Table V.

Additional analysis: the effect of discretionary loan loss provisions

Non-audit fees to total fees ratioLog of audit feeLog of non-audit fee
 Model 1: ChairModel 2: DirectorsModel 1: ChairModel 2: DirectorsModel 1: ChairModel 2: Directors
Dependent variableCoef.t-statCoef.t-statCoef.t-statCoef.t-statCoef.t-statCoef.t-stat
Panel A: high Loan Loss Provisions (higher than median)
Affiliated alumni chair0.1893.289***  −0.156−2.240**  0.1150.404  
Unaffiliated alumni chair0.0000.019  −0.044−1.041  −0.364−1.538  
Affiliated alumni  0.1322.706***  −0.120−1.900*  0.3240.854
Unaffiliated alumni  −0.011−0.422  −0.069−1.400  −0.289−0.824
Panel B: low loan loss provisions (lower than median)
Affiliated alumni chair0.0591.722*  −0.103−1.961*  0.2101.073  
Unaffiliated alumni chair−0.005−0.132  −0.011−0.272  −0.319−1.309  
Affiliated alumni  0.0721.322  −0.128−2.628***  0.1210.280
Unaffiliated alumni  0.0070.215  −0.057−1.274  −0.279−0.615

Notes:

All p-values are two-tailed. *, **, and *** denote p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively. The standard errors to calculate p-values are obtained after clustering observations from unique firms. Results are based on the same model as in Table III, but for brevity, the control variables are not tabulated. All variables are as defined in Table I 

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