorized at the one percent and ninety-nine percent level. Included are industry-fixed effects (using Fama and French 48 industry classifications) and year-fixed effects in the regressions. Variable definitions can be found in  Appendix 1. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively

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