Table 8

Ownership structure: SOE vs POEs

Full sampleBy ownership
SOEsPOEs
(1)(2)(3)
ΔlnSALEt0.984*** (70.628)0.980*** (68.533)0.992*** (62.695)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt−0.085*** (−3.473)−0.067* (−1.876)−0.117*** (−3.434)
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVERt−0.000 (−0.725)−0.014** (−2.057)−0.002 (−0.245)
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVERt−0.050*** (−3.555)−0.004** (−2.272)−0.039*** (−2.718)
ΔlnSALEt×SOEt0.009 (1.394)  
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×SOEt−0.030** (−2.208)  
ΔlnSALEt×TURNOVERt×SOEt−0.015 (−1.615)  
ΔlnSALEt×Dt×TURNOVERt×SOEt0.046** (2.275)  
ControlYesYesYes
Year fixed effectYesYesYes
Firm fixed effectYesYesYes
Observations20,3929,97110,421
Adjusted R20.7280.6880.683

Note(s): This table presents the results of testing the impact of firm ownership on the relation between political uncertainty and asymmetric behavior of operating costs. The subscript t denotes the time index, while prefecture-city and firm indices are omitted for brevity. The dependent variable is ΔlnXOPR, the log-change in operating costs. Column (1) adds the key variable SOE. SOE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a state-owned enterprise and zero otherwise. Columns (2) and (3) report the results on the subsample of SOEs and the subsample of POEs, respectively. ΔlnSALE is the log-change in sales. D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if sales decrease, and zero otherwise. TURNOVER is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if either the city head or mayor is changed in year t, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in the Table A1. Regressions control for both firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. In this table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively

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