Robustness checks
| Panel A: Alternative subsamples | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre anti-corruption campaign | Post anti-corruption campaign | Excluding election years | Matched sample analysis | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| 1.005*** (59.382) | 1.040*** (46.898) | 0.991*** (68.681) | 0.979*** (76.840) | |
| −0.032*** (−2.773) | −0.208*** (−4.698) | −0.094*** (−3.397) | −0.120*** (−4.211) | |
| −0.018*** (−2.782) | 0.005 (0.777) | −0.005 (−0.940) | −0.004 (−0.736) | |
| −0.020** (−2.148) | −0.037*** (−2.563) | −0.024** (−2.049) | −0.027** (−2.372) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 10,372 | 10,020 | 16,026 | 11,140 |
| Adjusted | 0.775 | 0.777 | 0.775 | 0.675 |
| Panel A: Alternative subsamples | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre anti-corruption campaign | Post anti-corruption campaign | Excluding election years | Matched sample analysis | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| 1.005*** (59.382) | 1.040*** (46.898) | 0.991*** (68.681) | 0.979*** (76.840) | |
| −0.032*** (−2.773) | −0.208*** (−4.698) | −0.094*** (−3.397) | −0.120*** (−4.211) | |
| −0.018*** (−2.782) | 0.005 (0.777) | −0.005 (−0.940) | −0.004 (−0.736) | |
| −0.020** (−2.148) | −0.037*** (−2.563) | −0.024** (−2.049) | −0.027** (−2.372) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 10,372 | 10,020 | 16,026 | 11,140 |
| Adjusted | 0.775 | 0.777 | 0.775 | 0.675 |
| Panel B: Alternative explanatory variables | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| 0.984*** (76.922) | 0.988*** (77.469) | 0.986*** (79.655) | |
| −0.104*** (−4.437) | −0.116*** (−4.980) | −0.117*** (−5.103) | |
| −0.006 (−1.214) | |||
| −0.034*** (−3.078) | |||
| −0.013** (−2.508) | |||
| −0.019* (−1.741) | |||
| −0.018*** (−2.695) | |||
| −0.035** (−2.474) | |||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.777 | 0.778 | 0.778 |
| Panel B: Alternative explanatory variables | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| 0.984*** (76.922) | 0.988*** (77.469) | 0.986*** (79.655) | |
| −0.104*** (−4.437) | −0.116*** (−4.980) | −0.117*** (−5.103) | |
| −0.006 (−1.214) | |||
| −0.013** (−2.508) | |||
| −0.018*** (−2.695) | |||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.777 | 0.778 | 0.778 |
| Panel C: Alternative dependent variables | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| 0.987*** (76.564) | 0.677*** (21.901) | 0.620*** (23.987) | 0.999*** (63.775) | |
| −0.102*** (−4.285) | −0.440*** (−5.646) | −0.115* (−1.722) | −0.024*** (−2.912) | |
| −0.007 (−1.531) | 0.003 (0.228) | −0.003 (−0.205) | −0.011** (−2.090) | |
| −0.028*** (−2.761) | −0.105*** (−4.468) | −0.038** (−2.176) | −0.015* (−1.830) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.778 | 0.235 | 0.032 | 0.766 |
| Panel C: Alternative dependent variables | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| 0.987*** (76.564) | 0.677*** (21.901) | 0.620*** (23.987) | 0.999*** (63.775) | |
| −0.102*** (−4.285) | −0.440*** (−5.646) | −0.115* (−1.722) | −0.024*** (−2.912) | |
| −0.007 (−1.531) | 0.003 (0.228) | −0.003 (−0.205) | −0.011** (−2.090) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 | 20,392 |
| Adjusted | 0.778 | 0.235 | 0.032 | 0.766 |
Note(s): This table presents the results of several robustness checks on the impact of political uncertainty on the asymmetric behavior of operating costs. In Panel A, we conduct a set of subsample analyses, including anti-corruption campaign effect, national election effect, and matched sample analysis. In Panel B, we test the impact of political uncertainty on asymmetric behavior of operating costs in terms of alternative specifications of political turnover. In Panel C, we test the baseline results in terms of alternative dependent variables. The subscript denotes the time index, while prefecture-city and firm indices are omitted for brevity. is the log-change in sales. is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if sales decrease, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in the Table A1. Regressions control for both firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. In this table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
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