Additional analysis: the effect of discretionary loan loss provisions
| Non-audit fees to total fees ratio | Log of audit fee | Log of non-audit fee | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1: Chair | Model 2: Directors | Model 1: Chair | Model 2: Directors | Model 1: Chair | Model 2: Directors | ||||||||
| Dependent variable | Coef. | t-stat | Coef. | t-stat | Coef. | t-stat | Coef. | t-stat | Coef. | t-stat | Coef. | t-stat | |
| Panel A: high Loan Loss Provisions (higher than median) | |||||||||||||
| Affiliated alumni chair | 0.189 | 3.289*** | −0.156 | −2.240** | 0.115 | 0.404 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni chair | 0.000 | 0.019 | −0.044 | −1.041 | −0.364 | −1.538 | |||||||
| Affiliated alumni | 0.132 | 2.706*** | −0.120 | −1.900* | 0.324 | 0.854 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni | −0.011 | −0.422 | −0.069 | −1.400 | −0.289 | −0.824 | |||||||
| Panel B: low loan loss provisions (lower than median) | |||||||||||||
| Affiliated alumni chair | 0.059 | 1.722* | −0.103 | −1.961* | 0.210 | 1.073 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni chair | −0.005 | −0.132 | −0.011 | −0.272 | −0.319 | −1.309 | |||||||
| Affiliated alumni | 0.072 | 1.322 | −0.128 | −2.628*** | 0.121 | 0.280 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni | 0.007 | 0.215 | −0.057 | −1.274 | −0.279 | −0.615 | |||||||
| Non-audit fees to total fees ratio | Log of audit fee | Log of non-audit fee | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1: Chair | Model 2: Directors | Model 1: Chair | Model 2: Directors | Model 1: Chair | Model 2: Directors | ||||||||
| Dependent variable | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | |||||||
| Affiliated alumni chair | 0.189 | 3.289 | −0.156 | −2.240 | 0.115 | 0.404 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni chair | 0.000 | 0.019 | −0.044 | −1.041 | −0.364 | −1.538 | |||||||
| Affiliated alumni | 0.132 | 2.706 | −0.120 | −1.900 | 0.324 | 0.854 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni | −0.011 | −0.422 | −0.069 | −1.400 | −0.289 | −0.824 | |||||||
| Affiliated alumni chair | 0.059 | 1.722 | −0.103 | −1.961 | 0.210 | 1.073 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni chair | −0.005 | −0.132 | −0.011 | −0.272 | −0.319 | −1.309 | |||||||
| Affiliated alumni | 0.072 | 1.322 | −0.128 | −2.628 | 0.121 | 0.280 | |||||||
| Unaffiliated alumni | 0.007 | 0.215 | −0.057 | −1.274 | −0.279 | −0.615 | |||||||
Notes:
All p-values are two-tailed. *, **, and *** denote p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively. The standard errors to calculate p-values are obtained after clustering observations from unique firms. Results are based on the same model as in Table III, but for brevity, the control variables are not tabulated. All variables are as defined in Table I
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