Table 3 Most trending documents on... | Emerald Publishing

Table 3

Most trending documents on corporate governance and remuneration (among articles published in the last five years)

Author	Selected findings
Zorn et al. (2020)	• Poor performance and the number of hiring directors are positively related to the increment in CEO pay and negatively related to likelihood of CEO dismissal • The bias among hiring directors can be mitigated via experience
Borisova et al. (2019)	• CEO equity-linked wealth in privatized firms is less sensitive to stock performance, and equity remuneration is negatively related to government ownership stakes • Privatized companies take less risk than non-privatized companies
Shaikh et al. (2019)	• The pressures imposed on a board through external regulations and controls often result in outside directors signing off on less risky expenditures
Banerjee and Homroy (2018)	• The performance sensitivity of CEO pay, and turnover differ significantly between group affiliates and stand-alone firms
Fedaseyeu et al. (2018)	• On average, more qualified directors handle more board functions and receive higher pay, but this is not true for co-opted directors (i.e. those that joined the board after the CEO) • Co-opted directors are assigned more functions and receive higher pay on boards highly influenced by the CEO
Kang and Zaheer (2018)	• The preference of manager is leaded by the managerial incentives
Dah and Frye (2017)	• On average, CEOs are under-remunerated • Excessive remuneration is consistent with increased director workloads
Sila et al. (2017)	• When more-independent directors get higher rank in, the firm-specific information content of a firm's stock price increases
Wang (2016)	• CEO remuneration is negatively (positively) related to information trading (volatility)

Author	Selected findings
Zorn et al. (2020)	• Poor performance and the number of hiring directors are positively related to the increment in CEO pay and negatively related to likelihood of CEO dismissal • The bias among hiring directors can be mitigated via experience
Borisova et al. (2019)	• CEO equity-linked wealth in privatized firms is less sensitive to stock performance, and equity remuneration is negatively related to government ownership stakes • Privatized companies take less risk than non-privatized companies
Shaikh et al. (2019)	• The pressures imposed on a board through external regulations and controls often result in outside directors signing off on less risky expenditures
Banerjee and Homroy (2018)	• The performance sensitivity of CEO pay, and turnover differ significantly between group affiliates and stand-alone firms
Fedaseyeu et al. (2018)	• On average, more qualified directors handle more board functions and receive higher pay, but this is not true for co-opted directors (i.e. those that joined the board after the CEO) • Co-opted directors are assigned more functions and receive higher pay on boards highly influenced by the CEO
Kang and Zaheer (2018)	• The preference of manager is leaded by the managerial incentives
Dah and Frye (2017)	• On average, CEOs are under-remunerated • Excessive remuneration is consistent with increased director workloads
Sila et al. (2017)	• When more-independent directors get higher rank in, the firm-specific information content of a firm's stock price increases
Wang (2016)	• CEO remuneration is negatively (positively) related to information trading (volatility)