Table 2.

Effect of time until completion on stock performance using accruals quality of target to proxy for information asymmetry

 (1)(2)(3)
CAR/BHARThree monthsOne yearTwo years
 Whole sample
Time until completion0.002900**0.0012230.007954
Time until completion squared−0.000028***−0.000018−0.000076
Control variables and fixed effectYYY
Optimum time until completion(days)523452
U-test (p-value)0.020.370.09
U-test-implicationStrong inverse UMonotone/UWeak inverse U
Observations1,4991,4941,478
R20.1120.0760.072
Number of firms979974959
 Opaque targets
Time until completion0.0023220.047026***0.050680**
Time until completion squared−0.000100−0.001469***−0.001605***
Control variables and fixed effectYYY
Optimum time until completion (days)121616
U-test (p-value)0.350.000.02
U-test-implicationMonotone/UStrong inverse UStrong inverse U
Observations623622615
R20.2260.3070.346
Number of firms498497490
 Transparent targets
Time until completion0.002919−0.0003610.003738
Time until completion squared−0.000033**−0.000015−0.000045
Control variables and fixed effectYYY
Optimum time until completion (days)44−1242
U-test (p-value)0.070.24
U-test-implicationWeak inverse UMonotone/UMonotone/U
Observations561559556
R20.1650.1550.062
Number of firms426424421

Notes:

Regressing our performance measure (CAR/BHAR) on time until deal completion and its squared term for different periods post-merger, the table is a combined test of the due diligence hypothesis and the overdue hypothesis. To test the role played by information asymmetry of the target, the sample is partitioned into opaque and transparent targets using the accrual quality of the target as a proxy for information asymmetry. Control variables include the national- and firm-level and deal-specific variables as explained in the Appendix. Firm fixed effect is included in all models and the optimum time until deal completion and the results of the stringent test of quadratic relation, following Lind and Mehlum (2010) are also reported. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.

***p < 0.01,

**p < 0.05;

*p < 0.1

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