Political uncertainty and asymmetry of operating costs: instrumental variable approach
| Variable | First stage | Second stage | |
|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
| Panel A: Turnover of city heads | |||
| −0.979*** (−17.283) | |||
| 0.278*** (22.007) | |||
| −1.299*** (−22.749) | |||
| 0.204*** (15.846) | |||
| 4.274*** (18.819) | −0.004 (−0.521) | 0.969*** (44.108) | |
| −0.015 (−0.365) | 5.579*** (24.336) | −0.077*** (−3.509) | |
| −0.025 (−0.725) | |||
| −0.188*** (−3.522) | |||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.311 | 0.315 | 0.735 |
| Panel B: Turnover of city mayors | |||
| −0.979*** (−18.895) | |||
| 0.162*** (12.606) | |||
| −1.197*** (−22.012) | |||
| 0.097*** (7.391) | |||
| 4.283*** (20.729) | 0.000 (0.043) | 0.978*** (62.703) | |
| −0.025 (−0.585) | 5.156*** (23.642) | −0.093*** (−2.652) | |
| 0.011 (0.411) | |||
| −0.106** (−2.336) | |||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.296 | 0.311 | 0.680 |
| Variable | First stage | Second stage | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.274*** (18.819) | −0.004 (−0.521) | 0.969*** (44.108) | |
| −0.015 (−0.365) | 5.579*** (24.336) | −0.077*** (−3.509) | |
| −0.025 (−0.725) | |||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.311 | 0.315 | 0.735 |
| 4.283*** (20.729) | 0.000 (0.043) | 0.978*** (62.703) | |
| −0.025 (−0.585) | 5.156*** (23.642) | −0.093*** (−2.652) | |
| 0.011 (0.411) | |||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.296 | 0.311 | 0.680 |
Note(s): This table presents the results of 2SLS regressions. We use local officials' age () and the mean value of official turnover of other cities in the same province () as instrumental variables for local official turnover. In the first stage, we regress endogenous variables and on , , and control variables used in the baseline model. In the second stage, we replace and by their predicted values from the first stage and re-run the baseline regression. Panel A reports the estimation results based on the turnover of city heads and Panel B reports the estimation results based on the turnover of city mayors. The subscript denotes the time index, while prefecture-city and firm indices are omitted for brevity. The dependent variable is , the log-change in operating costs. is the log-change in sales. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if sales decrease, and zero otherwise. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the city head is changed in year , and zero otherwise. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the city mayor is changed in year , and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in the Table A1. Regressions control for both firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. In this table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
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