Table 5. Multiple regression results for...

Table 5.

Multiple regression results for categories of voluntary disclosure

General and strategic information category
Independent variables	β	t-value	VIF	No. of obs.
Constant		−1.457
Board size	0.253	2.696***	1.021	109
CEO duality	0.422	4.565***	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	0.032	0.378	1.274	109
Auditor type	−0.192	−1.992**	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.321	3.708***	1.084	105
Leverage	0.040	0.449	1.043	107
Profitability	−0.00	−0.356	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.276
F-value	6.46
Significance	0.000***
Financial information category
Constant		0.454
Board size	0.210	2.209**	1.021	109
CEO duality	0.159	1.700*	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	−0.145	−1.689*	1.274	109
Auditor type	0.296	3.035***	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.236	2.690***	1.084	105
Leverage	−0.139	−1.549	1.043	107
Profitability	−0.041	−0.488	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.324
F-value	7.85
Significance	0.000***
Forward-looking information category
Constant		−1.311
Board size	0.150	1.481	1.021	109
CEO duality	−0.166	−1.668*	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	0.089	0.977	1.274	109
Auditor type	0.187	1.792*	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.371	3.969***	1.084	105
Leverage	−0.182	−1.891*	1.043	107
Profitability	−0.113	−1.251	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.063
F-value	1.97
Significance	0.068
Social and board information category
Constant		−1.452
Board size	0.574	6.413***	1.021	109
CEO duality	0.218	2.478**	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	−0.025	−0.306	1.274	109
Auditor type	−0.039	−0.419	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.060	0.725	1.084	105
Leverage	−0.061	−0.713	1.043	107
Profitability	0.023	0.284	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.481
F-value	14.23
Significance	0.000***

General and strategic information category
Independent variables	β	t-value	VIF	No. of obs.
Constant		−1.457
Board size	0.253	2.696***	1.021	109
CEO duality	0.422	4.565***	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	0.032	0.378	1.274	109
Auditor type	−0.192	−1.992**	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.321	3.708***	1.084	105
Leverage	0.040	0.449	1.043	107
Profitability	−0.00	−0.356	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.276
F-value	6.46
Significance	0.000***
Financial information category
Constant		0.454
Board size	0.210	2.209**	1.021	109
CEO duality	0.159	1.700*	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	−0.145	−1.689*	1.274	109
Auditor type	0.296	3.035***	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.236	2.690***	1.084	105
Leverage	−0.139	−1.549	1.043	107
Profitability	−0.041	−0.488	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.324
F-value	7.85
Significance	0.000***
Forward-looking information category
Constant		−1.311
Board size	0.150	1.481	1.021	109
CEO duality	−0.166	−1.668*	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	0.089	0.977	1.274	109
Auditor type	0.187	1.792*	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.371	3.969***	1.084	105
Leverage	−0.182	−1.891*	1.043	107
Profitability	−0.113	−1.251	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.063
F-value	1.97
Significance	0.068
Social and board information category
Constant		−1.452
Board size	0.574	6.413***	1.021	109
CEO duality	0.218	2.478**	1.348	109
Proportion of NEDs	−0.025	−0.306	1.274	109
Auditor type	−0.039	−0.419	1.236	109
Control variables
Firm size	0.060	0.725	1.084	105
Leverage	−0.061	−0.713	1.043	107
Profitability	0.023	0.284	1.146	107
Model summary
Adjusted R²	0.481
F-value	14.23
Significance	0.000***

Notes:

Table 5 presents the analysis of the variables of corporate governance and control variables of firm-specific characteristics with respect to the dependent variables, Gen&StrgInf, FinData, FwdLkInfo and Soc&BdDisc. respectively, using OLS regression with corresponding variance inflation factors. Significance is denoted at the

***0.01,

**0.05 and

*0.10 levels, respectively. The number of observations (N) for all the categories of VDScore is 101

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