Moderators and their effect on the M–P relationship
| # | Moderator | Measurement | Effect | Findings significant | Study |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firm characteristics N = 32 | |||||
| 1 | attainment discrepancy | difference between firm aspirations and the firm's actual performance | positive | yes | Lin et al. (2011) |
| 2 | bank debt | sum of all bank loans divided by the MVF | negative | yes | O'Brien et al. (2014) |
| 3 | bond debt | sum of all bonds and long-term notes divided by the MVF | negative | yes | O'Brien et al. (2014) |
| 4 | firm age | natural logarithm of the number of years of operation since the firm's inception | positive | yes | Singla and George (2013) |
| 5 | firm size | total number of employees, logarithmized | positive | yes | Fisch (2012) |
| 6 | firm size | natural logarithm of total sales | positive | no | Singla and George (2013) |
| 7 | firm type | dummy variable | negative | yes | Fisch (2012) |
| 8 | high-discretion slack | current assets divided by current liabilities | positive | yes | Lin et al. (2011) |
| 9 | intangible assets in the field of R&D | ratio of expenses for R&D to total sales | negative | yes | Dittfeld (2017) |
| 10 | intangible assets in the field of marketing | ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total sales | positive | yes | Dittfeld (2017) |
| 11 | international asset dispersion | total number of countries in which a firm operates subsidiaries | negative | yes | Kirca et al. (2016) |
| 12 | international expansion | firm's relative increase in the spread of international operations (inverted Gini coefficient measure) | positive | yes | Fisch (2012) |
| 13 | leverage | total debt (bank loans plus bond debt) divided by the total MVF | negative | yes | O'Brien et al. (2014) |
| 14 | low-discretion slack | equity to debt ratio | positive | yes | Lin et al. (2011) |
| 15 | marketing advantages | selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA) stock | positive | yes | Li et al. (2011) |
| 16 | marketing capabilities | dummy variable | positive | yes | Sun et al. (2019) |
| 17 | technological advantages | patent count and R&D stock | positive | yes | Li et al. (2011) |
| 18 | primary industry | dummy variable | positive | yes | Borda et al. (2017) |
| 19 | industry life cycle | total sales growth in each industry to identify stage in the industry life cycle | positive | yes | Pangarkar and Yuan (2021) |
| Business group affiliation | |||||
| 20 | business group affiliation | dummy variable | negative | yes | Gaur and Kumar (2009) |
| business group affiliation | dummy variable | positive | yes | Singla and George (2013), Batsakis et al. (2018) | |
| 21 | business group affiliation (keiretsu membership) | dummy variable | positive | yes | Kim et al. (2004) |
| 22 | business group diversification | number of industries in which the business group affiliates participate | positive | yes | Borda et al. (2017) |
| Corporate governance | |||||
| 23 | CEO age | number of years from the date of birth | negative | yes | Hsu et al. (2013) |
| 24 | CEO duality | dummy variable | negative | yes | Hsu et al. (2013) |
| 25 | CEO educational level | categorical variable | positive | yes | Hsu et al. (2013) |
| 26 | CEO international experience | dummy variable | positive | yes | Hsu et al. (2013) |
| 27 | CEO tenure | number of years for which the firm's CEO has been in that position | negative | no | Hsu et al. (2013) |
| 28 | entrenchment effect | ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights | negative | yes | Tsao and Chen (2012) |
| 29 | family dominance in the TMT | dummy variable | negative | yes | Lu et al. (2015) |
| 30 | family firm | dummy variable | none | – | Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno (2012) |
| family firm | dummy variable | positive | yes | Tsao and Lien (2013) | |
| 31 | family ownership | percentage of common stock owned by family members | positive | yes | Tsao and Lien (2013) |
| 32 | firm's governance structure | Dummy variables | positive | yes | Xiao et al. (2013) |
| 33 | foreign ownership | share of foreign-owned paid-in capital over the total paid-in capital of the firm | Positive | Yes | Chen et al. (2015) |
| 34 | incentive alignment effect | cash flow rights level of the largest ultimate owner | positive | yes | Tsao and Chen (2012) |
| 35 | ownership structure | dummy variable | positive | yes | Gu et al. (2018) |
| 36 | state ownership | share of state-owned paid-in capital over the total paid-in capital of the firm | none | – | Chen et al. (2015) |
| 37 | TMT Experience | average number of years for which the TMT members have worked in a particular industry | positive | yes | Singh et al. (2010) |
| Home-country context N = 15 | |||||
| 38 | cluster presence | dummy variable | none | – | Upadhyayula et al. (2017) |
| 39 | degree of centralized government control | scale ranging from 1 to 10 | positive | yes | Xiao et al. (2013) |
| 40 | degree of home-region orientation | magnitude of foreign export sales realized in Asia-Pacific | positive | yes | Lee (2013) |
| 41 | difference in growth rate | [(Global industry growth rate)] − [(Home country industry growth rate)] | negative | yes | Elango (2012) |
| 42 | home country governance | mean average score of 6 governance items | positive | yes | Elango (2006) |
| 43 | home country legal institutions | dummy variables | positive | yes | Li and Yue (2008) |
| 44 | home country political stability | Index | positive | yes | Tan and Chintakananda (2016) |
| 45 | home country political risk | Index | positive | yes | Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2018) |
| 46 | home country corruption | Index | positive | yes | Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2018) |
| 47 | home country regulatory effectiveness | combination of four indices | positive | yes | Tan and Chintakananda (2016) |
| 48 | normative institutional distance | Index | positive | yes | Chao and Kumar (2010) |
| normative institutional distance | Index | positive | yes | Chao et al. (2012) | |
| 49 | regulative institutional distance | Index | negative | yes | Chao and Kumar (2010) |
| regulative institutional distance | Index | negative | yes | Chao et al. (2012)) | |
| 50 | industrial diversification | entropy measure | none | – | Wan (1998) |
| 51 | quality certification | dummy variable | positive | yes | Upadhyayula et al. (2017) |
| 52 | trade liberalization | seven related variables, extracted from databases | negative | yes | Banalieva and Sarathy (2011) |
| Strategy N = 36 | |||||
| 53 | acquired shares | the percentage share of total equity of the target company that the acquirer has proposed to acquire | negative | yes | Batsakis et al. (2018) |
| 54 | advertising intensity | firm's proprietary marketing assets | positive | yes | Kirca et al. (2016) |
| 55 | advertising intensity | advertising expenditure divided by sales | positive | yes | Lu and Beamish (2004) |
| 56 | board activeness | ordinal variable indicating the frequency of board meetings each year | positive | yes | Lu et al. (2015) |
| 57 | board independence | number of independent directors | positive | yes | Lu et al. (2015) |
| 58 | cost efficiency | ratio of total sales divided by cost of sales | negative | yes | Pattnaik and Elango (2009) |
| 59 | duration of internationalization | number of years since the firm conducted its first cross-border sales | positive | yes | Abdi and Aulakh (2018) |
| 60 | entry mode | dummy variable | none | – | Jain and Prakash (2016) |
| 61 | export intensity | percent of parent firm sales that were derived from export revenues | negative | yes | Lu and Beamish (2001) |
| 62 | firm-specific assets | the ratio of a studio's budget for blockbuster productions to its total production budget in a year | positive | yes | Tashman et al. (2019) |
| 63 | internationalization motives | dummy variable | positive | yes | Jain and Prakash (2016) |
| 64 | intrafirm trade | 1 − [absolute value of (exports − imports)/(exports + imports) | positive | yes | Elango (2012) |
| 65 | investments | quotient between capital expenditures and total sales | negative | no | Dittfeld (2017) |
| 66 | knowledge integration | 7 items in the survey using a 5-point Likert scale | positive | yes | Zahra et al. (2000) |
| 67 | marketing intensity | annual advertising expenditure divided by sales | positive | no | Kotabe et al. (2002) |
| marketing intensity | marketing expenditures divided by sales | negative | yes | Pattnaik and Elango (2009) | |
| 68 | marketing resources | logarithm of (advertisement cost to number of employees) | positive | yes | Chen et al. (2014) |
| 69 | R&D intensity | parent firm's R&D spending as a percentage of its sales | none | – | Berry and Kaul (2016) |
| 70 | R&D intensity | firms' unique technological assets | positive | yes | Kirca et al. (2016) |
| 71 | R&D intensity | R&D expenditure divided by sales | negative | no | Kotabe et al. (2002) |
| R&D intensity | R&D expenditures divided by sales | positive | yes | Lu and Beamish (2004), Bae et al. (2008) | |
| 72 | real options awareness | dummy variable | positive | yes | Ioulianou et al. (2021) |
| 73 | region-specific marketization | marketization index for Chinese regions developed by Fan et al. (2011) | positive | yes | Chen et al. (2015) |
| 74 | research intensity | research expenditures divided by sales | none | – | Pattnaik and Elango (2009) |
| 75 | scale of operations | natural logarithm of the firm’s annual sales | positive | yes | Abdi and Aulakh (2018) |
| 76 | technological resources | ratio of R&D cost to annual sales revenue | positive | yes | Chen et al. (2014) |
| Location strategies | |||||
| 77 | geographic distance | mean distance between a firm's HQ and its foreign subsidiaries | negative | yes | Fisch (2012) |
| 78 | geographic distance | location data, where each firm reports up to three country export destinations | negative | no | Thomas (2006) |
| 79 | location choice | dummy variable | positive | yes | Gu et al. (2018) |
| Product diversification | |||||
| 80 | overall effect of product diversification (related and unrelated) | not specified | positive | no | Chang and Wang (2007) |
| 81 | product diversification | entropy measure | positive | yes | Hitt et al. (1997), Hsu (2006) |
| 82 | product diversification | Herfindahl type index | positive | no | Oh and Contractor (2012) |
| 83 | product diversification | entropy index | negative | yes | Oh et al. (2015) |
| 84 | related product diversification | entropy index; weighted average of the firm's degree of diversification within related business segments | positive | yes | Chang and Wang (2007) |
| 85 | related product diversification | dummy variable | positive | yes | Chen et al. (2014) |
| 86 | unrelated product diversification | entropy index; weighted average of the firm's degree of diversification within unrelated business segments | negative | yes | Chang and Wang (2007) |
| 87 | unrelated product diversification | dummy variable | negative | yes | Chen et al. (2014) |
| Cultural diversity | |||||
| 88 | cultural diversity | cultural distance index | negative | yes | de Jong and van Houten (2014), Fisch (2012) |
| 89 | computer-mediated communication | 5-point Likert scale | positive | yes | Andersen and Foss (2005) |
| 90 | IT investment | IT investment made in 1997 divided by number of employees | positive | yes | Chari et al. (2007) |
| # | Moderator | Measurement | Effect | Findings significant | Study |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | attainment discrepancy | difference between firm aspirations and the firm's actual performance | positive | yes | |
| 2 | bank debt | sum of all bank loans divided by the MVF | negative | yes | |
| 3 | bond debt | sum of all bonds and long-term notes divided by the MVF | negative | yes | |
| 4 | firm age | natural logarithm of the number of years of operation since the firm's inception | positive | yes | |
| 5 | firm size | total number of employees, logarithmized | positive | yes | |
| 6 | firm size | natural logarithm of total sales | positive | no | |
| 7 | firm type | dummy variable | negative | yes | |
| 8 | high-discretion slack | current assets divided by current liabilities | positive | yes | |
| 9 | intangible assets in the field of R&D | ratio of expenses for R&D to total sales | negative | yes | |
| 10 | intangible assets in the field of marketing | ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total sales | positive | yes | |
| 11 | international asset dispersion | total number of countries in which a firm operates subsidiaries | negative | yes | |
| 12 | international expansion | firm's relative increase in the spread of international operations (inverted Gini coefficient measure) | positive | yes | |
| 13 | leverage | total debt (bank loans plus bond debt) divided by the total MVF | negative | yes | |
| 14 | low-discretion slack | equity to debt ratio | positive | yes | |
| 15 | marketing advantages | selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA) stock | positive | yes | |
| 16 | marketing capabilities | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 17 | technological advantages | patent count and R&D stock | positive | yes | |
| 18 | primary industry | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 19 | industry life cycle | total sales growth in each industry to identify stage in the industry life cycle | positive | yes | |
| 20 | business group affiliation | dummy variable | negative | yes | |
| business group affiliation | dummy variable | positive | yes | ||
| 21 | business group affiliation (keiretsu membership) | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 22 | business group diversification | number of industries in which the business group affiliates participate | positive | yes | |
| 23 | CEO age | number of years from the date of birth | negative | yes | |
| 24 | CEO duality | dummy variable | negative | yes | |
| 25 | CEO educational level | categorical variable | positive | yes | |
| 26 | CEO international experience | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 27 | CEO tenure | number of years for which the firm's CEO has been in that position | negative | no | |
| 28 | entrenchment effect | ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights | negative | yes | |
| 29 | family dominance in the TMT | dummy variable | negative | yes | |
| 30 | family firm | dummy variable | none | – | |
| family firm | dummy variable | positive | yes | ||
| 31 | family ownership | percentage of common stock owned by family members | positive | yes | |
| 32 | firm's governance structure | Dummy variables | positive | yes | |
| 33 | foreign ownership | share of foreign-owned paid-in capital over the total paid-in capital of the firm | Positive | Yes | |
| 34 | incentive alignment effect | cash flow rights level of the largest ultimate owner | positive | yes | |
| 35 | ownership structure | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 36 | state ownership | share of state-owned paid-in capital over the total paid-in capital of the firm | none | – | |
| 37 | TMT Experience | average number of years for which the TMT members have worked in a particular industry | positive | yes | |
| 38 | cluster presence | dummy variable | none | – | |
| 39 | degree of centralized government control | scale ranging from 1 to 10 | positive | yes | |
| 40 | degree of home-region orientation | magnitude of foreign export sales realized in Asia-Pacific | positive | yes | |
| 41 | difference in growth rate | [(Global industry growth rate)] − [(Home country industry growth rate)] | negative | yes | |
| 42 | home country governance | mean average score of 6 governance items | positive | yes | |
| 43 | home country legal institutions | dummy variables | positive | yes | |
| 44 | home country political stability | Index | positive | yes | |
| 45 | home country political risk | Index | positive | yes | |
| 46 | home country corruption | Index | positive | yes | |
| 47 | home country regulatory effectiveness | combination of four indices | positive | yes | |
| 48 | normative institutional distance | Index | positive | yes | |
| normative institutional distance | Index | positive | yes | ||
| 49 | regulative institutional distance | Index | negative | yes | |
| regulative institutional distance | Index | negative | yes | ||
| 50 | industrial diversification | entropy measure | none | – | |
| 51 | quality certification | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 52 | trade liberalization | seven related variables, extracted from databases | negative | yes | |
| 53 | acquired shares | the percentage share of total equity of the target company that the acquirer has proposed to acquire | negative | yes | |
| 54 | advertising intensity | firm's proprietary marketing assets | positive | yes | |
| 55 | advertising intensity | advertising expenditure divided by sales | positive | yes | |
| 56 | board activeness | ordinal variable indicating the frequency of board meetings each year | positive | yes | |
| 57 | board independence | number of independent directors | positive | yes | |
| 58 | cost efficiency | ratio of total sales divided by cost of sales | negative | yes | |
| 59 | duration of internationalization | number of years since the firm conducted its first cross-border sales | positive | yes | |
| 60 | entry mode | dummy variable | none | – | |
| 61 | export intensity | percent of parent firm sales that were derived from export revenues | negative | yes | |
| 62 | firm-specific assets | the ratio of a studio's budget for blockbuster productions to its total production budget in a year | positive | yes | |
| 63 | internationalization motives | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 64 | intrafirm trade | 1 − [absolute value of (exports − imports)/(exports + imports) | positive | yes | |
| 65 | investments | quotient between capital expenditures and total sales | negative | no | |
| 66 | knowledge integration | 7 items in the survey using a 5-point Likert scale | positive | yes | |
| 67 | marketing intensity | annual advertising expenditure divided by sales | positive | no | |
| marketing intensity | marketing expenditures divided by sales | negative | yes | ||
| 68 | marketing resources | logarithm of (advertisement cost to number of employees) | positive | yes | |
| 69 | R&D intensity | parent firm's R&D spending as a percentage of its sales | none | – | |
| 70 | R&D intensity | firms' unique technological assets | positive | yes | |
| 71 | R&D intensity | R&D expenditure divided by sales | negative | no | |
| R&D intensity | R&D expenditures divided by sales | positive | yes | ||
| 72 | real options awareness | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 73 | region-specific marketization | marketization index for Chinese regions developed by Fan | positive | yes | |
| 74 | research intensity | research expenditures divided by sales | none | – | |
| 75 | scale of operations | natural logarithm of the firm’s annual sales | positive | yes | |
| 76 | technological resources | ratio of R&D cost to annual sales revenue | positive | yes | |
| 77 | geographic distance | mean distance between a firm's HQ and its foreign subsidiaries | negative | yes | |
| 78 | geographic distance | location data, where each firm reports up to three country export destinations | negative | no | |
| 79 | location choice | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 80 | overall effect of product diversification (related and unrelated) | not specified | positive | no | |
| 81 | product diversification | entropy measure | positive | yes | |
| 82 | product diversification | Herfindahl type index | positive | no | |
| 83 | product diversification | entropy index | negative | yes | |
| 84 | related product diversification | entropy index; weighted average of the firm's degree of diversification within related business segments | positive | yes | |
| 85 | related product diversification | dummy variable | positive | yes | |
| 86 | unrelated product diversification | entropy index; weighted average of the firm's degree of diversification within unrelated business segments | negative | yes | |
| 87 | unrelated product diversification | dummy variable | negative | yes | |
| 88 | cultural diversity | cultural distance index | negative | yes | |
| 89 | computer-mediated communication | 5-point Likert scale | positive | yes | |
| 90 | IT investment | IT investment made in 1997 divided by number of employees | positive | yes | |
Notes: The coding of the effect (positive, negative or none) is based on the claims made by the authors in the respective paper, even though they sometimes reported insignificant results
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