Table 3

Political uncertainty and asymmetry of operating costs

Exp. sign(1)(2)
ΔlnSALEt+0.995*** (144.039)0.987*** (76.564)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt−0.042*** (−5.178)−0.102*** (−4.285)
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVERt  −0.007 (−1.531)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVERt −0.028*** (−2.761)
ΔlnSALEt×GDPt  0.136* (1.815)
ΔlnSALEt×UNEMPt  −0.063 (−0.740)
ΔlnSALEt×lnANITt  0.005 (1.261)
ΔlnSALEt×lnEMPINTt  0.001 (0.476)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×GDPt −0.551** (−2.380)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×UNEMPt+ 0.938* (1.716)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×lnANITt −0.025*** (−3.379)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×lnEMPINTt −0.038*** (−7.275)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×LAGDt+ 0.044*** (4.808)
Intercept 0.004*** (5.368)0.004*** (5.493)
Year fixed effect YesYes
Firm fixed effect YesYes
Observations 20,39220,392
Adjusted R2 0.8570.778

Note(s): This table presents the results of testing the impact of political uncertainty on the asymmetric behavior of operating costs. The dependent variable is ΔlnXOPR, the log-change in deflated operating costs. Column (1) presents the basic results of testing the presence of cost stickiness. Column (2) adds the key variable, prefecture-city official turnover TURNOVER, into the analysis. TURNOVER is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if either the city head or mayor is changed in year t, and zero otherwise. ΔlnSALE is the log-change in deflated sales. D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if sales decrease, and zero otherwise. Control variables include firm characteristics and local economic factors. All variables are defined in the Table A1. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. In this table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively

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