Pooled-OLS panel regression of COE on corporate governance
| COE | Coef. | SE | t-value | p-value | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BOWNS | −0.001 | 0.004 | −0.29 | 0.768 | |
| IOWN | −0.008 | 0.011 | −0.73 | 0.465 | |
| NED | 0.221 | 0.181 | 1.22 | 0.223 | |
| INED | 0.274 | 0.234 | 1.17 | 0.240 | |
| BDS | −0.181 | 0.385 | −0.47 | 0.639 | |
| FMD | 0.491 | 0.196 | 2.50 | 0.012 | ** |
| DUALITY | 0.219 | 0.464 | 0.47 | 0.637 | |
| TENURE | −1.045 | 0.072 | −14.53 | 0.000 | *** |
| LEV | 0.002 | 0.010 | 0.24 | 0.808 | |
| LNTA | −0.138 | 0.179 | −0.77 | 0.441 | |
| _cons | 0.078 | 0.316 | 0.25 | 0.806 | |
| Mean dependent var | −0.046 | SD dependent var | 2.478 | ||
| Overall r-squared | 0.747 | Number of obs | 107.000 | ||
| Chi-square | 558.687 | Prob>χ2 | 0.000 | ||
| R-squared within | 0.757 | R-squared between | 0.454 | ||
| COE | Coef. | SE | Sig. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BOWNS | −0.001 | 0.004 | −0.29 | 0.768 | |
| IOWN | −0.008 | 0.011 | −0.73 | 0.465 | |
| NED | 0.221 | 0.181 | 1.22 | 0.223 | |
| INED | 0.274 | 0.234 | 1.17 | 0.240 | |
| BDS | −0.181 | 0.385 | −0.47 | 0.639 | |
| FMD | 0.491 | 0.196 | 2.50 | 0.012 | ** |
| DUALITY | 0.219 | 0.464 | 0.47 | 0.637 | |
| TENURE | −1.045 | 0.072 | −14.53 | 0.000 | *** |
| LEV | 0.002 | 0.010 | 0.24 | 0.808 | |
| LNTA | −0.138 | 0.179 | −0.77 | 0.441 | |
| _cons | 0.078 | 0.316 | 0.25 | 0.806 | |
| Mean dependent var | −0.046 | SD dependent var | 2.478 | ||
| Overall | 0.747 | Number of obs | 107.000 | ||
| Chi-square | 558.687 | Prob> | 0.000 | ||
| 0.757 | 0.454 | ||||
Notes: COE, cost of equity; BOWNS, block ownership; IOWNS, inside ownership; NED, non-executive directors; INED, independent non-executive directors; BDS, board size; FMD, female directors; DUA, CEO duality; CEO TEN, CEO tenure; LEV, leverage, LNTA, LOG of total assets. **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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