Table 2 Summary of the links between... | Emerald Publishing

Table 2

Summary of the links between theoretical arguments and research findings obtained using the composite sequence analysis methodology

Theoretical argument	Sequence of analysis	Position–practice	Political accountability
Argument 1 If external structures change but internal structures are free to remain the same as before, the strong structuration outcome entails no change or a purely ceremonial change of political accountability	Sequence 1. Up to the 2007 Act	Taken for granted external and internal structures Trust between agents-in-focus and local entrepreneurs is questionable	Political accountability is stable
Argument 2 If external structures change and internal ones are forced to adapt to the change in external structure, the strong structuration outcome leads to unstable political accountability	Sequence 2. Designing the first competitive tendering	Agents-in-focus face changes of external structures and must internally implement them Internal structures are weak Positioning among agents-in-focus is problematic Trust between agents-in-focus and the general public is under challenge from social media	Political accountability becomes unstable: the general public is more attentive to what has happened
Argument 3 If no new changes occur in external structures but the internal structure changes, the strong structuration outcome leads to stabilised political accountability	Sequence 3Sub-sequence 1	Agents-in-focus invite other agents to cooperate Agents-in-focus stabilise and strengthen their internal structures (using accounting and managerial performance metrics) External structures are now more familiar Trust between agents-in-focus and the general public is improving but weak Irresistible regulation obliges to change competitive tendering from national to international position–practice Managers- and politicians-in-focus can now fully trust each other but still face challenges in minimising costs and controlling the performance of outsourced services	Political accountability gradually stabilises: politicians feel safe as public officials regain control of the outsourcing process

	Sub-sequence 2		Politicians feel safer as public officials gain control of the outsourcing process
Follow-up of argument 3 If internal structures change but external structures remain stable, structuration outcome lead to a stabilised political accountability	Sequence 4Learning from previous errors to work better		Both politicians and public officials have good understanding of accountability in relation to managing outsourced services at lower costs

Theoretical argument	Sequence of analysis	Position–practice	Political accountability
Argument 1 If external structures change but internal structures are free to remain the same as before, the strong structuration outcome entails no change or a purely ceremonial change of political accountability	Sequence 1. Up to the 2007 Act	Taken for granted external and internal structures Trust between agents-in-focus and local entrepreneurs is questionable	Political accountability is stable
Argument 2 If external structures change and internal ones are forced to adapt to the change in external structure, the strong structuration outcome leads to unstable political accountability	Sequence 2. Designing the first competitive tendering	Agents-in-focus face changes of external structures and must internally implement them Internal structures are weak Positioning among agents-in-focus is problematic Trust between agents-in-focus and the general public is under challenge from social media	Political accountability becomes unstable: the general public is more attentive to what has happened
Argument 3 If no new changes occur in external structures but the internal structure changes, the strong structuration outcome leads to stabilised political accountability	Sequence 3Sub-sequence 1	Agents-in-focus invite other agents to cooperate Agents-in-focus stabilise and strengthen their internal structures (using accounting and managerial performance metrics) External structures are now more familiar Trust between agents-in-focus and the general public is improving but weak Irresistible regulation obliges to change competitive tendering from national to international position–practiceManagers- and politicians-in-focus can now fully trust each other but still face challenges in minimising costs and controlling the performance of outsourced services	Political accountability gradually stabilises: politicians feel safe as public officials regain control of the outsourcing process

	Sub-sequence 2		Politicians feel safer as public officials gain control of the outsourcing process
Follow-up of argument 3 If internal structures change but external structures remain stable, structuration outcome lead to a stabilised political accountability	Sequence 4Learning from previous errors to work better		Both politicians and public officials have good understanding of accountability in relation to managing outsourced services at lower costs