Table 6

Robustness checks

Panel A: Alternative subsamples
Pre anti-corruption campaignPost anti-corruption campaignExcluding election yearsMatched sample analysis
(1)(2)(3)(4)
ΔlnSALEt1.005*** (59.382)1.040*** (46.898)0.991*** (68.681)0.979*** (76.840)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt−0.032*** (−2.773)−0.208*** (−4.698)−0.094*** (−3.397)−0.120*** (−4.211)
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVERt−0.018*** (−2.782)0.005 (0.777)−0.005 (−0.940)−0.004 (−0.736)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVERt−0.020** (−2.148)−0.037*** (−2.563)−0.024** (−2.049)−0.027** (−2.372)
ControlYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectYesYesYesYes
Firm fixed effectYesYesYesYes
Observations10,37210,02016,02611,140
Adjusted R20.7750.7770.7750.675
Panel B: Alternative explanatory variables
TURNOVER_HEADTURNOVER_MAYORTURNOVER_BOTH
(1)(2)(3)
ΔlnSALEt0.984*** (76.922)0.988*** (77.469)0.986*** (79.655)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt−0.104*** (−4.437)−0.116*** (−4.980)−0.117*** (−5.103)
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVER_HEADt−0.006 (−1.214)  
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVER_HEADt−0.034*** (−3.078)  
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVER_MAYORt −0.013** (−2.508) 
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVER_MAYORt −0.019* (−1.741) 
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVER_BOTHt  −0.018*** (−2.695)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVER_BOTHt  −0.035** (−2.474)
ControlYesYesYes
Year fixed effectYesYesYes
Firm fixed effectYesYesYes
Observations20,39220,39220,392
Adjusted R20.7770.7780.778
Panel C: Alternative dependent variables
Dependent variable
ΔXOPRtΔlnSG&AtΔlnR&DtΔlnCOGSt
(1)(2)(3)(4)
ΔlnSALEt0.987*** (76.564)0.677*** (21.901)0.620*** (23.987)0.999*** (63.775)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt−0.102*** (−4.285)−0.440*** (−5.646)−0.115* (−1.722)−0.024*** (−2.912)
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVERt−0.007 (−1.531)0.003 (0.228)−0.003 (−0.205)−0.011** (−2.090)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVERt−0.028*** (−2.761)−0.105*** (−4.468)−0.038** (−2.176)−0.015* (−1.830)
ControlYesYesYesYes
Year fixed effectYesYesYesYes
Firm fixed effectYesYesYesYes
Observations20,39220,39220,39220,392
Adjusted R20.7780.2350.0320.766

Note(s): This table presents the results of several robustness checks on the impact of political uncertainty on the asymmetric behavior of operating costs. In Panel A, we conduct a set of subsample analyses, including anti-corruption campaign effect, national election effect, and matched sample analysis. In Panel B, we test the impact of political uncertainty on asymmetric behavior of operating costs in terms of alternative specifications of political turnover. In Panel C, we test the baseline results in terms of alternative dependent variables. The subscript t denotes the time index, while prefecture-city and firm indices are omitted for brevity. ΔlnSALE is the log-change in sales. D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if sales decrease, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in the Table A1. Regressions control for both firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. In this table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively

or Create an Account

Close Modal
Close Modal