Robustness check-effect of time until completion on financial performance using Tobin’s Q of target to proxy for information asymmetry
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ΔROA | One year | Two years | Five years |
| Whole sample | |||
| Time until completion | 0.001133 | 0.002953** | 0.002331 |
| Time until completion squared | −0.000016 | −0.000045** | −0.000044 |
| Control variables and fixed effect | Y | Y | Y |
| Optimum time until completion (days) | 32,072 | 29,619 | 23,948 |
| U-test (p-value) | – | – | – |
| U-test-implication | Monotone/U | Monotone/U | Monotone/U |
| Observations | 717 | 672 | 504 |
| R2 | 0.167 | 0.251 | 0.318 |
| Number of firms | 568 | 528 | 392 |
| Opaque targets | |||
| Time until completion | 0.002430 | 0.005606** | 0.004836 |
| Time until completion squared | −0.000046 | −0.000103* | −0.000078 |
| Control variables and fixed effect | Y | Y | Y |
| Optimum time until completion (days) | 23,711 | 24,375 | 27,992 |
| U-test (p-value) | – | – | – |
| U-test-implication | Monotone/U | Monotone/U | Monotone/U |
| Observations | 366 | 345 | 262 |
| R2 | 0.173 | 0.209 | 0.353 |
| Number of firms | 299 | 282 | 214 |
| Transparent targets | |||
| Time until completion | −0.000504 | −0.000455 | 0.000100 |
| Time until completion squared | 0.000017 | 0.000014 | 0.000008 |
| Control variables and fixed effect | Y | Y | Y |
| Optimum time until completion (days) | 13,579 | 14,547 | −5,748 |
| U-test (p-value) | – | – | – |
| U-test-implication | Monotone/U | Monotone/U | Monotone/U |
| Observations | 351 | 327 | 242 |
| R2 | 0.429 | 0.425 | 0.416 |
| Number of firms | 299 | 276 | 204 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Δ | One year | Two years | Five years |
| Time until completion | 0.001133 | 0.002953 | 0.002331 |
| Time until completion squared | −0.000016 | −0.000045** | −0.000044 |
| Control variables and fixed effect | Y | Y | Y |
| Optimum time until completion (days) | 32,072 | 29,619 | 23,948 |
| U-test ( | – | – | – |
| U-test-implication | Monotone/U | Monotone/U | Monotone/U |
| Observations | 717 | 672 | 504 |
| 0.167 | 0.251 | 0.318 | |
| Number of firms | 568 | 528 | 392 |
| Time until completion | 0.002430 | 0.005606 | 0.004836 |
| Time until completion squared | −0.000046 | −0.000103* | −0.000078 |
| Control variables and fixed effect | Y | Y | Y |
| Optimum time until completion (days) | 23,711 | 24,375 | 27,992 |
| U-test ( | – | – | – |
| U-test-implication | Monotone/U | Monotone/U | Monotone/U |
| Observations | 366 | 345 | 262 |
| 0.173 | 0.209 | 0.353 | |
| Number of firms | 299 | 282 | 214 |
| Time until completion | −0.000504 | −0.000455 | 0.000100 |
| Time until completion squared | 0.000017 | 0.000014 | 0.000008 |
| Control variables and fixed effect | Y | Y | Y |
| Optimum time until completion (days) | 13,579 | 14,547 | −5,748 |
| U-test ( | – | – | – |
| U-test-implication | Monotone/U | Monotone/U | Monotone/U |
| Observations | 351 | 327 | 242 |
| 0.429 | 0.425 | 0.416 | |
| Number of firms | 299 | 276 | 204 |
Notes:
Regressing our performance measure (change in return on assets) on time until deal completion and its squared term for different periods post-merger, the table is a combined test of the due diligence hypothesis and the overdue hypothesis. To test the role played by information asymmetry of the target, the sample is partitioned into opaque and transparent targets using Tobin’s Q of the target as a proxy for information asymmetry. Control variables include the national- and firm-level and deal-specific variables as explained in the appendix. Firm fixed effect is included in all models and the optimum time until deal completion and the results of the stringent test of quadratic relation, following Lind and Mehlum (2010) are also reported. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05
*p < 0.1
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