Table 10 Channel test one: turnover...

Table 10

Channel test one: turnover types

	(1)	(2)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t}$	0.986*** (73.158)	0.987*** (73.495)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times D_{t}$	−0.101*** (−4.196)	−0.103*** (−4.310)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times T U R N O V E R_{t}$	−0.016* (−1.631)	−0.010 (−1.309)
$Δ lnSAL E_{t} \times D_{t} \times TURNOVE R_{t}$	−0.016*** (−3.304)	−0.034** (−1.982)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times T U R N O V E R_{t} \times E X T E R N A L_{t}$	0.011 (1.030)
$Δ lnSAL E_{t} \times D_{t} \times TURNOVE R_{t} \times EXTERNA L_{t}$	−0.025*** (−3.163)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times T U R N O V E R_{t} \times U N E X P E C T E D_{t}$		0.004 (1.505)
$Δ lnSAL E_{t} \times D_{t} \times TURNOVE R_{t} \times UNEXPECTE D_{t}$		−0.021** (−3.023)*
Control	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,392	20,392
Adjusted $R^{2}$	0.754	0.777

	(1)	(2)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t}$	0.986*** (73.158)	0.987*** (73.495)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times D_{t}$	−0.101*** (−4.196)	−0.103*** (−4.310)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times T U R N O V E R_{t}$	−0.016* (−1.631)	−0.010 (−1.309)
$Δ lnSAL E_{t} \times D_{t} \times TURNOVE R_{t}$	−0.016*** (−3.304)	−0.034** (−1.982)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times T U R N O V E R_{t} \times E X T E R N A L_{t}$	0.011 (1.030)
$Δ lnSAL E_{t} \times D_{t} \times TURNOVE R_{t} \times EXTERNA L_{t}$	−0.025*** (−3.163)
$Δ l n S A L E_{t} \times T U R N O V E R_{t} \times U N E X P E C T E D_{t}$		0.004 (1.505)
$Δ lnSAL E_{t} \times D_{t} \times TURNOVE R_{t} \times UNEXPECTE D_{t}$		−0.021*** (−3.023)
Control	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,392	20,392
Adjusted $R^{2}$	0.754	0.777

Note(s): This table presents the results of comparing the effect of the change of government officials according to different types of turnover. Column (1) reports the estimation by distinguishing official turnover into the external appointment and local promotion. Column (2) reports the estimation by distinguishing official turnover into expected and unexpected. The subscript $t$ denotes the time index, while prefecture-city and firm indices are omitted for brevity. The dependent variable is $Δ l n X O P R$ ⁠, the log-change in operating costs. $Δ l n S A L E$ is the log-change in sales. $D$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if sales decrease, and zero otherwise. $E X T E R N A L$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an official is appointed from another city by a higher level of government, and zero otherwise. $U N E X P E C T E D$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an official severs the position for less than five years, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in the Table A1. Regressions control for both firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. In this table, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable