| Ahlers et al. (2015) | Signaling theory, entrepreneurial ownership, IPO | Human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, financial information | Signals | Human capital (+): board members (+), %MBA (+). Social capital (+/−): %nonexecutive board members. Intellectual capital (+/−): patents. Retained equity offering (−). Financial information: absence of disclaimer of no information (−; but not on the number of investors). Exit channel/strategy (+/−; “cheap talk” and not effective signal) |
| Agrawal et al. (2016) | Information asymmetry and quality assessment, voting rights and syndicates | Syndicates | Syndicates deals provide division of labor among investors (due diligence, etc.), enhance economic growth by reducing market failures and allocating capital more efficiently | Syndicates (+) |
| Li et al. (2016) | Traditional finance on capital markets and information disclosure | Firm characteristics, team characteristics, lead investor information, project presentation and social interaction | Likelihood of elaboration (ELM) and persuasion, information disclosure reduce information asymmetry and induce persuasion; early lead investments as signal, but not for higher percentage of investment (collusion risk) | Team size (+), firm age (+), ratio of full-time workers (+), human capital (+), project updates and interactions (+), pitch video (+), length of description (+), information disclosure (+), early lead investments (+), percentage of lead investors’ investments (−; think they might collude to attract followers) |
| Lukkarinen et al. (2016) | Drivers of investment decisions in adjacent fields to ECF: crowdfunding (reward, etc.) and VCs and BAs | Investment decision criteria of CF, investment decision criteria of early-stage financing (VC, BA), campaign characteristics | Credibility, encourage investment, capability and decisiveness of entrepreneurs | BA/VC criteria (+/−): financial information (+/−, but may be relevant for accredited investors with more expertise). CF criteria (+, easily observable): understandability of product (+), campaign characteristics (+): [funding target (+), share price/min investment (−), campaign duration (−), financials provision (+/−)], network (+): [private funding from early hidden phase (+), social media network interaction (+, Facebook)] |
| Vismara (2016) | Equity retention, entrepreneurs’ social capital and social network | Campaign characteristics, social capital, firm characteristics | Signaling | Social capital (+, LinkedIn), retained equity offering (−), team size (+), funding target (+), tax incentives (+/−), exit IPO (+/−), exit in five years (−), dividends intention (+), female gender (−), duration (−), seedrs (+), London (+/−) |
| Vulkan et al. (2016) | Crowdfunding | Campaign characteristics, investors characteristics, firm characteristics | Herding behavior, signaling | Share accumulated in first week (+), funding target (-), largest investment made by single investor (+), number of investors (+), premoney (+/−), team size (+, weak), tax incentives (+/−), public profile of investors (+/−) |
| Löher (2017) | Crowdfunding, role of platforms, information asymmetries, intermediation | Role of platforms | Platform intermediation: project evaluation and assessment (prescreening), reputation, reduction of information asymmetry, reduction of transaction costs | Platform intermediation (+) |
| Block et al. (2018) | Signaling theory and information disclosure | Updates, readability/understandability index of updates | Updates by start-up as signals in ECF | Update number (+, but takes time and “cheap talks” issue), Flesch readability index (+, but weak, on number of investments only and takes time), word count (+/−). Updates about: (new funding (+), business development (+), campaign developments (+), cooperation projects (+), team update (+/−, typically do not change during campaign), business model (+/−, typically do not change during campaign), external certifications (−, not credible?) |
| Löher et al. (2018) | Entrepreneurial finance, information asymmetry, crowdfunding | Own commitment level of entrepreneurs, firm characteristics, campaign characteristics, investor characteristics | Signals | Own commitment level (+), premoney (+), professional investors (+/−), firm age (−), financing alternatives available before start (+/−), destination of funds: [market entry (+/−), market penetration (+/−)]. |
| Malaga et al. (2018) | Female entrepreneurship and finance | Gender | ECF platform as facilitator for female entrepreneurship | Gender (+/−, perhaps ECF do not ease female entrepreneurship) |
| Mamonov and Malaga (2018) | ECF title III JOBS Act | Business characteristics: market risk, execution risk, agency risk. Human capital, intellectual capital, firm characteristics | Less sophisticated investors will follow more sophisticated investors’ lead (BA, VC) decision-making | Company development (of product) stage (+), venture with large corporate clients (+), intellectual capital and patents (+/−), team size (+), prior early-stage funding (+, BA, VC), serial entrepreneur (+/−), entrepreneur experience (+/−) |
| Motylska-Kuzma (2018) | Sustainable development | Sustainability elements, campaign characteristics | Sensitivity of investors to sensitivity | Key elements of sustainable development (+, but not on the number of investors), Basic elements (+, weaker: number of investors not sensitive to sustainability) |
| Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2018) | Information asymmetry, human capital, signaling | Human capital, social capital, intellectual capital, firm characteristics, business characteristics | Signals | Entrepreneur social (media, LinkedIn) capital (+), funding goal (−), high-tech (−, more uncertainty Ahlers et al., 2015), team size (+/−), intellectual capital and patents (+). Human capital: (entrepreneur education (+, but only specific to business education; others are +/−), entrepreneur experience [+, but not necessarily in industry)]. Gender (+/−) |
| Barbi and Mattioli (2019) | Human capital, crowdfunding | Human capital, firm characteristics, team characteristics, business characteristics | Signals | Firm age (+), high-tech (+/−), big city (+/−), reward/discounts in addition to shares (+/−), prior seed financing (+), featured in media, newspapers, TV (+), online presence (+/−, number of social media on webpage), team size (+), graduate within team (+, weak), professional business experience (+), experience in the field of firm (+/−), gender (+/−), volunteering (+/−) |
| Cumming et al. (2019a, 2019b) | Corporate finance theories about voting rights and separation between ownership and control (Principal-Agent) | Ownership variables | Signals: firm value increase with cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders but decrease if voting rights exceed cash-flow rights. Separation of voting power and cash-flow | Equity offered [−, equal to cash-flow rights (+)], separation ownership and control (−, potential rise of agency costs), separation mitigated by entrepreneur experience (+), firm age (−), positive sales (+) |
| Kleinert and Volkmann (2019) | Information asymmetries, early-stage finance | Discussion and discussion topics. Control for herding (investor frequency before day t) | Signals, herding | Investor frequency (+), competing offers (+), entrepreneur reply (+), updates (+), discussions (+), discussion topic (+, significant: market risk, financial snapshot, likely return, shareholders' rights) |
| Mamonov and Malaga (2019) | Market risk, execution risk, agency risk, computer mediation challenge (videos) | Intellectual capital, human capital, firm characteristics, market/product characteristics, pitch video | Effects of market risk, agency risk, execution risk and computer mediation | Market risk: firm age/stage (+), B2B corporate clients (+), patents (+). Agency risk: BA/VC investors (+). Execution risk: team size (+/−), entrepreneur industry experience (+/−), serial entrepreneur (+). Computer mediation: use of pitch video (+), presence of entrepreneur in video (+/−) |
| Nitani et al. (2019) | Information asymmetry, crowdinvestors’ rationality, social media herding behavior | Firm characteristics, financial information and measures, usage of funding, social capital, human capital | Signals, herding | Firm attributes: firm size (+), firm age (−), exit strategy: IPO (+), M&A (−, weak). Usage of funds: working capital (+), R/D (+/−), marketing (+/−), market expansion (+/−). Financial measures: expected sales growth (+, but reasonable), expected EBITDA (+). Social network (+, LinkedIn and Facebook). Prior start-up experience (+). Education degree (+/−) |
| Rossi et al. (2019) | Corporate governance: separation between ownership and control, voting rights, information asymmetry | Ownership and voting rights, syndicate-platform, platform characteristics | Signals: impact of voting rights delivery, platform intermediation | Voting rights (+/−): individual voting rights (−), pooled voting rights (+/−), syndicate-like platforms (−), common law country (+), platform age (+) |
| Usman et al. (2019) | Information asymmetry | Role of media, experience | Signals | Role of media (+, both video and images), past CF success (+), duration (−), updates (+), comments (+), number of URL links shared (+) |
| Vismara (2019) | Sustainable development, signal interpretation | Firm characteristics, human capital, campaign characteristics, business characteristics | Signals and different interpretations (characteristics of the receiver) | Sustainability (+/−, but attracts more crowd investors; not professionals), team size (+, but not for professionals), entrepreneur experience (+/−), target capital (+, but for investors only and not for success), equity offered (−), serial entrepreneur (+/−), tax incentives (+/−) |
| De Crescenzo et al. (2020) | Contingency factors of ECF | Firm characteristics, campaign characteristics | Signals and contingency | Firm age (−), industry sector (+), team size (+), gender (+, failure if not female), reward (−, they prefer financial returns), pictures (+) |
| Kleinert et al. (2020) | Entrepreneurial finance, signaling | Prior funding, human capital, social capital, firm stage, firm characteristics | Signals with moderation effects | Prior funding (+): CF (+), VC (+, but only for no. investors), BA (+, but only for no. investors), grant (+, but not for no. investors). Market access (+, but not on number of investors), entrepreneur education (+), technology (−, but only for number of investors), exit plan (+), funding goal (+, but only for number of investors), multiple investor types (+), revenues/sales (+), moderation effects of social capital (+, nonexecutive directors), moderation effects of seed stage (+) |
| Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2020) | Entrepreneurial finance and ECF | Campaign characteristics, firm characteristics, intellectual capital, human capital | Signals | Equity offered (−), funding goal (+/−), external financing (+), accelerator attendance (+), firm age (−), team size (+), entrepreneur age (−), prior ECF funding (follow-on campaign) (+), intellectual property rights and patents (+/−) |
| Xiao (2020) | Trust theory and early-stage financing | Trust | Signals, trust building, platform intermediation |
| Lim and Busenitz (2020) | Signaling and CF, human capital characteristics | Human capital, team characteristics (moderation effect) | Signals | Human capital (+): university education (+), management experience in SMEs (+), management experience in large companies (+/−), startup experience of previous ventures (+), startup experience of ongoing ventures (−). Team characteristics (+): team size (+, dummy: lone founder or team-based). Control: sales (−), intellectual capital [+, number of patents (+), proportion of MBAs (+)], funding target (+), team board/employee size (+/−), location (+/−), prior CF funding (+/−, dummy) |
| Shafi (2021) | ECF and professional investors’ criteria | Human capital (team characteristics), firm characteristics (business), financial information and metrics | Evaluability heuristics | Management: management rating (+), commitment (+), experience (+/−), skills (+/−). Business: business rating (+), market rating (+/−), product rating (+/−), competition rating (+/−). Financials (+/−). Control: prior CF success (+), equity offered (−), high-tech (+/−), London (+/-), funding target (+/−), firm age (+/−), tax relief (+/−) |
| Andrieu et al. (2021) | ECF and female entrepreneurship, homophily theory | Gender | Female risk aversion and homophily theory | Gender (−); Control: entrepreneur characteristics: [+/−,PhD level ( ), hi-tech experience (+/−), ethnicity (+/-)], firm maturity (+/−), geographical location (+/−), funding goal (−), date (+/−), platform (+/−) |
| Dority et al. (2021) | ECF determinants, signaling, information asymmetry and information overload | Pitch descriptions: textual analysis in CF and information overload | Signals; tone and readability of descriptions, information overload (less is more) | Readability: Information quantity [word count (+) word count^2(−)], information quality [SMOG (+), SMOG^2(−)]; tone [Information attitude (+), information attitude^2(−)]. Control: [gender (+/−), funding goal (−), prior seed financing (+), VIX volatility level (−)] |
| Meoli and Vismara (2021) | Signaling, digital finance, social finance, information manipulation | Withdrawal rights | Signals, information manipulation | Platform-member investment (−), platform-member withdrawal (+). Control: funding target (−), team size (+/−), sales (+), equity offered (−) |
| Vrontis et al. (2021b) | Knowledge sharing, singaling | Intellectual capital, social capital, platform characteristics, campaign characteristics | Knowledge sharing and information dissemination | Platform information hub (+), number of campaigns on platform (+/−), intellectual capital (+), geographical distance(+/−), number of shareholders (+), team size (+/−), reward (+), equity retention (+/−), campaign success (+) |
| Coakley et al. (2022) | Signaling | Team characteristics, human capital | Signals, certification effect | Team size [+, lone founder (−)], human capital [+, tenure heterogeneity (+), age heterogeneity (+), advanced degrees (+)]. Controls: (premoney (+/−), firm maturity [+, startup dummy(−)], location (+/−), equity offered (+/−), diversification (−), funding target (+/−), number of investors (+)] |